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A rapist not only violates a victim’s privacy and personal integrity, but
inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process.
The long-range effect upon the victim’s life and health is likely to be
irreparable; it is impossible to measure the harm which results. . . . Rape is not
a mere physical attack—it is destructive of the human personality.
1
–Chief Justice Burger
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every
heart. . . . [T]he human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance
disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to
unheralded search and seizure by the police.
2
–Justice Jackson
I. INTRODUCTION
I begin by echoing Chief Justice Burger’s conviction that the
profound harm suffered by the victim of a rape is immeasurable and
can be compared with few other violations of the human body,
personality, and spirit in its scope and magnitude.
Without
trivializing or diminishing the gravity of the injury imposed upon
victims of rape, or making any comparison in degree, I also share
Justice Jackson’s sentiment, expressed above, that the victims of
Fourth Amendment violations, whether through physical intrusions
of home, body, or effects, or through other more intangible assaults
on liberty, privacy, and dignity, also suffer significant harm. At a
basic conceptual level, in each context, one entity asserts a claim of
power over another, using that power to extract from the victim that
which it seeks to obtain.
This Article seeks to explore and develop a theoretical
relationship between rape law and Fourth Amendment search
doctrine in order to apply, by way of analogy, the insights and lessons
of the rape reform movement to the task of promoting a broader,

1

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 611–12 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
2
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more inclusive definition of the Fourth Amendment search. The
Article argues that the Court, in crafting its search doctrine, has
created a regime favoring law enforcement at the expense of
individual privacy and autonomy, much as traditional rape law was
well-disposed towards alleged perpetrators at the expense of victims.
At the outset of this Article, I wish to note my choice of the word
“victim” to connote one who has endured a rape as well as one who
has been the target of unlawful government surveillance. In the rape
context, I am aware of the debate surrounding the use of this label,
perhaps because the word “victim” is imbued with an aura of passivity
or helpless vulnerability, and perhaps because there is still some
residual shame (and blame) associated with victimhood in the sexual
4
abuse context. On the other hand, while some may find the use of
the word “victim” offensive in the search context—after all, it may be
hard for some to imagine many criminal defendants as victims
(especially those factually guilty defendants seeking to suppress the
5
evidence of their unlawful behavior uncovered by the surveillance) —
3

At least one other scholar has also recognized the benefit of turning to rape
law to inform consent doctrine in the Fourth Amendment realm. See Josephine Ross,
Blaming the Victim: ‘Consent’ Within the Fourth Amendment and Rape Law, 26 HARV. J. ON
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 (2010) (identifying the parallels between rape law and
Fourth Amendment consent doctrine and arguing that feminist theory should be
imported into Fourth Amendment law in order to promote a more realistic
conception of consent that takes into account the imbalance of power between
police and citizens, that does not equate consent with submission to authority, and
that focuses on individual autonomy). I would like to emphasize that, while I seek to
draw parallels between these two areas of law in the abstract, I am in no way equating
the atrocity of the crime of rape, or the devastation suffered by those who have
experienced this heinous crime, to government surveillance and the impact of such
surveillance on its subjects, and I am aware, of course, that the law of rape is a matter
of substantive criminal law, while the law of searches is a matter of criminal
procedure. Further, I also acknowledge the legitimate law enforcement purposes of
government surveillance in the interests of detecting and preventing crime, which, of
course, has no parallel in the discussion of rape. Nonetheless, in constructing a
framework for substantively defining the Fourth Amendment search, I look to the
law of rape, in both its substantive and procedural aspects, for guidance.
4
Sharon Lamb, Constructing the Victim: Popular Images and Lasting Labels, in NEW
VERSIONS OF VICTIMS: FEMINISTS STRUGGLE WITH THE CONCEPT 108, 118–19 (Sharon
Lamb ed., 1999) (“[T]he term survivor evokes . . . heroic adaptation. The new label
was the first suggestion that the victim was an active resister in her abuse, and that
whatever she did . . . she did this to ‘survive.’ . . . Why did victims resist being called
‘victims’? It is shameful to be a victim in our culture. No matter how much victims’
rights advocates and therapists have told victims that they are not to blame for their
abuse, that they did not provoke it, and that it had nothing to do with them, it is still
shameful to be a victim.”).
5
Ross, supra note 3, at 10 (“The public tends to view the victims of police
searches as unworthy of the “victim” label because they were caught with drugs or
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this is precisely the term used to describe those claiming an unlawful
6
search. For clarity and ease of description, as well as to engage the
analogy between these areas of law, I will use the term “victim” in
both contexts.
I was led to this analogy between the law of rape and the law
defining searches, which is the focus of this Article, by my
examination of, and dissatisfaction with, current Fourth Amendment
7
standing doctrine. In Rakas v. Illinois, the first in a set of three cases
that established the Supreme Court’s approach to standing, the
Court held that a defendant may seek suppression of evidence
discovered through an allegedly unlawful search only if she has a
8
“legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas” searched.
other contraband. This article aims to do for victims of searches what feminists have
done for victims of unwanted sexual touching. Certainly there are differences
between rape and police searches . . . but these differences do not require the law to
treat like elements as unalike.”). Professor Ross seeks to help “humanize the victims
of nonconsensual search and seizures” and encourages her readers to “grapple with
the antipathy they might normally accord to victims of Fourth Amendment violations
and consider how this response skews logic and fairness.” Id.
6
See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350–51 (1974) (“[T]his Court
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to one who was not the victim of the
unlawful search.”); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (“In order to
qualify as a ‘person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure’ one must have been
a victim of a search or seizure.”).
7
See Nadia Soree, The Demise of Fourth Amendment Standing: From Standing Room to
Center Orchestra, 8 NEV. L.J. 570 (2008) (providing analysis and critique of current
Fourth Amendment standing doctrine).
8
439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978). In reaching its holding, Rakas repudiated the
“legitimately on the premises” test of standing announced in Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960). Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142. In announcing the legitimate expectation
of privacy test as the proper test of standing, the Court also disapproved of the
concept of standing as a separate procedural inquiry, merging the standing inquiry
with the merits of the suppression hearing: “But we think the better analysis
forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined
concept of standing.” Id. at 139. I will continue to use the term “standing” to refer
to the ability of a given defendant to seek suppression of evidence, as a matter
independent from the ultimate resolution of the suppression hearing. Although the
Rakas opinion left open the possibility of a defendant’s ability to seek suppression on
the basis of a property or possessory interest in the item seized, the Court’s opinions
in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), and United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980), left no doubt that even such an interest in the item seized does not suffice to
permit a defendant the opportunity to press a Fourth Amendment claim based on an
allegedly unlawful search. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137 n.6. In Rawlings, although the
defendant admitted ownership, for suppression purposes, of the drugs found in his
companion’s purse, the Court denied him “standing” to challenge the search
because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse. Rawlings, 448 U.S.
at 105–06. Thus, the police conduct in searching the purse was simply never
examined at all.
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In other words, the Court adopted, although not entirely accurately,
the substantive test used to define a Fourth Amendment search,
9
derived from Katz v. United States, as the proper measure of a
defendant’s ability to challenge the government activity that
10
unearthed the evidence to be used against her at trial. In Rakas, the
Court used this test to preclude the defendants from challenging the
search of an automobile that produced evidence against them
because “they made no showing that they had any legitimate
expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the
11
seat of the car in which they were merely passengers.” Therefore,
because Rakas, a mere passenger, had no legitimate expectation of
12
privacy in these particular areas of the car, the Court never had to
address whether the police acted in accordance with the Fourth
13
Amendment.
What I believe to be the most troubling consequence of the
decision to subsume standing under the substantive definition of a
search is that, even when the government is clearly acting improperly,
such misconduct receives no judicial scrutinya perverse outcome if
one conceives of the Fourth Amendment as a provision meant to
14
regulate the government’s use of power against its citizens.
It
should be no surprise, then, that what I argue is the most troubling
9

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
In adopting this test, the Court in Rakas, citing Katz at page 353, stated, “the
Court in Katz held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment
depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. However, a thorough
exploration of the cited page in Katz fails to reveal either the word “expectation” or
“place.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
11
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148.
12
Justice White, in dissent, wonders what, short of ownership, would have
satisfied the Court to establish the requisite expectation of privacy. Id. at 165 (White,
J., dissenting).
13
See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130; see also Soree, supra note 7, at 621 (explaining that
the Rakas majority made no pretense of concern with whether there was, in fact, the
proper level of justification for the search at issue, stating at the outset of the
discussion that a brief exposition of the facts was adequate because “we are not here
concerned with the issue of probable cause.” (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130)).
14
One need not look any further than United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727
(1980), for evidence that the Court’s standing doctrine permits, perhaps even
encourages, the government’s lawless behavior in investigating crime. In Payner,
government agents broke into and retrieved documents from a banker’s briefcase,
knowing that third parties would not have “standing” to claim a Fourth Amendment
violation with respect to the briefcase and thus, the evidence gained from an
obviously unlawful search would be (and was) admissible against Payner, who was
convicted of falsifying his income tax return. See id. at 728–32.
10
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flaw of current standing doctrine—that courts may, even must, turn
a blind eye to governmental misconduct—is also to a significant
extent a characteristic of the test used to define a search, at least as
currently applied. Although I have elsewhere argued that the Court
should once again separate standing from the substantive definition
16
of a search, assuming the status quo, the reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test should be reconceived to include a more meaningful
examination of the government’s conduct in seeking information.
Recently, the Court has indicated its willingness to reexamine
and reevaluate its post-Katz search doctrine. On January 23, 2012, the
Court, in holding that the Government’s placement of a Global
Positioning System (GPS) on defendant’s vehicle and the use of the
GPS to monitor his movements over a period of four weeks
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, announced that “Jones’s
Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz
17
formulation.”
The Court framed its decision fairly narrowly,
restricting its holding to the fact that the Government, for the
purpose of gaining information, “physically intrud[ed] on a
18
constitutionally protected area,” leaving open whether such long15

The Court in Payner held that a federal court was not permitted to exclude
evidence pursuant to its supervisory powers, even in the face of “the Government’s
knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any person’s fundamental constitutional
rights.” Id. at 730–31 (internal citations omitted).
16
See Soree, supra note 7, at 620.
17
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 947 (2012).
18
Id. at 950 n.3. The Court found it unnecessary to ascertain whether Mr. Jones
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements, reasoning that “Katz did
not erode the principle ‘that, when the Government does engage in physical intrusion
of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion
may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. at 951. Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, stated his judgment that the Fourth Amendment must be
interpreted to “provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was
adopted,” hinting that the application of the Katz formulation to these facts might
have mandated the opposite result. Id. at 953 (“The concurrence does not share that
belief. It would apply exclusively Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, even
when that eliminates rights that previously existed.”). Justices Sotomayor and Alito,
in their respective concurring opinions, however, indicated their belief that such
long-term GPS monitoring would indeed impinge upon reasonable expectations of
privacy, although Justice Sotomayor found it unnecessary to reach that question in
this case. Id. at 955, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“When the Government
physically invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs. The
reaffirmation of that principle suffices to decide this case.”); Id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. . . . We need not identify with precision
the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely
crossed before the 4-week mark.”).
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term surveillance accomplished without physical intrusion would
19
constitute a search under the Katz formulation. The Court
indicated, though, that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law
20
trespassory test.”
Further, in her concurring opinion, Justice
Sotomayor, while agreeing with the trespass-based reasoning of the
Court under the particular facts of the case, urged that it may be
“necessary” to reconsider the Court’s existing post-Katz
21
jurisprudence.
Additionally, Justice Alito, in his concurrence,
although not embracing the trespass rationale and, instead, adhering
to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, noted that this test “is
22
not without its own difficulties.”
What is clear, after Jones, is that absent a trespass on a
constitutionally protected area (for the purpose of gathering
23
information), the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test still
controls the threshold question of whether a Fourth Amendment
24
search has occurred, and is therefore the subject of this Article’s
efforts to induce much needed reform. What is equally clear is that
the law of searches is in flux, and that the Court has recognized the
inability of Katz, in its application to this point, to adequately protect
the public against modern-day encroachments on privacy. The time
is ripe for the development of Fourth Amendment search doctrine,
and the law of rape provides a rich source of grist for the mill of
change.
The primary goal of this Article, then, is to propose a more
balanced approach to defining Fourth Amendment searches that
takes into account the conduct of both law enforcement and the
19

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (“It may be that achieving the same result through
electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”).
20
Id. at 954. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of Katz as departing from a
definition of a search that required a governmental trespass (or physical intrusion)
into a constitutionally protected area.
21
Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
22
Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
23
The Court’s opinion, interestingly, stressed the Government’s purpose of
gathering information as a factor in defining the search, id. at 951 n.5, as has been
urged by Professor Thomas Clancy. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within
the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 39 (2006). Professor Clancy
has also noted that the Court has generally found the Fourth Amendment to apply to
physical invasions, even minor ones, which is consistent with the Court’s decision in
Jones. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
24
Id. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”).
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victim of surveillance to determine whether a search has occurred,
resulting in a doctrine truer to the letter and spirit of Katz. As this
Article will demonstrate, the current application of Katz places almost
exclusive scrutiny on the conduct and precautions taken by the victim
of the surveillance, and in fact requires unreasonably onerous efforts
to maintain privacy, with scant attention given to the measures taken
25
by the government to overcome those precautions.
We can now begin to examine how the law of rape can provide a
relevant analogy and useful framework for a new understanding of
Fourth Amendment searches. At common law, forcible rape was
defined as follows: “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against
26
her will.” While force and nonconsent were both required elements
27
of the crime of rape, traditionally these elements were defined
almost exclusively in terms of the victim’s conduct, making the
28
victim’s resistance a de facto element of rape. Further, under the
traditional model of rape, not only was resistance required on the
part of the victim, but it was necessary for the victim to resist to the
29
utmost in order for the law to recognize what occurred as rape.
Naturally, the requirement of utmost resistance resulted in a
definition of rape that punished only the most extreme uses of force,
as only severe force used by the perpetrator would be successful in
overcoming this mandatory level of resistance, even in the face of the
victim’s clear nonconsent. This Article argues that current search
doctrine suffers from the same defect identified by critics of
traditional rape law: as rape was originally defined by the victim’s
conduct and state of mind, so the Fourth Amendment search is
currently defined primarily by the conduct and state of mind of its
victim as well. While a rape was not deemed to have occurred absent
the actor’s use of force sufficient to overcome the utmost resistance
of the victim, a search similarly is not deemed to have occurred unless
25

See infra Part III.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210 (1769).
27
E.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.04 (5th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW].
28
See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1998)
(setting forth common objections to the traditional approach in rape prosecutions,
which “places the victim’s behavior and demeanor at the center of the trial”); Susan
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094 (1986) (arguing that requirements of force and
nonconsent are both determined in reference to the victim’s behavior).
29
E.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV.
953, 957 (1998); Estrich, supra note 28, at 1099; Richard Klein, An Analysis of ThirtyFive Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV.
981, 987 (2008).
26
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the government is able to overcome what amounts to utmost
resistance, measured by the precautions taken to maintain one’s
30
integrity against governmental intrusion.
While this Article does not seek to make any normative claims
31
with respect to the reforms achieved in the law of rape, there are
valuable insights to be gained from examining the evolution of rape
law, and the concerns animating that evolution, that can illuminate
the pursuit of a new paradigm for defining Fourth Amendment
searches. Part II discusses Katz and some of its progeny, taking into
32
account the Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones, and
briefly sketching the argument that the language and spirit of Katz
support the more balanced, conduct-oriented approach that this
Article proposes. This section begins, however, by emphasizing the
significance of the injury suffered by victims of compelled searches of
body or home, and by reasserting the importance of recognizing
more than simply the most egregious practices of governmental
surveillance as deserving of Fourth Amendment protection. Part III
focuses on the law of rape, discussing the primary critiques of
traditional rape law and the broader goals sought to be achieved by
reformers in this area, as well as the specific reforms developed as a
response to these critiques and goals. Part IV returns to the task of
redefining the Fourth Amendment search and invites the reader to
complete the conceptual journey connecting rape law with search
law. This section will demonstrate that in many significant ways, the
grievances animating the rape reform movement can be analogized
to the Fourth Amendment context, and indeed, one can discern a
compelling parallel between the two areas of law. The section
concludes by illustrating how the reforms achieved in the rape
context can provide a model for reform in Fourth Amendment
30

See infra Part IV.
The focus of this Article is not to evaluate the reforms achieved in rape law,
but to apply the reasoning and substance of those reforms to the context of defining
Fourth Amendment searches. Although in order to accomplish this objective it is
necessary to explore rape law in depth, this Article is really about Fourth
Amendment searches. That said, there is a certain irony in urging a Fourth
Amendment doctrine that will be more generous to defendants by highlighting rape
law reforms that have made rape convictions easier to obtain, causing many scholars
concern that, perhaps, certain of these reforms have gone too far and may raise the
risk of unfairly convicting defendants accused of rape. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler,
Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape
Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409 (1998) [hereinafter Dressler, Where We Have
Been] (praising many of the legal reforms achieved while urging caution in moving
forward in order to achieve a balance between the rights of victims and defendants).
32
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
31
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search doctrine as well, reform that can promote the goals of
improved government behavior, individual autonomy, and equality.
In concluding, the Article briefly highlights a few cases in which the
Court has indicated its willingness to reconsider its post-Katz
jurisprudence and which have set the stage for the beginnings of the
shift in defining Fourth Amendment searches that has emerged in
United States v. Jones, and that will, hopefully, continue to evolve.
II. FROM 1967 TO 1984 AND BEYOND: DECONSTRUCTING AND
RECONSTRUCTING KATZ
A. Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear . . . But the Search Itself
They rape us with their eyes, their laws, and their codes.
33
—Marilyn French
There was no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any
given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in
on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they
watched everybody all the time. . . . You had to live—did live—from habit
that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was
overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.
34
—George Orwell
Just as the Article began, this section again juxtaposes two
quotations to impress upon the reader the fundamental affront to
personhood perpetrated through psychic, as well as physical,
intrusions into private realms of life. Although we have not reached
the Orwellian state of affairs described by the second quotation, we
may be moving dangerously close. In 1984, the protagonist explains:
It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when
you were in any public place or within range of a telescreen.
The smallest thing could give you away. A nervous tic, an
unconscious look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to
yourself—anything that carried with it the suggestion of
abnormality, of having something to hide. In any case, to
wear an improper expression on your face . . . was itself a
33

MARILYN FRENCH, THE WOMEN’S ROOM 433 (Ballantine Books 1977). The
Women’s Room was feminist novelist Marilyn French’s debut novel, and the material
quoted above was spoken by one of the novel’s characters, preceded, however, by the
following statement: “All men are rapists, and that’s all that they are.” Id. I chose to
open Part II with this (quite controversial) quote to emphasize the concept of
nonphysical means of breaching personal barriers.
34
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 3 (Signet Classics 1950).
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punishable offense. There was even a word for it in
35
Newspeak: facecrime . . . .
In Orwell’s dystopian world, constant surveillance, whether
through direct human observation or via telescreen, of facial and
body expressions provided officials with information as to citizens’
inner thoughts and emotions. Had Orwell been writing his novel
today rather than in 1948, perhaps the Thought Police would have
had even more effective means of “prob[ing] deeper and deeper into
36
the reaches of our cognitive existence”
by utilizing a process
37
referred to as Brain Fingerprinting. Professor Christian Halliburton
describes this process in the following way:
Brain Fingerprinting can tell the operator what an
individual does or does not know without any voluntary
action, response or consent by the subject. While Brain
Fingerprinting can’t “read minds” in the absolute sense, it
does allow irresistible access to one’s thoughts, with any
decision to keep those thoughts and ideas private effectively
38
overridden. . . .
Professor Halliburton mentions various scientific techniques
“designed to provide the means to tap into human cognitive contents
39
and cerebral functioning for information-gathering . . . purposes,”
and continues:
The common thread uniting these complex and varied
approaches is the belief that technological innovation can
provide the power to peer behind the veil that keeps our
thoughts and thought processes confidential, and that
developing the power to do so ultimately serves the public
40
good.
As experience has shown, the erosion of individual interests for the
35

Id. at 145.
Christian M. Halliburton, Letting Katz out of the Bag: Cognitive Freedom and
Fourth Amendment Fidelity, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 309 (2007) [hereinafter Halliburton,
Cognitive Freedom].
37
See id.
38
Id. at 309–10.
39
See id. at 310. Professor Halliburton refers to these various methods as
Cognitive Camera Technologies, or CCTs. Id. at 310. Brain Fingerprinting primarily
utilizes electroencephalographic monitoring, although there are other techniques
available and in use with the capability of providing access to our cognitive domain.
Id. Brain Fingerprinting uses imagery to measure brain responses to selected stimuli,
with the potential, for example, to indicate whether the subject has been previously
exposed to a certain event or location. Halliburton, Cognitive Freedom, supra note 36,
at 320.
40
Id. at 310.
36
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“public good” is not only the stuff of (then) futuristic novels, but it is
the stuff of Supreme Court opinions as well.
With advances in technology and, due in part to the War on
Terror, the increased vigilance of the government, the importance of
a more inclusive definition of a search cannot be understated. As
Professor Anthony Amsterdam has asserted, “I can think of few issues
more important to a society than the amount of power that it permits
41
its police to use without effective control by law.” To be sure, the
most extreme intrusions upon individuals by the government are
classified as searches and are, thus, regulated under the Fourth
Amendment. Indeed, if the government seeks to retrieve evidence of
crime by drugging a “citizen—not yet convicted of a criminal
offense—with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of
unconsciousness, and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of
42
a crime,” something more than probable cause and a warrant is
43
required. Yet, under the special needs doctrine, the government
may compel “a person to submit to the piercing of his skin by a
44
hypodermic needle so that his blood may be extracted” with no
45
individualized suspicion at all.
41

Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 377 (1974).
42
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).
43
The Court stated that the reasonableness of conducting surgical intrusions is
properly determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 760. Weighing the severity of the
intrusion against the government’s need to surgically retrieve a bullet from under
the defendant’s collarbone for use as evidence in an attempted robbery prosecution,
the Court held the proposed surgery to be unreasonable, as this particular piece of
evidence was not critical to the government’s case and therefore, the government
failed to demonstrate a compelling need for the bullet. Id. at 766.
44
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 644 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). At issue in Skinner were Federal Railroad Administration regulations
concerning toxicological testing of the blood and urine of railroad employees
directly involved in certain types of train incidents. Id. at 609–12.
45
Id. at 634 (“In light of the limited discretion exercised by the railroad
employers under the regulations, the surpassing safety interests served by
toxicological tests in this context, and the diminished expectation of privacy that
attaches to information pertaining to the fitness of covered employees, we believe
that it is reasonable to conduct such tests in the absence of a warrant or reasonable
suspicion . . . .”). Skinner is one example of the Court’s special needs doctrine, under
which the usual requirements of a warrant and individualized suspicion are
suspended and reasonableness is determined by balancing the severity of the
intrusion upon the individual against the government’s need to search in order to
advance an interest unrelated to criminal law enforcement. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding Federal Railroad regulations
that allowed toxicology tests of railroad employees without a search warrant or
individualized suspicion); Nat’l Treas. Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
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The special needs doctrine also gives school administrators and
officials relief from the warrant and probable cause requirements of
the Fourth Amendment, permitting searches that are simply
46
reasonable “under all the circumstances.” As documented in a 2009
New York Times article:
Savana Redding still remembers the clothes she had on—
black stretch pants with butterfly patches and a pink Tshirt—the day school officials here forced her to strip six
years ago. She was 13 and in eighth grade. An assistant
principal, enforcing the school’s antidrug policies,
suspected her of having brought prescription-strength
ibuprofen pills to school. One of the pills is as strong as two
Advils. The search by two female school employees was
methodical and humiliating, Ms. Redding said. After she
had stripped to her underwear, “they asked me to pull out
my bra and move it from side to side,” she said. “They
made me open my legs and pull out my underwear.” Ms.
47
Redding, an honors student, had no pills.
Clearly, Savana Redding was the victim of a search, even, as it
48
turned out, an unreasonable one. However, Ms. Redding was not
entitled to relief in her suit against school officials because it was not
“sufficiently clear” that forcing a 13-year-old girl to “expose[] her
49
breasts and pelvic area” with no reason to suspect that the ibuprofen
was being secreted in her underwear, would violate the Fourth
Amendment. In other words, although the Court in T.L.O. warned
officials that a search “excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex
of the student and nature of the infraction” would not be
50
reasonable, and indeed described the strip search at issue here as a
(holding that the U.S. Customs Service’s testing of employees who apply for
promotion to positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to
positions that require the incumbent to carry firearms, is reasonable despite the
absence of a requirement of probable cause or of some level of individualized
suspicion); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (stating that supervision of
probationers is a “special need” of the State that may justify departures from the
usual warrant and probable cause requirements); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967) (upholding administrative home searches). But see Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that a hospital’s mandatory drug
screening of pregnant women is a type of search that does not meet the special needs
criteria).
46
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 326 (1985).
47
Adam Liptak, Strip-search of Girl Tests Limit of School Policy, N.Y. TIMES, March
23, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/us/24savana.html.
48
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009).
49
Id. at 369.
50
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
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“quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of
51
intimate parts,” it was apparently still not sufficiently clear that this
was excessively intrusive, and therefore the officials were entitled to
52
qualified immunity.
While Savana Redding at least could claim the satisfaction of
knowing that her outrage was legally justified (though not
compensable), Max Rettele, his girlfriend Judy Sadler, and her son
Chase Hall were told, in a per curium decision, that, despite the fact
that the “frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation” they suffered
53
54
was “real,” seven deputies acted reasonably when, executing a
warrant for the search of a home for African-American suspects of
fraud and identity theft, they entered the home of Rettele, Sadler,
and Hall (all Caucasian) at 7:15 A.M., unaware that Rettele had
purchased and moved into the home three months before the
55
search. Hall, upon answering the door to the deputies, was ordered
56
“to lie face down on the ground.”
The deputies’ announcement awoke Rettele and Sadler.
The deputies entered their bedroom with guns drawn and
ordered them to get out of their bed and to show their
hands. They protested that they were not wearing clothes.
Rettele stood up and attempted to put on a pair of
sweatpants, but deputies told him not to move. Sadler also
stood up and attempted, without success, to cover herself
with a sheet. Rettele and Sadler were held at gunpoint for
one to two minutes before Rettele was allowed to retrieve a
robe for Sadler. He was then permitted to dress. . . . By that
time the deputies realized they had made a mistake. They
apologized to Rettele and Sadler, thanked them for not
57
becoming upset, and left within five minutes.
The Court, in reaching its decision, mentioned that the officers
left the home less than one quarter hour after having arrived, and
that Ms. Sadler was “unclothed for no more than two minutes, and
58
Rettele for only slightly more time than that.” One cannot help but
wonder how long those two minutes felt to Sadler and Rettele,
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Redding, 557 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
Id. at 378–79.
L.A. Cnty., Cal. vs. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 616 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 611.
Id.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 615.
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standing naked in front of seven deputies and their drawn guns.
It is worth leaving the reader with one more example of a
physically invasive search, one is commonly experienced by many
59
citizens, especially those who frequently travel by air. While the
examples above all constitute searches, the Terry frisk also qualifies as
a search, but requires only reasonable suspicion because it is deemed
60
to be less intrusive than a full search, although still a “serious
61
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.” The Court, in Terry v.
Ohio, asks us to
[c]onsider the following apt description: “The officer must
feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner’s
body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner’s
arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to
62
the feet.”
If “such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while
63
the citizen stands helpless” gets something less than full Fourth
Amendment protection under the Court’s balancing approach, it
should not be surprising that a great many intrusions warrant no
Fourth Amendment protection at all. In fact, one view of Terry is that
the balance struck by the Court, accommodating law enforcement
needs while taking into account the individual interest, is preferable
to one alternative: not classifying anything short of a full arrest and
search as implicating the Fourth Amendment at all, thereby leaving
police officers completely to their discretion to “merely” stop and
64
frisk with no judicial oversight. Of course, this is precisely the result
59

I refer to the frisk that many travelers are required to endure as a condition to
boarding an airplane, either in lieu of agreeing to a full-body scan by the back-scatter
x-ray machines in use at many airports, or upon some indication from the x-ray that
indicates a need for the frisk. These airport frisks are sufficiently routine, however,
that they likely do not equal the humiliation and embarrassment felt by the
individual receiving a frisk, based on suspicion, on a public sidewalk in full view of
gawking passersby.
60
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (describing the frisk as “something less
than a ‘full’ search.”).
61
Id. at 17.
62
Id. at 17 n.13 (quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 4 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 481 (1954)).
63
Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17.
64
See Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure,
43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 48–65 (2010) (arguing that Terry actually expanded regulation of
law enforcement to include judicial oversight over areas of citizen-police encounters
that fell outside the usual warrant and probable cause standard). But see Amy D.
Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
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with a great many surveillance techniques the Court has classified as
non-searches: permitting police, at their whim, to peer into our back
65
yards from hovering aircraft, probe into our personal relationships
66
by tracking whom we telephone, stalk us in public with electronic
67
68
devices, rummage through our garbage, delve into our personal
69
finances, and yes, even search our friends’ cars as we ride with
70
them.
Professor Amsterdam is correct: there are few more
important issues.
B. A First Look at Katz: Was It All We Expected?
In 1967, the Supreme Court famously announced that “the
71
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” With that bold
statement, the Warren Court sought to expand the scope of the
72
Fourth Amendment by rejecting the traditional requirement of a
physical trespass into a “constitutionally protected area” as the trigger
73
for Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches.
Thus, Mr. Katz successfully claimed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment when government agents, acting without a warrant,
listened to and recorded his side of a telephone conversation by
REV. 383, 400 (2001) (referring to Terry as the “foundation upon which the Supreme
Court has built its racially biased Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”). Professor
Ronner argues that the Court briefly acknowledged, and then repressed and
negated, the awareness that stop and frisks could be, and often were, used by police
as tools of harassment and humiliation directed against minority citizens, a practice
that would likely increase in light of the reduced Fourth Amendment protection
afforded citizens by the reasonable suspicion standard, and a practice the Court
found the exclusionary rule ineffective to control. Id. at 404–05. With its decision in
Terry, Professor Ronner claims, the Court effectively “inaugurated what was to
become an insidious pattern—namely the exile of minorities from the dominion of
Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at 405–06.
65
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986).
66
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
67
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
68
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
69
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
70
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
71
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
72
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id.
73
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. “[T]he correct solution of Fourth Amendment
problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally
protected area.’” Id.
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affixing electronic recording equipment to the outside of the
telephone booth he used to place his call, despite the facts that he
had no traditional property interest in the public booth (the inside of
74
which was partially exposed to public view), the electronic device
did not physically intrude into the phone booth, and the words
spoken by him could not be “seized” in the usual meaning of the
75
word.
Thus, Mr. Katz received the protection of the Fourth
Amendment not because he claimed some property right to an
invaded place, but because the “Government’s activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words
76
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied . . . .”
So, if Katz was meant to herald a new age of expansive Fourth
Amendment protection broadly available to all “people” based on
77
some inherent right to privacy rather than upon the ability to assert
74

Id. at 352.
See id. at 348–49, 353, 359. Justice Black, in dissent, criticizes the majority for
straying so far from the text of the Fourth Amendment, which he reads to protect
against the unreasonable search and seizure of tangible things, concluding that the
Amendment simply does not apply to eavesdropping, whether by naked ear or with
the assistance of technology. Id. at 365–66 (Black, J., dissenting).
76
Id. at 353. This is not to say, however, that property law is irrelevant in
determining the existence of one’s right under the Fourth Amendment to be free
from governmental intrusions, as the Court in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012), has recently recognized. See supra notes 1724 and accompanying text. The
Court has finally heeded the many scholars who have disapproved of the
conventional view that Katz outright rejected any reliance on property law in favor of
a privacy-based regime, and who have argued, instead, that the focus on privacy was
meant to supplement the existing property framework, thereby expanding the
protective reach of the Amendment. See, e.g., Christian M. Halliburton, How Privacy
Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom and the Property of Personhood as Fourth Amendment
Norm, 42 AKRON L. REV. 803, 824–25 (2009) [hereinafter Halliburton, How Privacy
Killed Katz]
[T]he Katz opinion does not wholly require, nor justify, the shift from a
property to a privacy perspective that we attribute to it. The most
salient aspects of the Katz Court’s analysis . . . are its rejection of the
limitations of the trespass doctrine and the refusal to invest any
significance in the difference between tangible and intangible items.
The trespass doctrine itself is not wholly irrelevant after Katz because
Katz merely held that a trespass is not necessary to trigger the Fourth
Amendment, but it nowhere stated that it is insufficient.
Id. (emphasis in original); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004) (“While
existing scholarship often interprets the shift [in Katz] as a wholesale rejection of
property-based principles . . . it is better understood as a shift of degree from
common law rules to the looser property-based approach that currently governs.”).
77
Justice Black also accuses the majority of “clever word juggling” and of
“rewriting the Fourth Amendment” to reconstruct that Amendment as a law
protecting privacy rather than one prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.
75
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a sufficient property interest in a given location (which would limit
78
the number of individuals qualifying for protection), how did we
get to the state of affairs described above? Perhaps the fault lies
somewhat with Justice Stewart’s Katz opinion itself.
While
dismantling the existing trespass doctrine, the Katz majority did not
79
clearly construct its replacement, leaving Justice Harlan, in his
concurring opinion, to offer his understanding of the majority’s
holding, still in terms of places and areas, but with an emphasis on
the privacy an individual may expect in association with those places
and areas rather than with a sole focus on any property interest that
80
may be claimed. Thus, for Justice Harlan, the phone booth into
which Mr. Katz entered, after he shut the door and paid his toll,
became a “temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as
81
reasonable.” It was Justice Harlan’s concurrence that provided the
two-pronged test that came to define a search as a government
violation of “an actual, subjective expectation of privacy” that “society
82
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” This Article will show,
however, that Justice Harlan’s formulation is capable of a much more
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
78
Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion in Jones, urged the continued need to
look to reasonable expectations of privacy, noting that the physical trespass-based
approach would not have protected the defendant if, for example, the GPS device
had been affixed to the car before it came under his exclusive control or if the
Government made use of a GPS device already installed upon the car by the
manufacturer. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring). Of course, the irony
lies in the fact that the reasonable expectation of privacy test has also been used to
limit the number of individuals who can successfully claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment, as demonstrated in many of the Court’s “standing” cases. See,
e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that defendants who were mere
passengers in an automobile did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
portions searched); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 98 (1980) (holding that
defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his companion’s
purse).
79
See James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an Expanded
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 650–51 (1985)
(describing the Katz majority opinion as “an efficient dismantler, but neglectful
reconstructor”).
80
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81
Id. at 361.
82
Id. The Court officially adopted Justice Harlan’s formulation defining a
Fourth Amendment search in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979), taking
care to link each of the two prongs of Justice Harlan’s test to Justice Stewart’s
language in the Katz majority opinion. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. It is also important
to remind the reader that, even after United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), this
remains the test of a search in the absence of a physical trespass into a
constitutionally protected area.
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nuanced and subtle application than the Court has chosen to
endorse, especially when read carefully in conjunction with Justice
Stewart’s majority opinion.
A careful reexamination of Katz, with greater fidelity to both
language and intent, is particularly urgent, in light of the twin
pressures of a perceived need for both increased surveillance
(making government surveillance more frequent and routine) and
technological innovation (making such surveillance more effective
and revealing), both of which act on the current definition of a
search by consistently eroding societal expectations of privacy. Thus,
a definition of a search that focuses solely on those continually
diminishing expectations to delineate the scope of constitutional
protection will result in a Fourth Amendment that increasingly
permits the very entity meant to be cabined by that Amendment ever
more power:
[S]earches are defined as anything agents of the
government do that infringes a reasonable expectation of
privacy. As every criminal procedure class learns, if the key
to that definition is the word “expectation,” the definition is
circular. People expect what they think will happen, and
what they think will happen is a function of what has
happened in the past. By altering its behavior, the
government can change how people expect it to behave.
Thus, if the government is bound only to respect people’s
expectations, it is not bound at all, for it can easily
83
condition the citizenry to expect little or no privacy.
Ironically, although the Katz Court found the prior property and
trespass-based approach to defining a search inadequate to protect
citizens against the government’s use of novel, high-tech forms of
surveillance, its privacy-based solution, especially when distilled into
Justice Harlan’s two-pronged reasonable expectation test, has proved
vulnerable to manipulation and equally inadequate (as it has been
interpreted and applied) to protect privacy. Katz has left significant
questions unanswered, even with Justice Harlan’s clarification of the
Court’s holding, and has generated significant debate and criticism
83

William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1268 (1999). As Professor Thomas Clancy observed, “[t]he peculiar logic
of the diminished expectation of privacy rationale, therefore, is that it permits the
scope of Fourth Amendment protections to diminish as governmental regulation
increases. Yet, the mandates of the Fourth Amendment demand heightened, not
lowered, respect, as the intrusive regulatory authority of government expands.”
Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?,
33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 342 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).
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among scholars and Justices alike, as has the Court’s post-Katz
84
jurisprudence.
Justice Black, in his Katz dissent, reiterated his “fear of the
dangers involved when [the] Court uses the broad, abstract and
ambiguous concept of privacy as a comprehensive substitute for the
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and
85
seizures.”
Justice Black continued by expressing his grave
reservations concerning the adoption of such an amorphous standard
by which to define the scope of the Fourth Amendment (substituting
a general right to privacy for the concrete terms of the Amendment,
giving the Court “unlimited power to hold unconstitutional
86
everything which affects privacy”).

84

See generally Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91, 93 (1998) (Scalia, J., &
Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the legitimate expectation of privacy as
providing a “fuzzy standard” and further critiquing Justice Harlan’s formulation of
the Katz test as, at least in light of the case law generated in the three decades after
that test was announced, as “self-indulgent”); Sherry Colb, What Is a Search?: Two
Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 119, 120–21 (2002) (noting her agreement with numerous scholars who critique
the Court’s post-Katz decisions as so narrowly defining “the scope of protected
privacy . . . that much of the universe of investigative activity does not even trigger
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements” and arguing that the
doctrinal “moves” the Court has made in its decisions have eroded and threaten to
altogether eradicate privacy); Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz, supra note 76, at
810 (describing the Court’s privacy doctrine as “schizophrenic” and criticizing the
Katz Court for “articulat[ing] a descriptive explanation of its decision that
masquerades as a principle”); William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy
Interests, 92 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3, 35 (2001) (arguing that the Court has
“hardly . . . shown a serious concern for privacy” and describing the results of the
Court’s application of Katz as “deplorable”); Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy:
A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 584 (1989) (arguing
that the Court, in interpreting the Fourth Amendment, has “tipped the balance
unnecessarily further and further away from individual freedom, significantly
diminishing the realm of personal privacy,” and critiquing the Court’s application of
Katz to a variety of situations and advocating for a new model of protection based on
degrees of exposure); Tomkovicz, supra note 79, at 647 (arguing that Katz did not
provide much guidance with respect to the application of its new paradigm, leading
the Court to refine and develop the doctrine, unfortunately in ways that have
“neither fulfilled the promises of Katz nor been consonant with an appropriately
conceived fourth amendment core”).
85
Katz, 389 U.S. at 374 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 507–27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
86
Katz, 389 U.S. at 374. Justice Black continued, “Certainly the Framers, well
acquainted as they were with the excesses of governmental power, did not intend to
grant this Court such omnipotent lawmaking authority as that. The history of
governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such powers in courts.”
Id.
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What Justice Black did not predict, however, was that rather than
holding unconstitutional all investigative conduct of police that
impinges on a suspect’s privacy, the post-Warren Court would use the
very test meant to expand protection of the Fourth Amendment
beyond traditional and rigid notions of property and trespass to, in
fact, narrow the Amendment’s protective reach. Thus, in the hands
of a more conservative Court, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test resulted in a great many investigative techniques being deemed
non-searches, and thus, subject to no constitutional scrutiny
87
whatsoever. As one scholar has noted,
Today, it is common to find scholarly discussion of Supreme
Court “search” cases that is highly alarmist in tone. Indeed,
it is difficult to disagree with the view that these decisions
describe a society too redolent of the totalitarian: no
business relationship is confidential, especially with banks
and utilities; the use of an automobile, especially as a
passenger, must be avoided; only in your own home are you
secure, and then only if you live alone, do not have guests,
do not share, and keep the windows covered and the door
88
bolted.
Returning to Justice Harlan’s formulation of the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test and the Court’s application of that test, it
is appropriate, put plainly, to question whether the Court got it right.
Do individuals truly expect that the phone company will (or should)
release the numbers dialed from inside one’s home upon request
simply because placing a call necessarily requires divulging the
number of the intended recipient to the phone carrier for
89
connection? Is it objectively unreasonable to expect that the police,
whose behavior should serve as a model, will refrain from sifting
through one’s curbside garbage, even though “animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public” could
(although not necessarily would or commonly do) engage in such
90
rubbish-rummaging practices? Does society not accept as legitimate
87

See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaning of “Searches”
in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319, 323 (1984).
89
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that the use of pen
registers to disclose the numbers dialed from inside of defendant’s home was not a
search, because the defendant “in all probability entertained no actual expectation
of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation
was not ‘legitimate’”).
90
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left at the curb for pickup).
88
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the expectation that we won’t be hovered over and peered at in our
fenced back yards, like exhibits in a menagerie, by police, simply
because the helicopter from which they are staging their observation
maintains the minimal height permitted by aviation safety
91
regulations? Or, is the expectation preposterous that, if we place an
item in the glove compartment of a companion’s car as we ride
together, police will not have unfettered access to that item simply
92
because we are guests in, rather than the owners of, the car?
It is no happy coincidence, as noted by Justice Scalia, that “those
actual (subjective) expectation[s] of privacy that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable bear an uncanny resemblance to those
93
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.” And,
94
when, due to social or political pressures, the majority of the Court
is inclined to place a finger on the scale of reasonableness to tip the
95
balance in favor of law enforcement interests, that same Court will
likely find an expansive notion of privacy to be unreasonable,
96
regardless of what expectations society actually holds.
How the Court determines the question of reasonableness
should be a matter of grave importance to anyone concerned with
maintaining some sphere of personal dominion. After all, once the
Court decides that a defendant has no expectation of privacy in a
given context, the government may seek and find, but still will not
91

See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that surveillance conducted
from a helicopter at four hundred feet did not constitute a search).
92
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (holding that defendants, as
“mere passengers” had no “legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove
compartment or area under the seat of the car” in which they were traveling, as they
“asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile”).
93
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
94
President Nixon was elected, in part, on a “law and order” platform and,
during his presidency, had the opportunity to nominate four conservative Justices to
the Supreme Court: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Powell.
95
See Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government
Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 669 (1987)
[hereinafter Maclin, Government Perspective] (arguing that the Court’s post-Katz
Fourth Amendment doctrine is fashioned from a police perspective, rather than
from a perspective favoring the individual interests of those who are the subject of
police investigation).
96
See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at ‘Understandings
Recognized and Permitted By Society’, 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) (offering stark empirical
evidence that judges often incorrectly assess which expectations of privacy society
considers to be reasonable or unreasonable).
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have searched, thus leaving its conduct and methods completely
97
beyond judicial reproach. And, while the reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test often leads to the odd conclusion that seeking is not
searching, the Court’s standing doctrine, and its merger of standing
and substance, creates an even greater paradox, as now searching is
98
not always searching either.
This merger of standing and merits effectively narrows the set of
defendants who are even permitted to bring the government’s
conduct to a court’s attention, which in turn allows fewer
opportunities to develop search and seizure law at a time when the
97

Justice Scalia was clearly aware of the tension between the common
understanding of what it means to “search” for something and the Court’s insistence
on classifying purposeful visual inspection on the part of police as somehow not
being a search, offering the explanation that the Court avoided the alternative
means to validate warrantless surveillance—acknowledging it as a search, but holding
it to be reasonable—”perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more intact [the]
doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional.” Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001). Of course, there is a point, as the Court
observed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in upholding as reasonable warrantless
frisks based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, where it becomes “nothing
less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest” that a highly intrusive
inspection, such as the “careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s
clothing all over his or her body” at issue in Terry is not a search. Id. at 16–17.
98
For example, when police search the glove compartment referred to above,
they have conducted a Fourth Amendment search, at least with respect to the owner
of the car. However, with respect to the passenger, the identical conduct of the
police in opening and looking into the glove compartment is transformed into a
non-search because the passenger cannot legitimately expect the contents of the
glove compartment to remain private, even though that is precisely what the owner
of the car can and does expect. Ironically, while maintaining that the car owner
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, her actual privacy is more
likely to be invaded because police may have an incentive to search automobiles with
multiple passengers, knowing that any incriminating evidence found will likely be
admissible against the passengers (assuming a lawful stop) in the event of a criminal
prosecution. This, of course, demonstrates why Professor Stuntz described the
reasonable expectation of privacy test as “circular.” See Stuntz, supra note 83, at 1268,
and accompanying text. I have previously expressed my concern that this approach
to standing could affect the scope of Fourth Amendment protection even as to the
owner of the car, when she chooses to invite others inside. See Soree, supra note 7, at
61920 (“After all, how can I, driving down the freeway on my way to work,
reasonably expect that the government will not intrude into my car when my
coworker, to whom I’ve offered a lift, sitting alongside me in the same car, expects
exactly the opposite?”). Justice Ginsburg, expressed precisely this concern in
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), which held that individuals inside a home for
a limited period solely to conduct business did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the home: “As I see it, people are not genuinely ‘secure in their . . .
houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . if their invitations to
others increase the risk of unwarranted governmental peering and prying into their
dwelling places.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 108 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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privacy rights of citizens may be in need of the most protection. The
paradox identified above can be addressed by redefining the Katz test
to take the government’s conduct into account. This Article argues
that, in fact, the government’s conduct must be considered in the
context of answering two substantive questions: first, whether a
legitimate expectation of privacy has been invaded; and second,
whether such invasion is constitutionally permissible, with the focus
of this Article on the former inquiry. Under the conduct-oriented
approach proposed herein, the conduct of both police and
defendants will play a role in determining whether government
surveillance is a search, triggering the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.
C. A Second Look at Katz: Conduct in the Content
Despite the oft-noted lack of clarity in the Katz opinion, a careful
examination of the language contained in that opinion, as well as in
Justice Harlan’s concurrence, will reveal support for this more
balanced, conduct-oriented approach to defining a search. This
Article has already shown that the Katz Court sought to expand the
reach of the Fourth Amendment by rejecting sole reliance on
property concepts to define the parameters of a search, traditionally
limited to physical intrusions into traditionally protected places or
areas (such as a home, for example). Chartering new territory, the
Katz Court chose to define a search by focusing on what an individual
99
“seeks to preserve as private” as meriting Fourth Amendment
protection, versus that which “a person knowingly exposes to the
100
public,” without defining the individual’s intentions with respect to
disclosure or nondisclosure solely in reference to her location at the
101
time of the search, or non-search, as the case may be.
99

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
Id.
101
See id. In fact, if those phrases are read in the context of the full sentences in
which they appear, it is clear that the Court went further than simply stating that an
individual’s presence in a protected area is not dispositive to the question of whether
or not a search has occurred, and the Court used two diametrically opposed
locations to make its point: the home (or office) and a publicly accessible area. See
id. Thus, an individual located inside the home, an area that has consistently
received the greatest protection and deference, may nonetheless relinquish Fourth
Amendment protection through her actions in exposing information or objects to
public view, while an individual in public may nevertheless still claim the protection
of the Fourth Amendment because of her efforts to maintain something as private.
See id. “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
100
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This is not to say that places and areas are irrelevant. As Justice
Harlan noted in his concurring opinion, determining the level of
protection the Fourth Amendment confers on an individual
102
“[g]enerally . . . requires reference to a ‘place.’”
Since the Court
formally adopted Justice Harlan’s formulation as the definition of a
103
Fourth Amendment search, his opinion merits careful attention. I
quote (again) the actual language setting out Justice Harlan’s twoprong test: “there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
104
‘reasonable.’” Note what is missing from this language: there is no
reference to an area or place directly after “expectation of privacy.”
To be sure, Justice Harlan began his opinion with the “reading” of
the Court’s opinion as holding that “an enclosed telephone booth is
an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a
105
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”
However, Justice Harlan qualified the assertion that a home, for
example, is an area giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy
a bit later in his opinion, stating that “a man’s home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy,” while conversations held
in the open, or indeed objects exhibited in the plain view of
outsiders, are not constitutionally protected from discovery because
there is no objectively discernible intention to keep these
106
conversations or objects hidden.
Thus, a constitutionally recognized expectation of privacy
derives its reasonableness from all the circumstances surrounding its
breach by the police, which include, but are not limited to, the
individual’s location in a given place or area. Returning to Mr. Katz
in his phone booth, we see that the nature of what the person seeks to
keep private also informs the determination of whether or not an
expectation of privacy is reasonable; this refers to “nature” in its
107
general, rather than in its most specific, sense.
Because Mr. Katz
protected.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
102
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
103
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
104
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
105
Id. at 360.
106
Id. at 361 (emphasis added). Justice Harlan’s caveat, then, regarding the
home as a place where one usually, but not always, can expect privacy is entirely
consistent with the majority’s language with respect to knowing exposure, even from
the home. Id.
107
Thus, it suffices to note that Mr. Katz was intending to keep a conversation
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sought to keep a conversation private, the phone booth became an
area from which he could (and should) reasonably expect to do just
that. If instead, however, Mr. Katz decided to disrobe inside the
phone booth, or decided to dismantle and damage the telephone, he
would have had no legitimate expectation of not being seen and
consequently arrested for indecent exposure or destruction of
property, as the case may be, despite the fact that the activities would
have taken place in the very same “area.” It is, in other words, highly
relevant that Mr. Katz sought to exclude from the glass phone booth
108
“not the intruding eye,” but the “uninvited ear.”
Many scholars have analyzed and identified various factors that
the Court takes into account when determining whether a defendant
can claim a reasonable expectation of privacy, trying to give content
109
to what is often described as an open-ended and amorphous test.
But such a lack of structure may be precisely what Justice Stewart and
the Katz majority had in mind—to supplement a rigid doctrine based
solely on trespass and property rights with one more capable of
meeting the challenges to privacy presented by the advance of
technology and the modern reality of living in a highly regulated
society. Just as the Framers could not possibly have anticipated the
electronic device used by government agents in Katz, perhaps the
Katz majority also strove to create a test flexible enough to withstand
technologies that the Court, writing its opinion in 1967, also could
not predict.
Of course, the danger with creating such an open test is that,
rather than accepting the invitation Katz arguably offered to establish
a more nuanced, balanced approach to defining searches, courts may
instead opt for an uncritical application of the test that simply
provides the desired outcome. A mere four years after Katz, Justice
Harlan himself expressed concern that the Court’s application of
Katz lacked normative content and vigorously dissented from the
result in United States v. White, in which the Court held that the
government’s surreptitious listening to the defendant’s conversation
private, without taking into account the subject of the conversation. After all, Mr.
Katz’s conversation could be viewed as a type of contraband, as he was convicted
under a statute prohibiting the transmission of gambling information through wire
communication. See id. at 348 n.1 (setting out 18 U.S.C. § 1084).
108
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
109
See, e.g., Michael Campbell, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the
Supreme Court’s Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191 (1986); Goldberger, supra
note 87; Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An
Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077 (1987).
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with an informant wearing a concealed radio transmitter did not
110
The Court, in reaching its
violate the Fourth Amendment.
decision, relied on the misplaced trust, or assumption-of-risk,
111
112
rationale of Hoffa v. United States, Lewis v. United States, and Lopez v.
113
United States, which was left undisturbed by the test announced in
114
In other words, when one chooses his confidences unwisely,
Katz.
and assumes the risk that the one to whom he is speaking is in fact a
government agent or informant, he cannot justifiably rely on an
expectation of privacy. In his dissent, Justice Harlan stated,
While these formulations represent an advance over the
unsophisticated trespass analysis of the common law, they
too have their limitations and can, ultimately, lead to the
substitution of words for analysis. The analysis must, in my
view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or
legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations,
110

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). The various conversations
overheard by government agents included a conversation taking place in the
defendant’s home. Id. at 747. For Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion, see id. at
76895 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
111
385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that information received from a secret
government informer and used to obtain a conviction of James Hoffa, the Teamsters’
union leader, did not constitute an illegal search, because the informer was an
invited guest).
112
385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (“When the home is opened as a place of illegal
business to which outsiders are invited for commercial purposes, the Fourth
Amendment is not violated when a government agent enters pursuant to an
invitation and then neither sees, hears, nor takes anything either unrelated to the
business purpose of his visit or not contemplated by the occupant.”).
113
373 U.S. 427 (1963) (holding that an undercover agent’s secretive wire
recording of a conversation with defendant did not violate defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights, despite the fact that the conversation took place in defendant’s
office).
114
In reaching its decision, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, which had
found that simultaneous broadcasting of the conversation at issue in White violated
Katz, and thus, the Fourth Amendment. See White, 401 U.S. at 745. The Court of
Appeals had reasoned that, although Hoffa, Lewis, and Lopez remained good law after
Katz, On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), a case, like White, also involving realtime broadcasting of a conversation, did not survive, prompting its decision in favor
of the defendant. White, 401 U.S. at 745. The Supreme Court upheld On Lee, based
not on the original rationale of the case—that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation in the absence of a physical trespass—as that reasoning was rendered
irrelevant after Katz, but based on the alternate argument that the defendant in On
Lee “‘was talking confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted, and he was
overheard . . . .’” Id. at 750 (quoting On Lee, 354 U.S. at 75354). Thus, the Supreme
Court was able to maintain its previous precedents condoning the use of informants
and undercover officers (a significant source of information for law enforcement)
without reliance on trespass doctrine, by fitting that type of surveillance into Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy framework. See White, 401 U.S. at 750.
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and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws
that translate into rules the customs and values of the past
and present. . . . [W]e should not, as judges, merely recite
the expectations and risks without examining the
desirability of saddling them upon society. The critical
question, therefore, is whether under our system of
government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or
observer without at least the protection of a warrant
115
requirement.
116
Justice Harlan answered that critical question in the negative,
and his misgivings about a facile and uncritical application of the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test were well founded, for the
phrase has indeed taken on the talismanic quality the Katz majority
sought to avoid by rejecting recognition of Fourth Amendment
interests based on a mechanical identification of “constitutionally
117
protected area[s].”
The post-Katz Court simply substituted
constitutionally protected areas for those areas or places in which a
defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy, at least under the
118
formulation adopted by the Court in Rakas.
Ironically, the Rakas
Court criticized the “legitimately on premises” test of standing it
overruled as being “simply a label placed by the courts on results
119
which have not been subjected to careful analysis.” And yet, Justice
Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Court, failed to explain why the
defendants did not have the requisite interest in a private vehicle they
occupied with the owner’s consent, and in which they concealed
objects in the glove compartment and under the front passenger
120
seat. For Justice White, the reason for this failure is simple, and he
115

White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See id.
117
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (“We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues.
In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected
area.’”).
118
See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 148.
119
Id. at 148. Rakas overruled the much broader test for standing provided in
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960) (“No just interest of the Government in
the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by
recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may
challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to
be used against him.”).
120
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 165 (White, J., dissenting) (“More importantly, how is the
Court able to avoid answering the question why presence in a private place with the
owner’s permission is insufficient. If it is ‘tautological to fall back on the notion that
those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases
116
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challenged the Court, if concerned with the costs of the exclusionary
rule, to deal directly with the legitimacy of that rule itself and not
reach the Court’s desired outcomes by distorting Fourth Amendment
121
doctrine and values.
Putting aside, for the moment, Justice White’s assessment that,
upon deciding Rakas, the Court held “that the Fourth Amendment
122
protects property, not people,” what can be said with certainty some
forty years after Katz was decided? Having a legitimate expectation of
privacy in a house or curtilage does not necessarily require ownership
123
of such premises, nor is an ownership interest sufficient. When it is
a car that is searched, an ownership interest seems to be necessary,
124
but again, not sufficient.
And what about a public phone booth?
The result in Rakas is difficult to reconcile with Katz, even as the
former adopted the test of the latter (or, as this Article submits, some
version of it). It is difficult to explain, in any real-world sense, how
Mr. Katz had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a conversation
held in a public phone booth, while Mr. Rakas did not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the items he concealed from the
public in the privately owned car of his companion. Imagine that,
instead of hiding rifle shells and a sawed-off shotgun in the vehicle,
Mr. Rakas entered the vehicle, shut the door, and engaged in a
conversation with his companion, the owner of the car. Would the
police be entitled to place a listening device on the outside of the car,
without the car owner’s permission, and record the conversation
taking place inside? And, would Mr. Rakas even be permitted to
object? Perhaps there is something more sacred about conversations
than shotguns, but perhaps not. After all, just as our conversations

deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases,’ then it surely must be
tautological to decide that issue simply by unadorned fiat.”) (internal citation
omitted).
121
Id. at 157.
122
Id. at 156.
123
See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that overnight guests do
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their host’s home, despite a lack of
ownership or other property interest); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding
that, although ordinarily, one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in one’s
curtilage, there is no such expectation with respect to aerial observation from
navigable airspace); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that one has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed from inside one’s
home).
124
See Rakas, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)
(holding that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy implicated when a trained
dog sniffs and alerts to contraband located in one’s car).
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125

are constitutionally protected, so, too, can we claim a constitutional
126
right to bear arms. Ignoring (as we must) the fact that the shotgun
in Rakas was an instrumentality of crime, and Katz’s conversation
127
itself was unlawful, it seems that both Mr. Rakas and Mr. Katz would
have been reasonable in their expectations that what they sought to
keep private would remain so.
It is not helpful simply to say that Rakas reached the wrong result
and identified the wrong standard, without discerning what the
correct standard should be. For that, one must return to the majority
opinion of Katz itself. Places and areas are relevant, as are the
questions of ownership or other possessory interests in, and physical
trespasses onto, such places and areas, and Katz did not repudiate
this; it simply said that such factors should not be considered “in the
128
abstract” and that the reach of the Amendment “cannot turn upon
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
129
enclosure.” The key to determining whether a Fourth Amendment
search has occurred, and the closest the majority comes to
articulating a “test” is to ask whether the government violated not an
expectation of privacy, but the actual privacy upon which the defendant
130
“justifiably relied.”
In other words, was the information or object
discovered by the police otherwise hidden, would it have remained
so, and would the individual seeking to keep it hidden have been
entitled to believe that it would have remained so, absent some action
on part of the police?
The Katz majority, while not reducing this concept to a more
concrete test, did elaborate by providing that the conduct of the
defendant in trying to maintain his privacy and his intent to keep the
object of the government’s search to himself (or, in the case of a
conversation, to himself and his conversant) are relevant in
determining whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment have
been triggered. Justice Stewart wrote in Katz, “[w]hat a person
125

See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”).
126
See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed.”); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (affirming
personal right to bear arms under the Second Amendment).
127
Of course, the precise contents of the glove compartment or the conversation
would be unknown to law enforcement until after privacy is breached and the search,
or non-search, has already occurred. Thus, such ex-post knowledge cannot play a role
in determining, ex-ante, the reasonableness of defendant’s expectation of privacy.
128
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
129
Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
130
Id.
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knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not the subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private . . .
131
may be constitutionally protected.” Notice that although one seeks
to preserve one’s privacy, one may not ultimately be successful in
doing so.
Justice Harlan’s formulation of the Katz test seems to take this
language as a departing point and focuses solely on the conduct and
132
expectations of the defendant.
A more symmetrical, and more
accurate, understanding of the Katz “justifiable reliance” test also
requires an examination of the government’s conduct in the
threshold analysis of whether a search has occurred, before turning
to the government’s conduct once again, if that threshold is met, to
133
determine the ultimate issue of whether that search is reasonable.
Modern post-Katz doctrine has focused solely on the defendant’s
perspective for purposes of determining the threshold question, and
nowhere is this more obvious than in the standing cases, in which the
defendant’s relationship with the place searched is the sole criteria
examined, and the second, substantive stage of determining whether
police acted reasonably is never even reached.
While the Katz opinion does speak to the defendant’s conduct,
the government’s conduct must be examined at the threshold stage
as well, and this is implicit, if not explicit, in Katz. We know that Mr.
Katz’s conversation did not in fact remain private, but it is the
method of its disclosure to government agents that made it a search.
Had Mr. Katz, fully intending to keep his conversation private, shut
the door to the telephone booth, but nonetheless shouted so that
agents, or indeed any passersby, could hear him, then there would
have been no search. In modern terms, his subjective expectation of
privacy would not have been objectively reasonable. But Mr. Katz’s
conversation with his bookie did not come to light because it was
audible by the naked ear outside the phone booth; it was revealed to
government agents because of their “activities in electronically

131

Id. at 351 (internal citation omitted).
See White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As previously discussed,
Justice Harlan himself indicated his dissatisfaction with the Court’s treatment of his
test, because of the concentrated focus on the defendant’s expectations without any
normative inquiry as to what sort of surveillance on the part of the government we
should tolerate in a free society. See id.
133
For example, once it is determined that a search occurred, the Court must
examine the government’s conduct in conducting that search and decide whether it
conformed to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
132
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134

listening to and recording [Mr. Katz’s] words.”
In other words, if
one examines and focuses on the agents’ conduct (as the Katz
majority did), they were not merely passing by, or even secreting
135
themselves in a nearby bush to overhear the conversation.
They
placed a listening and recording device on the outside of the booth,
and it was this conduct that made the discovery of the evidence a
136
search and, consequently, a subject of Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
While this analysis of the Katz’s underlying facts and conclusion
may seem simple, perhaps even painfully obvious, this Article seeks to
illuminate what has been obscured, but nonetheless is inherent in the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, especially when read in
conjunction with Justice Stewart’s majority opinion: that an
expectation of privacy on which one may justifiably rely must take
into account the expectations that society harbors with respect to
government conduct, which entails a normative inquiry as to how we
expect, and indeed, want, our government to interact with its citizens.
Such a conduct-oriented test will require careful analysis of specific
facts and circumstances each time a court is called upon to determine
whether or not a search has occurred, and this may impact the clarity
137
(if any such claim can be made) of the existing regime. Police are
134

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
Justice Black, in dissent, points out that eavesdropping by the unaided ear,
even in secret, was not unknown to the Framers. See id. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting).
“There can be no doubt that the Framers were aware of this practice, and if they had
desired to outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe
that they would have used the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 366. What Justice Black failed to acknowledge, however, is that
it is much easier to protect oneself against the type of eavesdropping the Framers
would have been familiar with, for example, by whispering, although this Article does
not make a normative claim that we should all assume that someone is lingering
outside our windows and at all times speak in hushed tones. That said, however, it is
much more difficult to protect a conversation against technology that the average
citizen may not be aware of, and may not realistically be able to overcome.
136
The focus of this Article is on the necessity of examining governmental
conduct as part of the threshold search determination. It is worth pointing out here,
however, that the conduct of the government would be further examined at the
second stage, the determination of reasonableness. As the Katz Court stated, the
agents acted “with restraint” and did not gather any more information than would
have been authorized by warrant. Id. at 356. However, that was simply not sufficient
to satisfy the demands of the Fourth Amendment, which requires a warrant before
the government may conduct a search, at least in the absence of some lawful
justification for the failure to acquire one. Id.
137
While it is nearly impossible to make a claim that current Fourth Amendment
doctrine provides an easily administrable set of rules, a categorical approach to
defining searches at least establishes certain definite boundaries that police officers
can follow.
135
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certain, for example, that they may trespass upon a suspect’s land, as
long it is far enough from her home, regardless of what signs she has
posted or fences she has erected to keep the public off of her
138
property.
While there is a valid argument for providing the police with
bright-line rules to guide them in their day-to-day enforcement
decisions, there is also a real danger that Fourth Amendment rights
are violated when individual rights are subservient to clarity and
139
efficiency. The Fourth Amendment does offer a bright-line rule: a
warrant is required before the government may search, but this
bright line has already been dimmed by considerations to efficient
law enforcement that have resulted in a myriad of exceptions to the
general rule. Just as officers are required to make judgments as to
whether, for example, an exigency truly exists that makes a warrant
140
unnecessary, officers may make judgments as to whether their
investigative activities constitute a search. It would be unfair and
impractical to require police officers to make hair-splitting
distinctions, but just as the conduct of the suspect (with respect to
maintaining her privacy) is held to a standard of reasonableness, so
too, should the conduct of the officer. Thus, police conduct is not
evaluated in a vacuum, but in light of societal norms and existing law.
In the context of a due process challenge to a criminal statute, the
Court stated:
A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice
of the required conduct to one who would avoid its
penalties, and to guide the judge in its application . . . . But
few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols,
most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen
variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities
of discharging the business of government inevitably limit
the specificity with which legislators can spell out
prohibitions. Consequently, no more than a reasonable
degree of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it unfair to
138

See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). The Court indeed eschewed a
test that would be based on factual inquiries as to the height of fences and the
number and nature of posted signs. Id.
139
In Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court adopted a brightline approach to searches incident to lawful arrest, permitting the search of the
entire person and all containers, regardless of whether the actual justifications for
this exception to the warrant requirement exist, namely the danger that the arrestee
will harm the officer or others, or otherwise impede law enforcement by resisting
arrest or destroying evidence. See id.
140
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an
area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may
141
cross the line.
Is it unfair to require of police officers a similar assumption of
risk when police conduct violates social norms, when that risk entails
very little in terms of personal consequence to the officer? After all,
the police officer whose conduct crosses over the line of what is
constitutionally permissible generally faces only suppression of
evidence, while the defendant whose conduct has violated a criminal
142
statute faces great personal consequences.
Thus far, this Article has identified one of the most significant
flaws in the Court’s Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence: the
concentrated attention on the acts of the victim and the victim’s
relationship with a given area to define whether the government has
conducted a Fourth Amendment search. This almost exclusive focus
on the victim has led to a narrow definition of Fourth Amendment
searches, one that does not comport with the reality of society’s
expectations, is ill-equipped to protect against further encroachment
against privacy, and is decidedly government-friendly. This Article
has also shown, however, that Katz, even taking into account Justice
Harlan’s formulation of the majority’s holding, does not mandate an
approach that only contemplates the victim’s actions and
expectations, but in fact supports a more robust examination of the
conduct of both victim and law enforcement in defining a search.
Although, at first blush, it may seem unlikely that the law of rape
might inform the pursuit of a normatively sounder definition of a
search, rape law has undergone the very transition this Article
suggests is necessary in the Fourth Amendment search context: a shift
from a definition of the offense that relies solely on the victim’s
actions and intent to one that meaningfully takes into account the
conduct of the perpetrator (of the rape or of the search, as the case
may be). An examination of the evolution of rape law, to which the
Article now turns, including the specific reforms achieved as well as
the conditions that fueled the movement for drastic change, will
141

Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952).
While it is true that federal officers may face damages under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and state
officers may face civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the doctrine of qualified
immunity, established by the Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982),
offers considerable protection to officers who may violate one’s Fourth Amendment
(or other constitutional or statutory) rights, as long as the rights at issue are not
“clearly established” at the time of the violation. See id.
142
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reveal striking parallels to Fourth Amendment search law, as it has
developed under Katz, and will illuminate the pressing need for a
similar evolution in defining the search.
143

III. THE EVOLUTION OF RAPE LAW: WE’VE COME A LONG WAY, BABY
A. Rape Law Then: Helpful to Defendants, Hostile to Victims

[Rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and
harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent.
144
–Mathew Hale
The prospect of being raped is terrifying to its potential victim,
so much so that feminists conceived of rape as a method of control
that “kept women off the streets, confined to their homes, and unsafe
145
even there.”
However, as evidenced by Sir Matthew Hale’s
observation, quoted above, men were also terrified of rape, not
146
necessarily as victims, but as potential accusees. While the law may
143

See Highlights: Marketing Cigarettes to Women, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/2001/highlights
/marketing (last visited Nov. 24, 2012). The phrase “We’ve Come a Long Way, Baby”
is almost certain to conjure up images of elegantly dressed women smoking long,
slender cigarettes (demonstrating how effective the Phillip Morris advertising
campaign was in its day), although the exact slogan was, “You’ve Come a Long Way,
Baby.” Unfortunately, Phillip Morris was extremely successful in its approach,
tapping into the burgeoning women’s movement and creating the illusion that
smoking was somehow linked to independence and success. See id. So successful
were they, along with their competitors, that there was a significant increase in the
initiation of smoking among teenaged girls, proportional to the increase in sales of
cigarettes targeted specifically to women. See id. My use of a variant of the slogan is,
of course, by no means meant as an endorsement of smoking. “We’ve Come a Long
Way, Baby” is also the title of an album and song performed by Loretta Lynn, which,
quite appropriately to this discussion, includes the following lines: “Up to now, I’ve
been an object made for pleasin’ you. Times have changed and I’m demanding
satisfaction, too.” See LORETTA LYNN, We’ve Come a Long Way Baby, on WE’VE COME A
LONG
WAY
BABY
(MCA
1978),
available
at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpHzJ0Igayo.
144
KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS ON RAPE 18 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1999) (quoting 1 MATHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1847)).
145
Patricia Smith, Social Revolution and the Persistence of Rape, in A MOST
DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 32, 35 (Keith Burgess-Jackson
ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1999).
146
One reform from the common law definition of rape is to frame the offense in
gender-neutral terms, allowing for the prosecution of rape (or sexual assault)
committed by a perpetrator of either gender upon a victim of either gender. See, e.g.,
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (2011) (defining rape as occurring when “[a] person
engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant” under proscribed circumstances)
(emphasis added). For the purposes of this Article, I maintain the traditional,
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have done little to assuage the terror of women, traditional rape law
acknowledged and sought to alleviate men’s fear of being convicted
for sexual behavior that may have crossed the line by making that line
very clear and difficult to cross, and by erecting significant substantive
and evidentiary barriers to conviction. Hale was absolutely correct in
one respect: under traditional rape law it was indeed hard to prove
that a victim of undesired sexual intercourse had, in fact, been raped.
Standing as an obstacle between perpetrator and conviction, and
between victim and vindication, various characteristics of traditional
rape law ensured that only the most egregious acts of sexual
aggression were punishable. Blackstone defined rape as “carnal
147
knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.”
Under this
definition, force and nonconsent were both required elements; thus,
a man who proceeded to have intercourse with a woman, even one
who clearly did not consent, did not rape the woman if he did not
have to resort to the use or threat of severe force to accomplish the
148
State v. Alston provides an example of this dual
penetration.
requirement at work, in which the North Carolina Supreme Court
overturned the conviction of a physically abusive defendant who had
demanded sex from his former live-in girlfriend when she told him
149
that she wanted to end their relationship.
The Court had little
gender-specific approach assuming male perpetrators upon female victims, for ease
of writing, for better applicability to my analogy to the Fourth Amendment, and to
reflect statistical data. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW
387 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS] (referencing 1997
Bureau of Justice statistics indicating a 1.8 per 100 rate of victimization for women,
compared to a rate lower than 0.1 for men). I do not mean in any way to imply that
men are not also victims of this brutal offense or to minimize the gravity of harm to
any victim, female or male. I also wish to acknowledge the important work of
Professor I. Bennett Capers in raising awareness of “male rape victimization and our
collective response to such victimization.” I. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CAL.
L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2011). According to a 2008 Bureau of Justice Statistics study,
“more than 36,000 males age 12 and over were victims of completed rape or
attempted rape . . . and . . . one in thirty-three men in the United States has been the
victim of rape or attempted rape.” Id. at 1261.
147
BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at 210. See also Keith Burgess-Jackson, A History of
Rape Law, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 15
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1999) (tracing the history of rape law from 1900 B.C.).
148
E.g., David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 355 (2000);
Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra note 31, at 416–17; Estrich, supra note 28, at
1105–07.
149
State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 402 (1984). After the victim, Cottie Brown, told
the defendant that their relationship was finished, he “said that since everyone could
see her but him he had a right to make love to her again.” Id. The Court described
their six-month sexual relationship as “consensual,” despite the fact that Alston had
“struck her several times throughout the relationship when she . . . refused to do
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difficulty reaching the conclusion that the victim, Cottie Brown, had
not consented to the intercourse: she had told the defendant
immediately preceding the intercourse that she was not willing to
150
have sex with him.
Although the intercourse was clearly “against
151
her will,” Brown remained passive as Alston undressed her, “pushed
152
apart her legs and had sexual intercourse with her” while she cried.
The Court recognized, and then dismissed, her “general fear” of
Alston because, even though her fear was justified by his prior
conduct, the Court found it insufficient to prevent her resistance to
that specific act of intercourse on that particular occasion and,
153
therefore, insufficient to demonstrate Alston’s use of force.
Moreover, not only did the Court not credit Brown’s general fear of
Alston, based on the couple’s past, but it found that the acts of
grabbing her arm and threatening to “fix her face” on the very day of
the alleged rape, after he accosted her at her school, telling her “she
was going to miss class that day,” were also too remote from the
intercourse at issue to qualify as the use or threatened use of force
154
necessary to support a rape conviction.
The result of Alston led Professor Susan Estrich to note the
paradox created by acknowledging that sex may be simultaneously
without consent and without force: “In other words, the woman was
not forced to engage in sex, but the sex she engaged in was against
155
her will.” This paradox, Professor Estrich tells us, can be expected
what he wanted,” despite the fact that she often remained passive during intercourse,
and even with the finding that “their consensual sexual relations involved some
violence.” Id. at 401.
150
Id. at 403.
151
Id. at 408.
152
Id. at 403.
153
Id. at 409. “[A]bsent evidence that the defendant used force or threats to
overcome the will of the victim to resist the sexual intercourse alleged to have been
rape, such general fear was not sufficient to show that the defendant used the force
required to support a conviction of rape.” Id.
154
State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 402 (1984).
The State did not offer substantial evidence, however, of the element
of force. As we have stated, actual physical force need not be shown in
order to establish force sufficient to constitute an element of the crime
of rape. Threats of serious bodily harm which reasonably induce fear
thereof are sufficient. In the present case there was no substantial
evidence of either actual or constructive force. . . . This threat by the
defendant and his act of grabbing Brown by the arm at the school,
although they may have induced fear, appeared to have been unrelated
to the act of sexual intercourse between Brown and the defendant.
Id. at 408.
155
Estrich, supra note 28, at 1111. Professor Estrich also describes another
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when force is understood in terms of the “traditional male notion of
a fight . . . . In a fight, you hit your assailant with your fists or your
elbows or your knees. In a fight, the one attacked fights back. In
these terms, there was no fight in Alston. Therefore, there was no
156
force.”
For Estrich, physical force can be, but is generally not,
157
understood as “the power one need not use.” Alston did not have
to use physical force to engage in intercourse with the passive, yet
unwilling, Brown because she was unable to fight back: “[h]ers is the
reaction of people who have already been beaten, or who never had
158
the power to fight in the first instance.”
If the victim does not or cannot fight back, then of course, the
perpetrator does not have to resort to force, at least as force was
159
traditionally understood.
Therefore, as a practical matter, the
prosecution would be unable to prove one of the elements of forcible
rape—force—without the victim providing the impetus for the use of
force against her by her resistance. This de facto element of the
victim’s resistance, however, does more than simply necessitate the
use of the required force; it also defines the level of force that is
punishable and establishes, as an evidentiary matter, another
160
required element—the victim’s lack of consent to the intercourse.
Thus, if the woman failed to resist, absent good reason for her
161
failure, the law generally (though not always, as highlighted by
unsettling North Carolina case, State v. Lester, 321 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(aff’d 313 N.C. 595 (1985), but overruled by State v. Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987)),
in which the Court of Appeals applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Alston to hold
that a father alleged to have raped his fifteen-year-old daughter (he was alleged to
have had intercourse with all three of his daughters, and with this particular victim as
early as at the age of eleven) did not, in fact, use the required force to support a
conviction, even though in the past he beat the children’s mother (in view of his
children), his girlfriend, and his son, and threatened to kill the mother and the
daughter in question. Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals also found that the
intercourse was against the victim’s will, but nonetheless had this to say: “There is no
evidence, however, that defendant used either actual or constructive force to
accomplish the acts with which he is charged. As Alston makes clear, the victim’s fear
of defendant, however justified by his previous conduct, is insufficient to show that
defendant forcibly raped his daughter [on the days in question].” Id. at 761
(emphasis in original).
156
Estrich, supra note 28, at 1111.
157
Id. at 1115.
158
Id. at 1111.
159
Bryden, supra note 148, at 356.
160
Anderson, supra note 29, at 967; Estrich, supra note 28, at 1130.
161
A woman’s will to resist (and thus, the requirement for her to do so) could be
overcome by sufficient threats on the part of the perpetrator, although as Alston
demonstrated, such threats had to be specific to the act of intercourse at issue. See
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162

Professor Estrich) presumed that the intercourse was not against
her will; in fact, the historically prevailing view was that “a truly
unwilling woman would fight nearly to the death to protect her
163
virtue.” The victim’s utmost resistance, then, served to put the man
clearly on notice, thereby eliminating issues of mistake as to consent,
and also identified the victim who, by risking her life to safeguard her
164
chastity, earned the protection of the law as well. As for resistance
and its relationship to force, a requirement of utmost resistance saved
courts from the difficult task of defining precisely how much force

State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 409 (1984); see also State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 244
(1981) (holding that a woman’s failure to resist must be a result of threats that
generate fear that is “reasonably grounded”). In State v. Rusk, the Maryland Court of
Appeals reinstated the conviction of the defendant, primarily based on its conclusion
that the question of reasonableness of the complainant’s fear was a matter for the
jury. Id. In Rusk, the victim, met the defendant at a bar, gave him a ride home to an
unfamiliar area, and then accompanied him to his room (first having declined his
invitation) after he had taken her car keys. Id. She remained in his room while he
went to the bathroom, and when he returned, he asked her to undress herself and
remove his clothing as well. Id. The victim described what happened next:
I was really scared, because I can’t describe, you know, what was said. It
was more the look in his eyes; and I said, at that point—I didn’t know
what to say; and I said, “If I do what you want, will you let me go
without killing me?” Because I didn’t know, at that point, what he was
going to do; and I started to cry; and when I did, he put his hands on
my throat, and started lightly to choke me; and I said, “If I do what you
want, will you let me go?” And he said, yes, and at that time, I
proceeded to do what he wanted me to.
Rusk v. State, 43 Md. App. 476, 47879 (1979) (en banc), rev’d, 289 Md. 230 (1981).
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding that none
of the defendant’s “words or actions created in the mind of the victim a reasonable
fear that if she resisted, he would have harmed her, or that faced with such
resistance, he would have used force to overcome it.” Id. at 484. The Court of
Appeals reversed the intermediate court over a vehement dissent, arguing that
defendant was more a “seducer” than a rapist, and that the truly unwilling woman
must “follow the natural instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than mere
words, the violation of her person . . . . She must make it plain that she regards such
sexual acts as abhorrent and repugnant to her natural sense of pride.” Id. at 255
(1981) (Murphy, J., dissenting). For Chief Judge Murphy, the fact that the
defendant did not utter any specific verbal threats to physically and grievously harm
the victim, coupled with the fact that he did not display or threaten to use a weapon,
left him unable to “understand how a victim could participate in these sexual
activities and not be willing.” Id. at 257.
162
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
163
Estrich, supra note 28, at 1130. Professor Ross recognizes the same
presumption at work in the criminal procedure context, noting that consent is
equated with submission to power. Ross, supra note 3, at 2–4 (“Just as rape victims
were told they asked for it by wearing short dresses and not screaming for help,
individuals are told they asked for it by extending their arms to be searched.”).
164
Estrich, supra note 28, at 1130.
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exceeded the legally acceptable limit by demarking that limit with a
165
bright, if not unrealistic, line drawn by the victim’s response.
In sum, under the traditional approach, if the victim did not
resist vehemently, neither nonconsent nor force were proved, and
therefore, the intercourse was not considered rape. Perhaps one of
the most notorious examples of the utmost resistance requirement
166
can be found in Brown v. State.
The defendant tripped a sixteenyear-old girl (recently recovering from an episode of measles) to the
ground, and forced her to engage in intercourse with him. She
described her response to his attack in the following way:
I tried as hard as I could to get away. I was trying all the
time to get away just as hard as I could, I was trying to get
up; I pulled at the grass; I screamed as hard as I could, and
he told me to shut up, and I didn’t, and then he held his
167
hand on my mouth until I was almost strangled.
However, there were no tears in the clothing of either party,
other than a one-inch tear in the victim’s underwear, and no bruises
or other injuries to demonstrate the “terrific resistance which the
determined woman should make” and which is “essential to the crime
168
of rape.” What did the law require of this young woman before she
could be called a victim of rape? According to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court:
Not only must there be entire absence of mental consent,
but there must be the most vehement exercise of every
physical means or faculty within the woman’s power to resist
the penetration of her person, and this must be shown to
persist until the offense is consummated. . . . Except for one
demand, when first seized, to “let me go,” and inarticulate
screams, she mentions no verbal protests . . . . [W]e cannot
conceive it possible that one whose mind and exertions had,
during an encounter of this sort, been set on resistance,
could or would in narrative mention nothing but escape or
withdrawal. A woman’s means of protection are not limited
to that, but she is equipped to interpose most effective
169
obstacles by means of hands and limbs and pelvic muscles.
And what of the fact that there were no marks or signs of a
struggle? This leads us to another feature of pre-reform rape law
165
166
167
168
169

See id.
Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536 (Wis. 1906).
Id. at 537.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 538.
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(although not of common law origin): the corroboration
170
Other procedural features of pre-reform rape law
requirement.
171
included the “fresh complaint” rule, as well as the use of cautionary
instructions, to ensure that jurors did not rush to convict without first
“evaluat[ing] the testimony of a victim . . . with special care in view of
the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of
determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried
172
out in private.”
One final procedural feature of pre-reform rape law to address
here is the use of the victim’s prior sexual history as a tool of cross-

170

E.g., Estrich, supra note 28, at 1137. Although not a common law rule, the
corroboration requirement was set out in the Model Penal Code and was, at one
time, in effect in a significant number of states. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5)
(2011); Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra note 31, at 416. I remind the reader of
Sir Matthew Hale’s concern for the “never so innocent” party accused of rape, a
concern prompted by a distrust of women generally and a fear of fabrication on the
part of a woman whose dishonor may have been discovered, or whose accusation is
prompted by vengeance, or who simply cannot separate her fantasies about rape
from reality. Estrich, supra note 28, at 1137. Therefore, this evidentiary hurdle to
conviction was based on the following rationale: “[s]ince stories of rape are
frequently lies or fantasies, it is reasonable to provide that such a story, in itself,
should not be enough evidence to convict a man of a crime.” See id. at 1137 n.157
(quoting Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1967)).
Because most rapes occur in private, without the benefit of witnesses, the victim’s
testimony would need to be supplemented by other corroborating evidence, such as
the bruises, injuries, and other signs of struggle that were so notably absent from the
body or clothing of either victim or assailant in Brown, a “situation” the court there
found “well-nigh incredible.” Brown, 106 N.W. at 539. Wisconsin, in fact, did not
have a formal corroboration rule, but even absent such a requirement, the burden
on the victim to establish that she had been raped (and had adequately resisted) was
a difficult one to overcome in the absence of physical signs of a struggle. See id.
“This court does not hold, with some, that, as matter of law, rape cannot be
established by the uncorroborated testimony of the sufferer, but, in common with all
courts, recognizes that, without such corroboration, her testimony must be most
clear and convincing. Among the corroborating circumstances almost universally
present in cases of actual rape are the signs and marks of the struggle upon the
clothing and persons of the participants . . . .” Id.
171
E.g., Estrich, supra note 28, at 1139. Although the “fresh complaint” rule
found its absolute form, again, in the MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (2011)
(providing that prosecution was barred unless the offense was brought to the
attention of the police within three months of the occurrence, or in the case of a
child under the age of 16, within three months of a parent, guardian, or other
similarly situated adult learning of the incident), at common law, delay in reporting
created a compelling presumption against the victim, based on the fear of a woman’s
accusations being prompted by discovery of pregnancy, bitterness over the
dissolution of a relationship, and even the desire to blackmail the former sexual
partner. See id.
172
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (2011).
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173

examination at trial. Not only might the victim be cross-examined
as to her sexual past, but often testimony of third parties was
174
The victim’s prior history was thought to be
introduced as well.
relevant in two ways. First, the fact that the woman had an unchaste
character cast an aspersion on her general character for truthfulness
175
as a witness. Second, it demonstrated that, because she had
consented to sexual intercourse on a prior occasion, she was more
likely to have consented on the particular occasion alleged to be
176
rape.
These practices, however, went beyond simply assessing
credibility and propensity, by, in effect, putting the victim on trial,
causing her public humiliation, and attaching blame to her for
causing her own rape. Thus, if the victim engaged in a high-risk
lifestyle, by frequenting singles bars, for example, she was thought to
177
have assumed the risk of being raped.
And, if the victim was
clothed in a sexually provocative way, she had, again, assumed the
risk that the man she had so tempted would interpret her attire as
178
willingness to be his sexual partner.
For example, a three-man and three-woman Florida jury
acquitted a man of forcible rape, after he abducted the
victim, who was dressed in a lace mini-skirt without
underwear, at knife-point from outside a restaurant, and
repeatedly had intercourse with her during a five-hour
period. The male foreman of the jury stated that “[w]e felt
173

See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 148, at 319; Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra
note 31, at 416; Estrich, supra note 28, at 1094.
174
E.g., Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra note 31, at 416.
175
E.g., id.; Klein, supra note 29, at 990.
176
E.g., Klein, supra note 29, at 990. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide that, although evidence to prove “action in conformity” with one’s character
or character trait is generally inadmissible, such evidence may be admitted in certain
limited circumstances, such as when an accused seeks to offer evidence of the
character of the victim of the alleged crime. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). Whereas today
the ability of a defendant in a rape prosecution to offer evidence of the character of
the alleged victim has been limited by the enactment of Rule 412, when the Federal
Rules were first promulgated, this precise use was so typical that it merited mention
in the Advisory Committee Notes as an example of the rule. See FED. R. EVID. 412
advisory committee’s note (“[A]n accused may introduce pertinent evidence of the
character of the victim, as in support of a claim of self-defense to a charge of
homicide or consent in a case of rape.”). It is this use of prior sexual history
evidence—to show propensity to consent—that this Article will develop, by analogy,
in the context of searches, as the Court has taken a similar approach by equating
voluntary exposure of information to one party with exposure to the public at large.
See infra note 322 and accompanying text.
177
Klein, supra note 29, at 99192.
178
See Smith, supra note 145, at 34.
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she asked for it for the way she was dressed.” A female juror
explained, “[s]he was obviously dressed for a good
179
time . . . .”
Thus far, this examination of traditional rape law has revealed a
substantive definition of rape that requires both force and
nonconsent and measures the existence and sufficiency of both these
elements by the existence and sufficiency of the victim’s resistance
against her assailant, resulting in a definition of rape that placed the
180
burden on the victim to prevent the rape from occurring at all.
Further, pre-reform rape law erected additional, procedural barriers
to conviction in the way of a corroboration requirement, cautionary
instructions, and use of prior sexual history, resulting in a regime in
which the victim was in essence blamed (or at the very least severely
181
scrutinized) for the violence perpetrated against her. It should not
be surprising that this area of law, as this Article has briefly described
it, was the target of a great deal of outrage and, ultimately, the subject
of significant reform. The Article turns next to the broader criticisms
and goals of the reform movement that fueled the evolution of this
area of law.
B. Rape Law Under Siege: The Impetus for Change
It should not astonish the reader that the law of rape reflected
such a male-oriented bias; after all, at the time of its development,
women had no real influence over legal matters, even those that
182
concerned them so directly. It is greatly due to efforts of feminists
that the law has evolved to reflect a more balanced approach, one
that seeks to ameliorate the effects of this imbalance of power
between men and women. While one can conceive of this imbalance
in individual terms—meaning the disparity in physical size and
strength between the average man and woman, which makes it more
difficult for women generally to fend off a determined perpetrator
179

DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 146, at 42021 (citing Jury: Woman
in Rape Case “Asked for It”, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 1989, at 11).
180
See Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra note 31, at 414.
181
In developing the analogy to Fourth Amendment search law, this Article will
demonstrate that the law of searches bears a striking resemblance, at a conceptual
level, to the law of rape. The victim of an alleged search must also shoulder the
burden of demonstrating the desire to maintain privacy (nonconsent), as well as
sufficient government conduct aimed at breaching that privacy (what this Article will
refer to as force), by resorting to extreme measures to preserve that privacy, the
ultimate inefficacy of which often lead to the conclusion that no search has occurred.
See infra Part III.
182
See Dressler, Where We Have Been, supra note 31, at 410.
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(and has led many to question the wisdom of a requirement of
183
utmost physical resistance) —my focus is on the subjugation and
disfavored status of women as a class.
As numerous scholars have noted, in a patriarchal system that
conceived of women as property, rape was historically considered a
crime against a man—more precisely a crime against the particular
man, either the victim’s husband or father, who benefited from
184
control over sexual access to the victim.
Thus, “[r]ape of virgins
was a serious economic matter, with unmistakable characteristics of a
crime against property. For the married victim, rape appeared as an
excuse to be pleaded by a woman who would otherwise be executed
185
for adultery.”
Thus, women were either valuable commodities in
need of protection, creating a “dual male role of predator and
186
protector of the female prey,” or criminal defendants, subject to the
stereotype, prejudice, and distrust that adheres to most criminal
defendants, including those seeking to suppress evidence found by
allegedly unconstitutional means. Although, happily, women are no
longer regarded as property, and adultery and fornication are
187
generally no longer subject to criminal prosecution, the perception
of the complaining witness in a rape prosecution as being herself on
188
trial has persisted.
183

See infra text accompanying note 202.
See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 148, at 362 (citing SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST
OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 18 (1975)); Smith, supra note 145, at 32–33.
185
Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1781 (1992); see also Smith,
supra note 145, at 33 (“[W]omen were viewed more or less like valuable livestock or
perhaps uniquely prized possessions. Women, especially virgins, were very valuable
property.”).
186
Smith, supra note 145, at 33.
187
While adultery and fornication are still included in certain state criminal
codes, these crimes are rarely prosecuted, and, indeed, after the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which
invalidated Texas’s sodomy law, fornication laws (and likely adultery laws as well), if
challenged, will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. See Joanna Grossman, The
Virginia Supreme Court Strikes Down the State’s Fornication Law, Indicating that Other States’
Antiquated Laws Will Fall if Challenged, FINDLAW (Jan. 25, 2005),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20050125.html (discussing the Virginia
Supreme Court’s invalidation of a statute criminalizing fornication, and for an
analysis of the probable effect of Lawrence v. Texas on a variety of other criminal
statutes involving consensual sexual activity).
188
See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 28, at 10991100. In State v. Rusk, discussed above,
see supra note 161, Judge Cole, in his dissent, expressed his dissatisfaction with the
majority’s decision in terms that strongly reflect this mindset of the victim becoming
herself the accused by virtue of her bringing forward a complaint. State v. Rusk, 424
A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting) (asserting that in affirming the
184
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Ironically—but perhaps not surprisingly, considering the
parameters under which it developed—the law of rape, while
purporting to limit male sexual access to women, achieved the
opposite. If the goal of criminalizing rape was to “correct the existing
imbalance in sexual power . . . [by] constrain[ing] male sexual
189
autonomy,” traditional rape law, in practice, with its requirement of
physical resistance on the part of the victim, instead maintained a
system under which males were ensured extensive access to women
190
and only the most extreme uses of violence were punished.
After
all, as Susan Estrich points out, the law of rape reflected a male
perspective and imposed male standards of behavior on female
191
victims. In other words, the law of rape “has reflected, legitimized
and enforced a view of sex and women which celebrates male
192
aggressiveness and punishes female passivity.”
Thus, under a
traditional approach, men are permitted, if not expected, to respond
to some level of resistance (saying no, for example) with more
193
persistence and aggression, and the woman is forced to assume the
guilt for sexual intercourse that occurs in the absence of some ideal
194
level of resistance that she may not realistically be able to achieve.
While traditional rape law, according to critics, did much to
ensure the sexual autonomy of men, women did not enjoy a similar
freedom of choice. In fact, the sexual autonomy of women was
discouraged, certainly if one conceives of autonomy as the ability to
say yes as well as the ability to say no. Professor Coughlin, however,
cautions against the implication that men were always granted
unlimited sexual license, proposing that the development of rape law
conviction, “[t]he majority today . . . declares the innocence of an at best distraught
young woman.”). Indeed, the court below, which had reversed the defendant’s
conviction, began its discussion by describing the victim as a young mother,
separated but not divorced, who left her two-year-old son with her mother to attend a
high school reunion with a friend and go “bar hopping.” See Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d
624, 625 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
189
Coughlin, supra note 28, at 5.
190
See id.; Estrich, supra note 28, at 1122.
191
Estrich, supra note 28, at 1091 (“It is ‘boys’ rules’ applied to a boys’ fight.”).
192
Id. at 1092 (discussing “non-traditional” rapes, meaning those that occur “not
[in] an alley but a bedroom”).
193
Coughlin, supra note 28, at 5 (“Rape law thus instructs men that they are free
to ignore a woman’s verbal protests and even to construe such protests as expressing
her agreement to participate.”).
194
Anderson, supra note 29, at 957 (arguing that even though the standard of
resistance has been lowered over time, whichever level of resistance is required by
the woman still “conceptualizes resistance as a model of exemplary action against
which a real woman’s actions under the extreme stress of sexual attack are judged”).
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was inextricably connected with the Puritan prohibitions, applicable
195
Understood this
to both sexes, against fornication and adultery.
way, the burden on the alleged victim of a rape was akin to the hurdle
of any defendant asserting duress as a defense to a criminal charge,
and if she were to fail in her defense, presumably both parties to the
consensual (but nonetheless illegally extramarital) intercourse would
196
be punished.
Yet, putting aside fornication prosecutions, the stigma attached
to the woman engaging in consensual intercourse was, and to some
extent has remained, disproportionate to that suffered by a man
exercising the same freedom. In 1838, Judge Cowen, upholding the
admissibility of prior sexual history as relevant to sexual propensity in
197
People v. Abbot, asked,
[A]re we to be told . . . that the triers should be advised to
make no distinction in their minds between the virgin and a
tenant of the stew? Between one who would prefer death to
pollution, and another who, incited by lust and lucre, daily
offers her person to the indiscriminate embraces of the
198
other sex?
195

See Coughlin, supra note 28, at 10. In fact, Professor Coughlin points to
historical data indicating that, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, and for
the greater part of the eighteenth, fornication was prosecuted in county court to a
greater extent than any other category of criminal case, and, more importantly,
prosecuted quite even-handedly. Id. at 43 (quoting CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON,
WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN CONNECTICUT 160 (1995)).
That said, however, Professor Coughlin also notes that despite the appearance of
even-handed treatment, the ultimate goal of most of these prosecutions was to force
the parties into marriage, “an institution founded explicitly on the subordination of
women to men,” and further, that the law of adultery itself reflected a “sexual double
standard on its face,” because, at least in Connecticut, adultery was defined as being
committed with a married woman, leaving married men legally free to engage in
extramarital sex as long as their partners were unmarried. See id. at 4445 (citing
DAYTON, supra, at 114–15, 173).
196
Coughlin, supra note 28, at 42. Generally speaking, the common law defense
of duress required that the defendant demonstrate the following:
(1) another person threatened to kill or grievously injure the actor or a
third party . . . unless she committed the offense; (2) the actor
reasonably believed that the threat was genuine; (3) the threat was
‘present, imminent, and impending’ at the time of the criminal act; (4)
there was no reasonable escape from the threat except through
compliance with the demands of the coercer; and (5) the actor was not
at fault in exposing herself to the threat.
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at § 23.01.
197
19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
198
Id. at 195. Judge Cowen continues, “And will you not more readily infer assent
in the practiced Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous
Lucretia?” Id.
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And, while it was entirely proper to use prior sexual history to
attack a woman’s credibility as a witness, the Supreme Court of
Missouri, in 1895, disallowed the use of similar evidence to attack a
man’s credibility, stating,
It is a matter of common knowledge that the bad character
of a man for chastity does not even in the remotest degree
affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone,
while it does that of a woman. It is no compliment to a
woman to measure her character for truth by the same
standard that you do that of a man’s predicated upon
199
character for chastity.
Of course, attitudes and mores have changed and today’s world
bears little resemblance to the one experienced by the Puritans. Yet,
Professor Coughlin observes that “[t]he problem for women today is
that we seem to inhabit neither of these two worlds; rather, we live in
200
a world that combines the worst features of both.” While adultery
and fornication, if even still included in criminal codes, are rarely
201
prosecuted, the substantive law of rape still places a heavy burden
202
on women to prove their innocence of one of these offenses.
Further, while Professor Coughlin urges doctrinal changes to
eliminate the dilemma faced by rape complainants—that their claim
of being raped also serves as an admission of guilt—she concedes that
doctrinal solutions alone are inadequate to eliminate this prejudice
against women as long as social beliefs and conventions condemn
sexual activity by women, with such condemnation being manifested
203
through jury verdicts in rape trials.
Professor Patricia Smith further explores the sexual role of
women, noting the inconsistency of public attitudes, particularly in
the 1950s, that condemned sexual activity on the part of women while
204
nonetheless promoting a view of women as sex objects.
Thus,
according to Professor Smith, “women were supposed to be seductive
teasers who love sex themselves but somehow magically remain
199

State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 132 Mo. 102, 171 (1895). The Court continues by
noting how many “great and noble men,” including Lord Byron, had a “weakness . . .
for sexual pleasure.” Id.
200
Coughlin, supra note 28, at 45.
201
See supra note 187.
202
Coughlin, supra note 28, at 45. I remind the reader of Judge Cole’s
perception of the complainant, and of his disapproval of the majority’s decision to
uphold the defendant’s conviction, in State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981). See
supra text accompanying note 188.
203
Coughlin, supra note 28, at 4546.
204
Smith, supra note 145, at 35.
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205

pure.” At the same time, of course, women had to be careful not to
cross the line and tempt too much, as this would be seen as having
provoked the sexual encounter, or, indeed, be construed as
206
consent.
Taking into account this dual role of women as
seductresses who should nonetheless remain pure, coupled with a
distrust of women’s judgment and credibility, it is not surprising to
read in a 1966 student note, published in the Stanford Law Review,
that a high resistance standard is necessary, as a matter of fairness to
those accused of rape, to ensure that the woman who is ambivalent
about sex, or indeed may be “meaning ‘yes, yes, yes’” despite saying,
“‘no, no, no,’” is truly withholding consent at the time of the
207
intercourse rather than struggling with “moralistic afterthoughts.”
The various critiques briefly sketched above describe the law of
rape as having a male-oriented bias, and as reflecting the imbalance
of power between men and women at the time of its development.
While, according to feminist critics, the substantive definition of rape
ensured men broad sexual access to women, effectively promoting
male sexual autonomy while simultaneously restricting female sexual
liberty, the practice of rape facilitated male control over all aspects of
women’s lives by creating “an oppressive system in which the
production of fear has served to maintain women in a condition of
208
terror.”
As mentioned above, men undertook the dual roles of
protector and predator, and women depended for their safety on the
very class of individuals that they were taught to fear. Protection,
however, be it from the law or from men, came at a heavy price—”the
209
price of restriction.”
The woman who asserted her independence
210
too vigorously was considered fair game.
205

Id.
Id. at 34.
207
Roger B. Dworkin, Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 680, 682, 685 (1966) (quoted in Estrich, supra note 28, at 1128). Professor
Estrich quotes another student note, one that was quite influential, espousing the
view that not only do women lie, but that even a “normal girl” may be ambivalent
with regard to her own sexual desires and, further, that “a woman’s need for sexual
satisfaction may lead to the unconscious desire for forceful penetration, the coercion
serving neatly to avoid the guilt feelings which might arise after willing
participation.” Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: an Exploration of the Operation and
Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 6768 (1952) (quoted in Estrich,
supra note 28, at 1129).
208
Jeffrey A. Gauthier, Consent, Coercion, and Sexual Autonomy, in A MOST
DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 71, 73 (Keith Burgess-Jackson
ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1999).
209
Smith, supra note 145, at 34.
210
Id.
206
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With these broad critiques in mind, reformers sought to achieve
significant changes in the law of rape to eliminate the inequality
between men and women, improve male behavior, and promote
women’s sexual autonomy. This Article later argues that these
goals—achieving balance, improving behavior, and fostering
autonomy—are highly relevant in shaping Fourth Amendment
doctrine, in so much as that Amendment was designed to regulate
the government’s power over its citizens and to support the liberty
and self-determination of a free people. As many of the broader
critiques of traditional rape law find perhaps unexpected parallels in
211
the criminal procedure context, so too can the specific reforms
achieved and proposed by rape law reformers illuminate the efforts
of scholars advocating for change in Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Before turning to the Fourth Amendment, however, the next section
of this Article highlights the particular rape law reforms that, by
analogy, are most useful to developing the more balanced approach
to Fourth Amendment searches that is the subject of Part IV of this
Article.
C. Rape Law Now: Some Welcome Victories
Perhaps the most universal reform achieved in the law of rape
has been the abolition—or, at the very least, the significant
softening—of the resistance requirement, in no small part due to the
assertions of reformers that resistance to rape was dangerous and
212
increased the likelihood of serious injury.
No jurisdiction today
requires resistance to the utmost; in fact, many states have eliminated
any requirement of physical resistance from their statutes, either by
removing any reference to resistance or by expressly stating that
213
resistance is not required. A few state statutes, however, continue to
211

In the criminal procedure context, victims of police misconduct, especially the
poor and minorities, face the same imbalance of power, both politically and in a dayto-day real sense. Search doctrine is geared towards granting the government broad
access to evidence of wrongdoing while permitting police to use their power and
discretion to maintain control and inhibit individual autonomy in the very
communities being policed, creating, I argue, a similar dual role for the police of
predator and protector. See infra Part III.B.
212
Anderson, supra note 29, at 968. Professor Anderson critically evaluates the
empirical studies on which reformers based their claims that resistance should be
discouraged and presents arguments in favor of encouraging resistance, ultimately
advocating that any resistance, either physical or verbal, should be sufficient to
demonstrate nonconsent and force. See id.
213
See Bryden, supra note 148, at 358 n.161 (providing examples of statutes that
have been amended to remove reference to resistance, or to expressly state that
victims do not need to resist an attack).
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refer to some level of resistance, requiring the victim to offer, for
214
example, reasonable or earnest resistance. Further, even if a statute
is silent as to resistance, as long as courts must define force or
determine whether there is sufficient evidence of nonconsent (or
215
both), resistance remains a de facto requirement to some degree.
Thus, even with the elimination of a formal resistance requirement,
“courts today often evaluate a woman’s actions in the same way as
216
they did when resistance was required.” In fact, Professor Anderson
argues that regardless of the required level of resistance, women’s
conduct is still held to some ideal standard of behavior that may be
217
difficult to achieve.
As previously stated, the focus of this Article is not to provide a
comprehensive survey of the current status of the resistance
requirement in statutory or common law throughout American
218
jurisdictions, nor does this Article aim to provide a normative
critique of the various approaches to resistance with respect to their
effectiveness as rape law reforms. It suffices to simply make the very
modest normative claim that a requirement of utmost resistance
placed an unfair and unrealistic burden on the victim of an alleged
214

See id. (providing examples of statutes that require some level of resistance,
such as reasonable or earnest resistance, or such resistance as would communicate
nonconsent).
215
See id. at 35859; see also Anderson, supra note 29, at 968 (“Whether a state
rape statute codifies an utmost, earnest, or reasonable resistance requirement, or no
resistance requirement at all, for many courts, a woman’s resistance still determines
whether she consented and whether the man used force against her.”). Virginia law,
for example, affirmatively states that resistance is not required: “The Commonwealth
need not demonstrate that the complaining witness cried out or physically resisted
the accused . . . but the absence of such resistance may be considered when relevant
to show that the act alleged was not against the will of the complaining witness.” VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (2011). Thus, although resistance is not technically required,
it is still relevant: “The Commonwealth still must prove that the assault was against
the victim’s will. The statute merely allows the defendant to use lack of resistance to
buttress his consent defense.” Farish v. Virginia, 346 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Va. Ct. App.
1986). Pennsylvania’s sexual offense provisions also expressly provide that resistance
is not required, although also stating that the defendant is not prohibited “from
introducing evidence that the alleged victim consented to the conduct in question.”
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3107 (2011). In addition, rape is defined as sexual intercourse
accomplished, in relevant part, by “forcible compulsion,” or by “threat of forcible
compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution.” Id.
§ 3121. Thus, even though resistance is not required, the level of threat sufficient to
trigger the offense is based on the assumption of a woman’s resistance, the absence
of which can also be used to show consent. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3107, 3121 (2011).
216
Anderson, supra note 29, at 967.
217
See id. at 965.
218
See Klein, supra note 29, for a thorough treatment of the evolution of rape law.
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rape, in terms of both what was expected of her to prevent the
intercourse in the first place, or, if ultimately unsuccessful in her selfprotection, to receive vindication in a court of law. The advances
achieved by rape law reformers in this area constitute a welcome
victory.
Looking ahead for a moment, this Article will demonstrate that
victims of alleged searches currently also bear an “utmost resistance”
requirement, with a corresponding expectation that onerous
measures be taken to prevent the search in the first place, and a
similar difficulty of successfully claiming that a Fourth Amendment
search even occurred if the victim’s efforts to maintain privacy
219
ultimately fell short. As this Article does not propose to completely
eliminate a “resistance” requirement in the Fourth Amendment
context, but argues for something akin to a “reasonable resistance”
requirement as best suited to establishing the proper balance
between citizen and government, it is helpful to briefly highlight that
standard here before addressing other relevant changes in the law of
rape.
Missouri, for example, criminalizes forcible rape, defined as
“sexual intercourse with another person by the use of forcible
220
compulsion.”
Forcible compulsion is further defined, in relevant
221
part, as “[p]hysical force that overcomes reasonable resistance.” To
clarify the magnitude of force required to qualify as forcible
compulsion, the Missouri Court of Appeals provided the following
guidance:
The totality of the circumstances determines whether this
was physical force which would overcome reasonable
resistance. Reasonableness is that which is “suitable under
the circumstances.” Such circumstances in this context
would include the ages of the victim and the accused; the
atmosphere and setting of the incident; the extent to which
the accused was in a position of authority, domination and
control over the victim; and whether the victim was under
222
duress.
219

See infra Part IV.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.030 (West 2011).
221
MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12) (West 2011).
222
State v. Kilmartin, 904 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (internal citation
omitted); see also Jones v. State, 682 P.2d 757, 759 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (“In
Oklahoma, a woman threatened by rape is not required to resist to the uttermost;
instead, she is not required to do more than her age, strength, and surrounding
circumstances make reasonable.”).
220
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Resistance may also come into play when the offense is framed
223
The
in terms of the victim’s nonconsent, as it is in Delaware.
Delaware legislature chose to define “without consent” in terms of
the defendant compelling the victim, by various means, to submit;
however, the victim’s resistance is still required in order to show that
she was indeed compelled: “It is not required that the victim resist . . .
to the utmost, or to resist if resistance would be futile or foolhardy,
but the victim need resist only to the extent that it is reasonably
necessary to make the victim’s refusal to consent known to the
224
defendant.”
Both of these approaches to reasonableness of
resistance—based on an analysis of the totality of the circumstances
to determine what is realistically feasible for the victim, and as a
measure of resistance that reasonably conveys the victim’s
nonconsent, are, I argue, not only appropriate, but in fact called for
in the search context as well.
Another reform to rape law that has been urged involves the
elimination of force and nonconsent as jointly required elements of
rape; in other words, some scholars advocate that either one or the
225
other should be required, but not both.
Regardless, however, of
which element is eliminated from the formal definition of rape,
courts will most likely still continue to require the woman to
demonstrate, through some ideal standard of conduct, either the
force or the lack of consent, resulting in the continued vitality of the
226
resistance requirement. For this reason, Professor Anderson states
227
that “force and nonconsent . . . are not neatly separable.”
Therefore, this particular proposed reform will have little practical
effect unless the conduct that will qualify legally as sufficient
resistance is broadened to reflect how women really resist (thus
223

See DEL. CRIM. CODE § 773 (2011) (defining rape, in relevant part, as sexual
intercourse “without the victim’s consent”).
224
Id. § 761(j)(1).
225
See Anderson, supra note 29, at 1001–02. Professor Anderson references
various statutory approaches, some providing only that the intercourse be forcible in
the definition of the offense (although providing that consent is a defense), others
defining the offense in terms of nonconsent, and still others that continue to require
both force and nonconsent as elements, concluding that despite these formal
differences, most jurisdictions in practice still require both in order to prove that a
rape occurred. See id. at 1000–01 nn.280–84 and accompanying text.
226
See id. at 100507.
227
Id. at 1005. For example, at first glance, the Model Penal Code’s definition of
rape seems to focus on the actor, in that rape is defined, in pertinent part, as
intercourse wherein the man “compels” the woman (other than his wife) to submit
either by force or serious threat. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (2011). However,
implicit in “compelling” a woman is the fact that she is not consenting.
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228

recognizing verbal protests as resistance). Additionally, regardless
of which approach is taken, neither will be meaningful unless the
focus on the perpetrator’s conduct (if that is the touchstone of the
offense) reflects an expansive notion of force, or, alternatively, the
focus on the victim’s state of mind reflects an expansive notion of
229
what constitutes nonconsent.
Although this Article argues that in defining a Fourth
Amendment search, both the force used by police and the consent or
nonconsent (as demonstrated by the conduct) of the victim of a
230
search are relevant, it is beneficial to explore both of these
approaches—defining rape in terms of force used by the perpetrator,
on the one hand, and defining rape in terms of the victim’s
nonconsent, on the other—in order to uncover the reasoning
underlying each approach, which will in turn illuminate the analogy
to the criminal procedure context. Those reformers who advocate
force as the sole barometer of whether a rape has occurred seek to
shift scrutiny from the victim’s conduct and state of mind to that of
231
the actor.
Proponents of this approach encourage an
understanding of rape as a crime of violence, rather than as a purely
sexual crime, thus aligning rape conceptually with assault and
232
battery. There is, however, an additional reason to focus on force
228

See Anderson, supra note 29, at 1007.
See Estrich, supra note 28, at 1133. Pennsylvania, for example, classifies rape as
sexual intercourse by “forcible compulsion” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (2011), which
is broadly defined as “[c]ompulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional
or psychological force, either express or implied.” Id. § 3101.
230
See infra Part IV.
231
See Anderson, supra note 29, at 1005. However, as Professor Anderson notes,
force and nonconsent are difficult to separate; in many jurisdictions which statutes
criminalize forcible intercourse without mention of consent, courts nonetheless
recognize consent as a defense. Id. at 1000. The State of Washington, for example,
criminalizes intercourse by means of forcible compulsion, defined as “physical force
which overcomes resistance” or a threat that induces fear of injury or kidnapping,
but, pursuant to case law, the victim’s consent is an affirmative defense that the
defendant shoulders the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ A9A.44.050, A9A.44.010(6) (West 2011); see also State v.
Camera, 781 P.2d 483, 485–88 (Wash. 1989) (reasoning that placing the burden of
proving consent on the defendant was consistent with legislative intent and also
constitutionally permissible, as this did not relieve the prosecution of its burden of
proving every element of the offense, including forcible compulsion).
232
See, e.g., State of New Jersey in re M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 43738 (1992)
(“Reformers criticized the conception of rape as a distinctly sexual crime rather than
a crime of violence . . . . Critics of rape law agreed that the focus of the crime should
be shifted . . . to its forceful and assaultive, rather than sexual, character.”). In fact,
one significant reform in the law of rape is a change in the name of the offense; for
example, statutes may prohibit “sexual assault” rather than rape, which serves to
229
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rather than nonconsent, as expressed by Professor Catherine
MacKinnon and others: consent should be irrelevant where that
233
In other
consent is obtained “under conditions of patriarchy.”
words, consent that is not given under conditions of equality is not
234
really consent at all.
In contrast, those reformers who propose that the victim’s
nonconsent should be the critical focal point emphasize autonomy
235
and freedom of choice as the primary values to be protected. This
consent-based approach has taken various forms: for some reformers,
a rape has occurred if the actor has intercourse with the victim over
her specific objection while others go further, criminalizing
236
intercourse in the absence of the woman’s affirmative consent.
Perhaps the most controversial example of the affirmative consent
approach is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in
237
State in re M.T.S. The Court, in interpreting a statute that defined
238
sexual assault as involving the use of “physical force or coercion,”
turned to the history of rape reform in order to determine the
legislative intent behind the statute, which had been in no small part
promulgated by the National Organization of Women National
239
Taskforce on Rape.
Then, despite the statute’s requirement of
“physical force or coercion,” the Court held that
any act of sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant
without the affirmative and freely-given permission of the
victim . . . constitutes the offense of sexual assault.
Therefore, physical force in excess of that inherent in the

emphasize the violent nature of the offense. See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 27, at § 33.01 n.16.
233
Anderson, supra note 29, at 1004.
234
This is a powerful argument in the criminal procedure context as well, and
many have argued that the Court, in its enthusiastic approval of consent searches,
does not have a realistic understanding of consent or the power imbalance between
the citizen and the police officer that comes to bear on a suspect’s decision to
cooperate. See, e.g., Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and
Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a “Reasonable Person,” 36 HOW. L.J. 239 (1993).
Professor Ross, to illustrate this point, discusses scholarship regarding the power
imbalance between citizen and police, role-conditioning, and race as factors that act
upon an individual’s ability to freely choose or withhold consent during interactions
with police. Ross, supra note 3, at 24–30.
235
See Anderson, supra note 29, at 1002–03.
236
Id at 1002; see also Klein, supra note 29, at 1004–14 (discussing both the
affirmative consent and the “no means no” models).
237
M.T.S., 129 N.J. at 422.
238
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c(1) (2012).
239
M.T.S., 129 N.J. at 43040.
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act of sexual penetration is not required for such
penetration to be unlawful. The definition of “physical
force” is satisfied . . . if the defendant applies any amount of
force against another person in the absence of what a
reasonable person would believe to be affirmative and
240
freely-given permission to the act of sexual penetration.
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court virtually eliminated force
from the definition of sexual assault. However, a focus on autonomy
and freedom of choice does not necessarily imply that force is
irrelevant. If autonomy is understood as freedom to “define all of the
241
limits of permissible sex,” which would also include freedom to
engage in forcible intercourse if so desired, then rape can be viewed
242
Professor Stephen Schulhofer
as “the denial of that freedom.”
recommends that autonomy, as a primary interest to be protected,
should take “center stage,” proposing that improper interferences
with the exercise of autonomy, or ability to freely choose, including
the use or threat of physical force as well as certain nonviolent means
243
of coercion, should be criminalized.
This shift in emphasis may
result in the recognition that the use of nonforcible coercion may be
egregious enough to warrant criminal punishment, or may lead to a
broader understanding of force, aptly described by Professor Estrich,
244
as “the power one need not use.”
In either case, a focus on the
victim’s autonomy may eventually lead to vindication for those
victims, traditionally beyond the law’s protection, who have “agreed”
245
to intercourse under conditions of deception, fraud, extortion,
240

Id. at 444. As of 2008, two state legislatures, Wisconsin and Washington, had
adopted the affirmative consent model. See Klein, supra note 29, at 1007.
241
Estrich, supra note 28, at 1132.
242
Id.
243
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond,
11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 65 (1992). Professor Schulhofer proposes the creation of two
offenses prohibiting such interferences with autonomy. Rape would be defined in
terms of forcible intercourse (including the threat of violence), while a new offense
of “sexual abuse” or “sexual misconduct” (or some variant that would emphasize the
nonforcible nature of the means used to obtain the intercourse) would punish
nonviolent constraints on a woman’s free choice. See id. Although Professor
Schulhofer uses the term “nonviolent” in accordance with traditionally held
conception of the “real” rape, described by Professor Estrich as the type of situation
in which a “stranger puts a gun to the head of his victim, threatens to kill her or beats
her, and then engages in intercourse,” it is imperative to stress that any unconsented
to intercourse is inherently violent and physically painful to the victim. Estrich, supra
note 28, at 1092.
244
Estrich, supra note 28, at 1115.
245
For example, a California court dismissed a charge of rape against a man who
convinced the victim that, other than submitting to an extremely painful and
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abuse of professional authority or economic power, and other such
246
interferences with a victim’s meaningful choice.
While it is extremely difficult and beyond the scope of this
Article to define which of these coercive interferences merit criminal
sanctions, Professor Schulhofer provides an analytical framework that
lends itself easily to the task, still to come, of defining a Fourth
Amendment search. At the outset, sexual autonomy, meaning the
right to control access to one’s body under conditions conducive to
meaningful choice, must be recognized as a protected value
247
independent of the interest in being free from violence. Once the
right of autonomy is recognized, the important questions in shaping
reform become “whether the preconditions for meaningful choice
are present and whether behavior that may interfere with meaningful
248
choice has adequate social justification.” In other words, should
249
society tolerate the behavior in question?
As in the search context, trying to differentiate lawful from
unlawful constraints on autonomy will involve delineating socially
250
tolerable boundaries. In drawing those boundaries, it is critical to
understand the value of autonomy as necessary to the enjoyment of
the freedom, security, and dignity that are components of our
251
personhood. Autonomy can be understood in two dimensions: (1)
the moral and intellectual autonomy, exemplified by the capacity to
make unconstrained choices, that serves to express personal
preferences; and (2) autonomy in the physical sense, asserted to
252
preserve bodily integrity. Both these dimensions of autonomy are,
of course, threatened when an individual is coerced or compelled to
engage in sexual intercourse.
prohibitively expensive surgical procedure, the only way to treat a serious, lifethreatening disease was to engage in sexual intercourse with “an anonymous donor
who had been injected with a serum which would cure the disease.” Boro v. Superior
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (1985). In response to this decision, the California
legislature amended its criminal code to include a provision penalizing the
procurement of consent to intercourse by “false or fraudulent representation or
pretense that is made with the intent to create fear.” See CAL. PENAL CODE § 266c
(West 2012).
246
See Schulhofer, supra note 243, at 6593 for a discussion of the complexities in
determining the desirable scope of legal protection against these and other forms of
nonforcible coercion.
247
Id. at 68.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
See id. at 71.
252
Schulhofer, supra note 243, at 71.
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If autonomy is taken seriously, as the title of Professor
Schulhofer’s article urges, and sexual offenses are perceived more as
offenses against autonomy rather than offenses involving physical
253
violence, then an affirmative consent model is warranted.
The
traditional focus on rape as a crime of violence has led to an overly
generous understanding of consent, in that the law has required a
clear demonstration of nonconsent to an act that the victim finds
abhorrent, thereby in effect equating ambivalence or silence with
254
Once the focus shifts to autonomy, the argument can
consent.
more readily be made (and accepted) for requiring the same
standard of consent for all serious bodily intrusions; thus, as surgery
or any invasive medical procedure requires affirmative consent (and
consent is not presumed from a patient’s silence or ambivalent
feelings towards the procedure), so should intrusions of a sexual
255
nature.
There may be yet another, more pernicious, reason behind the
different standards of consent applied to sexual versus other bodily
intrusions, other than the perception of rape as a crime of violence
rather than an offense against autonomy. In the context of
undesired sex, as opposed to an undesired medical procedure, there
may still be lurking some notion of male entitlement to sex, as a
vestige of the patriarchal system in which sexual access was a
commodity belonging not to the woman, but to whichever man had
legal control over her. If indeed there is this lingering attitude that
256
men are in some way justified in asserting a claim to sex, then the
253

See id. at 77.
Id. at 76. Under this approach, the sleeping or unconscious woman is
protected because she does not have the opportunity to say no, the assumption
remaining being that if a woman is able to object, but fails to do so, she is a willing
partner to the intercourse. See id. at 72. Another possible explanation for this
assumption is that sexual intimacy is often a consensual act, desired by both parties.
Thus, there may be an operational presumption of consent that is absent, for
example, when a robber demands one’s wallet, or, as relevant to this Article, when
police search one’s home, person, or belongings for evidence.
255
Id. at 7475. Professor Schulhofer illustrates his argument effectively by
telling the “parable” of the athlete hesitating to decide whether or not to go through
with surgery, and the impatient surgeon who, tired of waiting for a yes, “just does it” in
the absence of a no. Id.
256
While it would certainly overstate the argument of this Article to imply that
society recognizes any actual right to or privilege of sexual access for men, the fact
that it remains common to blame the victim for her rape, whether because of her
attire, her actions, the company she chose, or simply because she placed herself in
harm’s way, and the fact that juries still acquit defendants because victims “asked for
it,” demonstrates the public’s willingness to accept some level of male entitlement to
sex. See supra text accompanying notes 176177.
254
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law, even if acknowledging the woman’s right of autonomy,
nevertheless may place a burden on her to assert her interest in that
right as against the countervailing interest of the man who desires the
sexual intercourse.
In contrast, there is no countervailing
entitlement, actual or perceived, vested in the surgeon (to use
257
who wishes to perform a
Professor Schulhofer’s example)
procedure; therefore, the only interest at stake is that of the patient.
With no competing interest to balance against the patient’s
autonomy, it follows logic to require greater certainty with respect to
consent, in the way of affirmative permission, before the surgeon is
permitted to proceed.
This possible explanation, or partial
explanation, of why the affirmative consent model is not more widely
accepted in the rape context is, of course, based on the prevalence
and durability of outdated attitudes regarding male and female
sexual roles and behavior—attitudes that should, and hopefully will,
dissipate with time.
Before returning once again to the primary objective of this
Article, applying the lessons of rape reform to the task of creating a
more normatively satisfying framework for defining the Fourth
Amendment search, one more significant advance for rape victims
merits attention. Prior to the enactment of “rape-shield” laws
throughout the country, rape victims were often humiliated and
embarrassed by the admission of evidence of prior sexual history, in
the form of both reputation and prior specific instances, in order to
258
show propensity to consent as well as character for untruthfulness.
Thus, one significant victory for rape victims was the enactment of
statutes prohibiting the use of such evidence, subject to a few
259
exceptions.
In addition, many states prohibit introduction of
evidence regarding the victim’s attire at and before the time of the
260
alleged rape. In urging the promulgation of rape-shield statutes,
reformers sought to encourage victims to come forward without fear
of public humiliation and also sought to prevent the “re-

257

See supra note 255.
See supra text accompanying notes 173176.
259
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at § 33.07; see also
Klein, supra note 29, at 99093. Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b), for example,
provides that in criminal trials, evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual
behavior is admissible in three circumstances: to prove that someone other than the
defendant was the source of physical evidence (such as semen or injury), to prove
consent if the victim’s behavior occurred with respect to the defendant, or if
constitutionally required. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b).
260
Klein, supra note 29, at 1028.
258
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victimization” of those brave enough to come forward and whose
261
complaints resulted in a trial.
As a result of such statutes, the law made significant advances
toward shifting the focus away from the victim, in no small part by
hampering the defense attorney’s ability to persuade a jury that
because a victim had freely chosen to engage in intercourse in the
past, she likely consented on this occasion as well. This “consent-toone, consent-to-all” argument that is no longer available to defense
attorneys in rape trials, however, still very much remains the
reasoning of the Court when determining whether police activity
constitutes a search. Thus, the adoption of rape-shield provisions
provides yet another example of a rape reform that can inform the
movement for change in the Fourth Amendment search doctrine, to
which this Article turns next.
IV. FROM RAPE LAW TO SEARCH LAW: A QUANTUM LEAP TO A PARALLEL
UNIVERSE
A. Search Law Then (and Now): Helpful to Law Enforcement, Hostile
to Victims
Part III.A has described several features of traditional rape law
that imposed significant barriers to conviction. This resulted in a
defendant-friendly doctrine that (1) punished only the most
egregious conduct; (2) required the prosecution to prove both force
and nonconsent, as measured by the victim’s most strenuous
resistance; (3) exhibited distrust of women complainants; and (4)
placed victims on trial, using prior sexual history to show propensity
to consent (as well as propensity to lie) and to scrutinize the victim’s
conduct, essentially allocating to her the blame for her own attack.
Similarly, the criminal defendant (or civil plaintiff) seeking to show
that she was the victim of an unlawful search faces a comparably
difficult challenge; in fact, the first obstacle that must be overcome
before a court will turn to any question of legality or reasonableness
is simply to demonstrate that a search even occurred.
Drawing on the parallel with traditional rape law, and as will be
developed in this part with respect to search law, only the most
egregious governmental conduct constitutes a searchthe victim
must show, through extreme measures to maintain privacy, a clear
objection to the intrusion and, further, that the government had to

261

Id. at 991.
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resort to a high level of force to accomplish the surveillance despite
that objection. I use the term “force” to mean the measures utilized
262
In
by the government to overcome efforts to secure privacy.
addition, the victim’s prior acts of disclosure and conduct are
scrutinized to show consent (or, in the language of Fourth
Amendment search doctrine, the lack of a reasonable expectation of
privacy) and to make the victim shoulder the blame for the
government’s successful surveillance.
To begin, the Court, while purporting to express the
expectations of society in defining the Fourth Amendment search,
has in reality exempted law enforcement from those very
263
expectations and norms.
In other words, while making “privacy
protection appear to hinge on lay people’s understandings of how
they should treat each other,” in its decisions, “the Court has
reasoned in terms of a narrow, occupationally-grounded conception
264
of privacy.”
As we saw in the rape context, the disparity between
how people generally are expected to behave and how the
government is permitted (at least for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment) to behave has led to police benefitting from what
amounts to a “special dispensation from everyday privacy norms, one
that doesn’t extend to egregious violations but that does encompass
265
minor ones.”
While I have already described some of the most intrusive
surveillance activities that have indeed achieved the Court’s
266
recognition as searches, the best way to illustrate the above point is
by showing the kinds of behaviors that are tolerated, perhaps even
encouraged, in the name of effective policing, and that are not
considered searches, even though the same behaviors committed by
the private citizen would be in many cases unlawful or, at the least,
highly objectionable. For example, under Fourth Amendment case
law, police are permitted to trespass on private property, snoop

262

I do not mean to equate such conduct such as, for example, placing a
listening device on the outside of a phone booth, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), or rummaging through garbage, see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
(1988), or trespassing, see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), with force as it
is understood in the context of rape. I use the term in the search context as a
metaphor, and for purposes of illustrating the analogy between these two areas of
law.
263
Heffernan, supra note 84, at 5.
264
Id. at 56.
265
Id.
266
See supra Part II.A.
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through garbage, peep through windows, and stalk their prey in
public. In Oliver v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
“open fields” doctrine, reasoning that the generally non-intimate
activities occurring in open fields do not merit protection from
arbitrary government intrusion, and, further, that such lands are still
accessible to members of the public or the police, regardless of the
existence of fences and/or “No Trespassing” signs, thus making any
267
expectation of privacy in open fields simply not reasonable.
Consequently, the police officers who trespassed upon the
defendant’s farm to investigate reports of a marijuana crop, reports
that were confirmed by their discovery of a field over one mile from
268
the defendant’s house, were simply not governed by the Fourth
Amendment at all. Justice Marshall, however, found the majority’s
269
decision “startling,” and, like him, one may well wonder how Mr.
Oliver’s expectation of privacy in his land was unreasonable when
anybody, other than a police officer that is, choosing to ignore his
wishes and enter on his land did so at risk of incurring “the most
270
severe of penalties—criminal liability.”
267

Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (“In contrast, open fields do not provide the setting for
those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of
those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.”). The
Court first announced the “open fields” doctrine in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
557 (1924). While still endorsing the textual basis of Hester’s reasoning, that an open
field does not attain the Fourth Amendment’s protection as an “effect,” the Court
also held the “open fields” doctrine to be consistent with the privacy-based approach
of Katz. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 17677. The Court’s recent decision in United States v.
Jones did not call into question the holding of Oliver, or the “open fields” doctrine.
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (“Quite simply, an open field,
unlike the curtilage of a home . . . is not one of those protected areas enumerated in
the Fourth Amendment . . . . The Government’s physical intrusion on such an
area—unlike its intrusion on the ‘effect’ at issue here—is of no Fourth Amendment
significance.”).
268
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 171.
269
Id. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
270
Id. at 191. The field at issue was “highly secluded . . . bounded on all sides by
woods, fences, and embankments,” not visible from any public area, and marked with
regularly posted “No Trespassing” signs. Id. at 174. Officers had to step around a
locked gate (with a posted “No Trespassing” sign), pass a barn and camper, from
which someone shouted at them to “come back up here,” and traverse through
woods to arrive at the marijuana field that was the object of their search, and which
was surrounded by a chicken-wire fence. Id. at 17374. Justice Marshall also
questioned the majority’s conclusion that no activities worthy of privacy occur in
fields, noting that “[m]any landowners like to take solitary walks . . . . [s]ome
landowners use their secluded spaces to meet lovers, others to gather together with
fellow worshippers, still others to engage in sustained creative endeavor.” Id. at 192
(Marshall, J., dissenting). For Justice Marshall, these potential uses of private
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So, while in Oliver, criminally liable interlopers set the
benchmark of conduct, the Court did not raise the bar much in
California v. Greenwood, as the police, who sifted through defendant’s
curbside trash, were held to no higher standard than scavengers and
271
snoops, even raccoons.
Needless to say, if an individual followed
272
another’s every movement out in public, or hovered about peering
273
into another’s back yard, that individual would be considered a
stalker. Yet, the police are permitted to conduct just this type of
concentrated surveillance, and with the aid of technology no less.
The reason that such police violations of social and, often, legal
norms give the Court such little cause for concern is that, under
Fourth Amendment search doctrine, the emphasis falls squarely on
the victim and her expectations, and it seems that the individual
asserting a Fourth Amendment interest cannot reasonably expect
more from the police than can be expected from any member of the
274
public, even a criminal. It is not surprising that such an approach
results in government surveillance being so frequently held to not
275
even trigger the Fourth Amendment.
property merit protection, and the fact that the property was, in fact, being used for
cultivation of marijuana is irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. Id. at 191.
271
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 4041 (1988) (holding that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left at the curb for collection, as “[i]t is
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street
are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of
the public.”); see Heffernan, supra note 84, at 38; Colb, supra note 84, at 128 (“When
the garbage was at the curb, Greenwood’s hypothetical snoopy neighbor might have
had to violate the law to rummage through it in the way that the police officer did.”).
272
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that the attachment
of an electronic radio transmitter (or “beeper”) to a container of chloroform
purchased by defendant, and monitoring the movement of that container in public,
constituted neither a seizure nor a search, as defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to his public movement, which could have been
monitored by naked-eye observation as well). The Court’s decision in United States v.
Jones also did not affect the holding in Knotts, as in the former case, the GPS device
was affixed to the car after it was under the control of the defendant, thus
constituting a physical trespass upon an effect, while in the latter case, the defendant
received the container with the beeper already attached. See United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012).
273
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that aerial surveillance
of defendant’s curtilage from an airplane at an altitude of 1,000 feet did not
constitute a search); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that aerial
surveillance of defendant’s greenhouse from a helicopter hovering at an altitude of
400 feet did not constitute a search).
274
See Colb, supra note 84, at 137 (“People who rummage through their
neighbors’ garbage, trespass on fenced-off fields, and stalk people . . . are criminals
who intrude on upon others’ sense of security, safety, and privacy.”).
275
See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.04 (5th
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As with traditional rape law, the definition of a search also
requires both the use of force by the perpetrator (here, the
government) and the victim’s nonconsent, with resistance as the
catalyst. As in the rape context, it is difficult to separate force from
nonconsent; if the subject of surveillance makes any effort to conceal
information, then some level of force, be it walking around a locked
gate, sifting through garbage, paying an informant, or hiring a pilot
to fly a small plane, is required in order to obtain that information.
In fact, Professor Wayne LaFave provides the following example of a
traditional definition of a search as implying:
some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a
looking for or seeking out. The quest may be secret,
intrusive, or accomplished by force, and it has been held
that a search implies some sort of force, either actual or
constructive, much or little. A search implies a prying into
hidden places for that which is concealed and that the
object searched for has been hidden or intentionally put
276
out of the way.
Regrettably, the Court has given little attention to the use of
such force by police, and where it has, it has defined it narrowly and
unrealistically, without addressing or answering, in any satisfying way,
the most important question in defining a Fourth Amendment
search: should the police be permitted to engage in certain
surveillance practices with no constitutional oversight, or is the threat
to personal freedom and security from such unregulated power
277
simply too great a burden on a free society?
Professor Dressler identifies the following three factors that the
Court has turned to in defining searches: (1) the location being
observed; (2) the measures taken to maintain privacy; and (3) the
degree of intrusion, which can be understood as encompassing the
severity of physical intrusion as well as the quantity and quality of the
278
information being observed. In this framework, one can readily see
ed. 2010). Professors Dressler and Michaels suggest that a counter-trend may well be
underway. See id. This Article addresses some of the cases that lend support for the
conclusion that the Court has indicated a willingness to reconsider, to some extent,
its current approach to defining the search in Part IV.
276
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.1 (4th ed. 2011) (quoting C.J.S., Searches and Seizures § 1 (1952)).
277
Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 403; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
76869 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
278
DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 275, at 79; see also Wilkins, supra note 109, at
1081 (arguing that the Court should explicitly adopt the framework that it implicitly
has utilized in defining searches, namely, examining the “place where governmental
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force (the degree of intrusion) and nonconsent (demonstrated by
measures to exclude). Focusing first on force, how does the Court
assess the methods used by police to discover information? If the
Court even acknowledges the illegality of police conduct, the fact that
the police are breaking the law while conducting surveillance is given
little weight in determining whether a search occurred. One need
not look further than Oliver for an example of the Court’s approach
to police lawlessness. In Oliver, the officers undoubtedly were
279
trespassing on private land, something noted by the Court. But as
quickly as the Court recognized the trespass, it stripped it of any real
significance: “‘The premise that property interests control the right
of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.’ . . .
For trespass law extends to instances where the exercise of the right
280
to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest.”
On the other hand, if the police are acting within the bounds of
the law, or not violating any rules or regulations, the legality of their
conduct becomes a central factor in defining the conduct as a non281
search. Thus, in the “flyover” cases, the Court emphasized the fact
surveillance occurs, the intrusiveness of the procedures used, and the object of the
surveillance itself.”). For purposes of this Article, the focus when discussing
intrusiveness is on the methods used by police to conduct surveillance, rather than
on the object of that surveillance. Although the Court has discussed the nature of
what is actually observed or discovered by the police as a factor in determining
whether or not government conduct constitutes a search, this should be irrelevant in
determining whether or not the government conduct constitutes a search. See
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 446 (1989) (noting, as a factor supporting the
conclusion that no search occurred when police observed the contents of the
defendant’s greenhouse from a helicopter, that no “intimate details about connected
with the use of the home or curtilage . . . were observed”). For example, if police
peer into a backyard, it should not matter, constitutionally speaking, whether they
observe marijuana plants or a naked sunbather; what matters is that they observed
the contents of an area that could contain either, and they are in no position to
know what the yard may contain until after they have observed it. See DRESSLER &
MICHAELS, supra note 275, § 6.07 (“Can the Court possibly mean that if the same
helicopter had observed the contents of the greenhouse as well as consensual but
illegal sexual acts in the backyard, the surveillance would have been a “search” of one
but not of the other activity?”).
279
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 18283 (1984).
280
Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)). Again, is ironic
that the Court quotes the language of Katz, meant to expand the reach of the Fourth
Amendment beyond the protection delineated by traditional property rights, to
narrow the reach of the Amendment by making property rights irrelevant when they
are in fact implicated.
281
In referring to the “flyover” cases for purposes of this Article, the discussion is
limited to Ciraolo and Riley, which involved the aerial observation of residential
curtilage. The Court also upheld such observation, aided by a professional camera,
of commercial curtilage in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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that police were flying, or hovering, at altitudes permitted by safety
282
regulations.
It is interesting to note the inconsistency between Oliver, on the
one hand, and Ciraolo and Riley, on the other. In Oliver, police were
trespassing, but that fact was irrelevant because the observation
occurred in a location, according to the Court, that did not merit
protection. In other words, the field that police entered upon was
not considered part of the curtilage of the home, an area in which
one generally harbors an expectation of privacy because of its
intimate connection to the home:
At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends
the intimate activity associated with the “sanctity of a man’s
home and the privacies of life,” and therefore has been
considered part of home itself for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment
protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the
curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the
factors that determine whether an individual reasonably
may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home
283
will remain private.
In Ciraolo and Riley, police observed the contents of the
defendants’ backyard and greenhouse, respectively, each within the
284
curtilage of the defendants’ homes. One might think, after Oliver,
that the legality of police conduct would have been of secondary
importance to the nature of the location being observed, but it seems
282

See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“The observations . . . took
place within public navigable airspace.”); see also Riley, 448 U.S. at 451. The plurality
in Riley notes the fact that the police are not breaking the law repeatedly: “We would
have a different case if flying at that altitude had been contrary to law or
regulation . . . . This is not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from
an aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the
plane is within the navigable airspace specified by law. But it is of obvious
importance that the helicopter in this case was not violating the law . . . .” Id. Justice
O’Connor, writing separately, concurred with the plurality, although for her, the
relevant question was not whether the flight complied with safety regulations, but
whether such flight was sufficiently “regular.” Id. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
She concluded that there was enough evidence of such regularity, although she
placed the burden on the defendant to show otherwise. Id. at 455.
283
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) the
Court provided a number of factors to aid in the determination of whether an area is
considered curtilage: (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the
home; (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home;
(3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.
284
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 21213; Riley, 448 U.S. at 450.
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that the Court, in each of these surveillance contexts, chose to focus
on the specific factor, either police conduct or location, that
supported the ultimate finding that no search had occurred.
Moreover, in the flyover cases, not only did the Court focus on
the legality of the flights, but also made mention, in Ciraolo, that the
285
surveillance was conducted in a “physically nonintrusive manner,”
and, in Riley, that there was no evidence
that the helicopter interfered with respondent’s normal use
of the greenhouse or of other parts of the curtilage. As far
as this record reveals, . . . there was no undue noise, and no
wind, dust, or threat of injury. In these circumstances,
286
there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In both these cases, then, the Court embraced the same
property-based, trespass analysis that Katz repudiated, at least to the
287
extent that it supported the outcome in favor of law enforcement.
Perhaps this is an attempt by the Court to at least nominally address
the conduct of the police (what this Article refers to as force) in some
way, although the discussion is superficial, void of normative content,
and also, perhaps, disingenuous. The Court clings to property law
when it is helpful to the government, and disavows property norms
when those norms would be helpful to individuals seeking to claim
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Again, traditional rape law can provide an explanation for the
Court’s somewhat empty examination of police conduct. As noted by
Professor Estrich, the resistance requirement in rape law relieved
288
courts of the difficult task of defining force in the context of rape.
Similarly, in the search context, the Court’s focus on the victim’s
expectationsas measured in significant part by resistance, or efforts
to maintain privacyspare the Court from having to look too closely
at the government’s conduct.
Resistance also has a role in
demonstrating the victim’s nonconsent to surveillance, to which this
analysis will turn shortly, but first, it is helpful to further explore
resistance in its relationship to force. While this Article does not
propose eliminating the resistance requirement entirely from the
definition of a search, it does submit that currently, in order for
285

Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
Riley, 448 U.S. at 452.
287
Professor Orin Kerr notes that the “Court’s opinions have sent conflicting
rhetorical signals” with respect to the place of property law after Katz. See Orin S.
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 825 (2004).
288
See Estrich, supra note 28, at 1130.
286
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government surveillance to qualify as a search, it must overcome what
amounts to utmost resistance, such as was required in traditional rape
law, placing too great a burden on the victim.
The Article’s analysis returns once more to the flyover cases,
specifically Ciraolo, to provide the clearest illustration of the utmost
resistance requirement at work. Turning first to Mr. Ciraolo’s efforts
to keep the contents of his backyard to himself, the Court offers the
following description of the non-search that revealed the marijuana
plants in that yard:
Police were unable to observe the contents of respondent’s
yard from ground level because of a 6-foot outer fence and
a 10-foot inner fence completely enclosing the yard. Later
that day, Officer Shutz, who was assigned to investigate,
secured a private plane and flew over respondent’s house at
an altitude of 1,000 feet, within navigable airspace; he was
accompanied by Officer Rodriguez. Both officers were
trained in marijuana identification. From the overflight,
the officers readily identified marijuana plants 8 feet to 10
feet in height growing in a 15- by 25-foot plot in
respondent’s yard; they photographed the area with a
289
standard 35mm camera.
What kind of resistance, then, did Mr. Ciraolo offer against the
visual invasion of his home? The Court grudgingly acknowledged
290
that he “took normal precautions to maintain his privacy,” although
the fact that Mr. Ciraolo erected not one, but two tall fences
completely enclosing his yard indicates, at least to my mind,
something more than “normal precautions.” So, while the Court
conceded that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy from
ground-level observation, it was not so generous in acknowledging
any such expectation from aerial surveillance.
What would the Court have required from Mr. Ciraolo? It
seems, nothing less than the utmost resistance would have sufficed to
endow Mr. Ciraolo with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of his yard, which included, although completely overlooked
291
by the majority, a swimming pool and sunbathing patio.
In other
289

Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
Id. at 211 (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980)).
291
See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 222 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority chose to
describe the defendant’s desire for privacy in the specific terms of his efforts to
conceal his marijuana plants, rather than in more general terms of an intent to keep
his backyard private, as an area for personal outdoor enjoyment, used as much for
swimming and sunbathing as for “unlawful agricultural pursuits.” See id. at 211.
290
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words, by not placing a roof over his yard, something, as Justice
292
Powell noted, few people do, Mr. Ciraolo knowingly exposed the
contents of his yard to passengers of low-flying aircraft, or even to
hypothetical police officers surfing atop trucks and double-decker
293
buses.
Engaging, again, the parallel to traditional rape law, the
victim bears the burden of preventing the intrusion in the first
294
place, which Mr. Ciraolo was unable to accomplish with his two tall
fences.
If effectiveness of resistance is used to define the level of force
necessary before something can be qualified as a search, then clearly,
by the Court’s measure, the force used by the officers in Ciraolo was
not at such a level as would trigger the Fourth Amendment. The
Court described the officers’ conduct as “simple visual observations
295
from a public place,” reasoning that the Fourth Amendment does
not require “officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on
296
public thoroughfares.” Thus, according to the majority, the officers
observed nothing more than any member of the public “who glanced
297
down” would have seen if flying at that altitude.
Let us take a slightly more realistic approach to describing the
force needed to overcome Mr. Ciraolo’s resistance. First, officers
went to Mr. Ciraolo’s home and attempted to view the contents of the
yard from ground level, but were prevented from doing so by the two
fences. Determined nevertheless to accomplish the surveillance of
the yard, the lead officer hired a pilot to fly a private plane over the
yard, so that he and another officer, trained in the identification of
marijuana, could ascertain whether or not the yard did indeed
contain the suspected marijuana, a fact the officers could not know
with certainty until after they completed the inspection of the yard.
As much as Mr. Ciraolo took “normal precautions” to shield his
property from visual intrusion, the officers engaged in extraordinary
measures to circumvent those precautions. One is again reminded of
traditional rape law, as it reflected an understanding of the sexual
roles of men and women under which men were expected to increase
their persistence in the face of a woman’s protests and, indeed, under
which such protests, if falling short of the most vigorous physical
292
293
294
295
296
297

Id. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 211.
See supra text accompanying note 180.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 21314.
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obstacle to the man, were deemed an invitation for men to pursue
298
more aggressively.
To equate what Justice Powell, in his dissent, described as “an
overflight at low altitude solely for the purpose of discovering
evidence of crime within a private enclave into which they were
constitutionally forbidden to intrude at ground level without a
299
warrant” with the casual glance of the business or recreational air
traveler into an unidentified yard during takeoff or landing is simply
unrealistic and, as Justice Powell concluded, does not accurately
measure the risk to privacy associated with such directed police
surveillance. In fact, Justice Powell noted that the everyday risk to
privacy from aerial observation by the general public is so minimal
that few people feel the need to build roofs over their yards to shelter
their outdoor living activities (as opposed to erecting fences to
300
surround their properties).
Of course, another reason that few
people build roofs over their yards is the fact that this particular
precaution is unfeasible and would essentially destroy the very space
it is meant to protect—that little piece of home in which family and
friends can gather to enjoy air, sun, sky, and yes, maybe a little garden
as well. Ciraolo clearly exemplifies a definition of a search that
rewards police for resorting to extreme efforts to overcome some
unfeasible level of resistance. Again, the parallel to traditional rape
301
law is striking.
If we now turn to resistance in its second role, as evidence of
nonconsent, then surely Mr. Ciraolo demonstrated that he had no
intention of permitting members of the public, no less the police,
access (visual or physical) to his yard. Yet, he barely survived the
Court’s application of the first prong of Justice Harlan’s Katz test:
whether he “manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
302
object of the challenged search . . . .”
The Court began by stating
298

See supra notes 191194 and accompanying text.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 22425 (Powell, J., dissenting).
300
Id. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting)
301
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
302
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (emphasis added). The Ciraolo majority actually
modified Justice Harlan’s language slightly by adding the highlighted phrase “in the
object of the challenged search.” See id. This is not the only time we have seen this
prong altered, and the reader may recall that the Court, in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 148 (1978), also referred to a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular
areas searched.” (emphasis added). Although Justice Harlan, in Katz, stated that the
inquiry “[g]enerally . . . requires reference to a ‘place,’” it does not necessarily need
to. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The
proper test for this first prong, to use Justice Harlan’s exact language, is, simply,
299
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that “[c]learly—and understandably—respondent has met the test of
303
manifesting his own subjective intent . . . to maintain privacy . . . .”
Despite the fact that this finding was not challenged below, and that
the Court acknowledged it was not necessary to address this issue, the
Court nonetheless felt compelled to do precisely that. What was once
clear became “not entirely clear,” as the Court, hypothesizing about
the inadequacy of the 10-foot fence to protect against citizens and
police peering into the yard from the roof of a tall vehicle, suggested
that Mr. Ciraolo had merely a “hope” that his “unlawful gardening
pursuits” would be free from observation, rather than an “expectation
304
of privacy from all observations of his back yard.”
What the Court seemed to be saying here is that in order to even
demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy, one must have taken
precautions against any possible invasion, again exhibiting an
unrealistic and overly permissive view of force and an equally
unrealistic and overly oppressive requirement of resistance. How can
one ever have an expectation that the precautions taken will be
whether the individual has “exhibited an expectation of privacy.” Id. Adding a
limiting phrase, referring to places or objects, allows the Court to manipulate the
concept of privacy by mooring it to something specific, rather than allowing for a
more expansive (albeit more nebulous) understanding of privacy. In Ciraolo, then,
what exactly is the “object” of the search? The Court begins by examining whether
the defendant manifested a desire to keep “his unlawful agricultural pursuits”
private. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211. Once the expectation of privacy is associated
specifically with the object that is discovered (or the object of the search), it is a small
step to find no legitimate expectation in that particular object. In Ciraolo, the
majority focuses on the fact that the marijuana plants were observed in the yard, and
does not mention other features of the yard that were also viewed and the human
activity that, at any given time, could have been viewed. See supra note 291 and
accompanying text. In the binary search context, meaning that the search can only
reveal the presence or absence of contraband and nothing else, the Court has
reasoned that individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the possession
of contraband, and that the absence of contraband is not information that
reasonably matters to anyone, thereby permitting field drug testing and dog sniffs of
luggage and cars. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that the dog
sniff of a vehicle does not constitute a search); United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S.
109 (1984) (holding that the dog sniff of luggage is not considered a search); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that the field testing of a small quantity
of powder to ascertain whether it was cocaine was not considered a search). Thus,
because the Court has determined that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy
in either possessing or not possessing contraband, these activities are not considered
searches, but note that by defining the expectation of privacy narrowly in terms of
the contraband, the Court did not recognize a broader notion of privacy, one that
would entitle people to retain control over information of the contents, whether
contraband or not, of their personal belongings.
303
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
304
Id. at 21112 (emphasis in original).
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absolutely impervious to penetration? Under the Ciraolo Court’s
reasoning, then, it seems that even Mr. Katz would have had difficulty
fulfilling this part of the test, as, failing to check the phone booth he
used for external bugs, he did not take sufficient precautions and his
conversation was, after all, intercepted. What the Ciraolo Court failed
to take into account was that Mr. Katz didn’t sweep the public phone
booth for bugs because it was reasonable for him to expect there
would be none, just as it was unreasonable for the agents
investigating him to place atop the booth the device that ultimately
305
revealed the contents of Mr. Katz’s conversation. The Ciraolo Court,
in contemplating trucks, double-decker buses, and, ultimately, lowflying aircrafts, as vehicles for spying into Mr. Ciraolo’s back yard,
never took into account the fact that the ordinary citizen would not
306
expect (and therefore would not protect against) such behavior.
Professor Sherry Colb has identified two flaws in the Court’s
reasoning with respect to defining searches, both of which this Article
307
will discuss in the context of the victim’s consent. The first of these
is exemplified by the Court’s reasoning in Ciraolo. According to
Professor Colb, the Court has equated the risk of exposure with what
this Article refers to as consent, or, in Katz parlance, “knowing
308
exposure.” Recall that in Katz, the Court reasoned that, even in the
most protected of spaces—the home, what one “knowingly exposes to
309
the public” is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. This idea
of knowing exposure implies that an individual has in some way,
either actually or constructively, consented to the observation.
Although the Court has chosen to refer to consent searches as those
searches in which an individual affirmatively grants permission to
310
search specifically to the police, as opposed to merely exposing
information to members of the public, which is not considered to be
305

This Article refers to the reasonableness of the measures used to intercept Mr.
Katz’s conversation, judged by commonly understood social norms (for purposes of
defining the search), rather than to reasonableness of the agents’ surveillance in the
more specialized sense of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures (for purposes of ascertaining whether or not a search or
seizure, once recognized as such, comports with that Amendment’s requirements).
306
The dissent, of course, makes this precise argument. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at
22324 (Powell, J., dissenting).
307
See Colb, supra note 84, at 122.
308
Id.
309
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
310
A search pursuant to valid consent is considered to be a reasonable search and
is exempted from the usual (at least, in theory) requirements of probable cause and
a warrant. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
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a search at all, for purposes of analogy, this Article will refer to the
victim’s consent or nonconsent as relevant to determining what type
311
of police conduct constitutes a search.
Despite the Court’s equivocality on the matter, this author
remains convinced that Mr. Ciraolo did not consent to the viewing of
his yard and adequately conveyed his nonconsent to the world. One
is reminded of the paradox identified by Professor Estrich in her
repudiation of Alston—that the sexual intercourse at issue was at once
against the will of the victim, yet somehow not committed by force,
312
and therefore the perpetrator was not guilty of rape. The paradox
may be even more puzzling in the search context. Mr. Ciraolo did
not consent, and he communicated his nonconsent. Yet, his “no” was
not respected, not by the police, not by the Court, and not even, at
least as the Court determined, by society. As already discussed, his
resistance was not deemed adequate because it could not prevent the
method of surveillance the police ultimately resorted to in order to
313
view his yard.
By the same token, because he failed to prevent all
efforts at securing the privacy of his yard, his nonconsent was also
discounted, and the Court treated the vulnerability to visual
314
penetration from the airways as “knowing exposure.”
So, just as
311

As Professor Colb points out, Justice Marshall expressed a similar
understanding of the central role of consent in defining a search, in that according
to his (dissenting) view, a citizen’s consent to a search constitutes a choice not to
exercise one’s Fourth Amendment right to exclude the government, a choice that
can only have meaning with the knowledge of the right to refuse that consent. Colb,
supra note 84, at 123. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 283 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). This understanding of consent—that a consent search is in
fact not really a search at all—is inherently logical. For example, how would it be
possible for one to invite the police to enter her home, and yet retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the home? In fact, the Court used the very
assumption-of-risk rationale often used to find no reasonable expectation of privacy
to validate third-party-consent searches, holding that any joint occupant of premises
may consent to a search of areas of common authority, the fruits of which are
admissible against a co-occupant. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171
(1974) (“[I]t is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to
permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that
one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.”). Professor
Colb argues that these two strands of search doctrine should be reconciled and that
equating consent with knowing exposure might lead the Court to define knowing
exposure as truly knowing (rather than accidental or unintended), and to require
that consent, to be valid, also be knowing. Colb, supra note 84, at 123.
312
See supra notes 155156 and accompanying text.
313
In other words, just as Professor Anderson described rape victims’ burden to
live up to a high standard of resistance, see Anderson, supra note 29, at 95758, Mr.
Ciraolo likewise failed to measure up to some ideal level of resistance.
314
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
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Cottie Brown said “no,” yet somehow the physical penetration of her
body was accomplished without force, Mr. Ciraolo also said “no,” but
was nonetheless deemed to have consented, making the visual
penetration of his yard non-forceful as well.
Ciraolo is but one of many cases in which the Court has relied on
this rationale, holding government surveillance not to constitute a
search because the individual has assumed the very risk of exposure
that the government exploits. Worse still, the risk contemplated by
the Court often involves some act of wrongdoing by a third party, in
the form of a violation of either the law or, at the least, a social
315
norm.
As this Article has already described, under the Fourth
Amendment, the government is permitted to trespass, rummage
through garbage, and stalk its citizens to gain access to information it
otherwise would not be able to acquire—information the government
316
seeks to use in wielding its power against those it has targeted.
Somewhat ironically, when the Court evaluates the government’s
force, the criminal or anti-social behavior actually committed by
police is given little, if any, weight, but the mere possibility of such
behavior on the part of members of the public, on the other hand,
no matter how speculative, is heavily relied on to discredit
individuals’ assertions of nonconsent. In other words, the Court
recognizes the prevalence of illegal or socially undesirable conduct
inconsistently—acknowledging lawlessness in people at large but
downplaying similar lawlessness on the part of law enforcement—
weakening both elements (as these elements are conceived for
purposes of analogy) of a search: the victim’s nonconsent and the
force used to overcome that nonconsent.
So, similarly to traditional rape law, the force needed to qualify
315

Colb, supra note 84, at 122. Professor Colb demonstrates the perverse
outcome of equating risk-taking with knowing exposure, in that wrongdoing on the
part of the police is not only excused, but seemingly justified, by invoking the image
of a man who imprudently falls asleep on a subway, thereby opening himself up to
the very real risk of being pick-pocketed. See id. As easy as it may be for a criminal to
reach into the sleeping man’s pocket and remove his wallet, stealing the wallet
remains a crime, and the victim did not, in fact, invite anyone to take his wallet, no
matter that he should have remained more vigilant and even though some might say
that he “asked to have his pocket picked.” Id.
316
See supra notes 267273 and accompanying text. Professor Colb thoroughly
explores the Court’s use of this reasoning in a variety of surveillance contexts in
which it has been held that individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy,
discussing the Court’s search jurisprudence involving garbage, open fields, flyovers,
tracking devices, hidden video cameras, and false friends. See Colb, supra note 84, at
12744. For purposes of this Article, I have highlighted only a few examples from
the Court’s search cases to illustrate my comparison to traditional rape law concepts.
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to meet the definition of a search is given a narrow construction, as is
nonconsent. And, if nonconsent is construed narrowly, consent is
simultaneously given overly generous breadth, leading us to the
second flaw identified by Professor Colb. The Supreme Court has
also equated knowing, but selective, exposure with knowing
317
exposure, period. In other words, the Court has treated voluntarily
sharing information with a limited number or for a limited purpose
as identical to voluntarily disclosing that same information to the
318
whole world, thus “failing to recognize degrees of privacy.”
So,
when we seek to place a call from our home telephone, the number
we have dialed is not protected because we have provided it, not even
319
to another human being, but to a machine.
In doing so, we have
“assumed the risk that the [phone] company would reveal to police”
the dialed numbers, and therefore, we cannot harbor a reasonable or
320
“legitimate” expectation of privacy in those numbers.
Likewise,
when we deposit money to our bank, we have relinquished any claim
to Fourth Amendment protection for our financial information,
because “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
321
Government.”
In both of these situations, we have revealed
information to a specific entity for a limited and specific purpose.
Further, both these risks are, of course, exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible, to avoid while going about our lives in today’s highly
322
interdependent society.
317

Colb, supra note 84, at 122.
Id. Justice Sotomayor, concurring in United States v. Jones, recognized the
gravity of this flaw:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks . . . whatever the societal expectations, they can
attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
319
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The Court analogized the switching
equipment used to complete the call to the human telephone operator of the past.
Id. at 74445.
320
Id. at 744.
321
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
322
In addition to phone numbers and bank records, Professor Colb also critically
318
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Still more troubling, perhaps, is the government’s use of “false
friends,” a category of surveillance involving undercover agents and
informants that is also unregulated by the Fourth Amendment. Just
as with the phone numbers we dial and the financial information we
disclose to a bank, the Court has held that when we confide in
another, whether that other is an old friend who betrays us, or a new
friend whose very existence in our lives has been artificially created in
order to gain information for use against us, we have no reasonable
323
expectation of privacy in what we have revealed.
This type of
surveillance, aptly characterized by Professor William Heffernan as
“interactive surveillance,” involves something potentially more
harmful, on a deeply personal level, than the police wrongdoing we
have thus far encountered:
[W]ith interactive surveillance, government agents try to
penetrate human relationships to discover information or
objects of evidentiary value. The penetration can be carried
out by deception. . . . But the penetration can also be
carried out by acts of betrayal . . . . In forging ties with
others, people take the risk, the Court maintains, that the
government has either planted friends among them or, the
associations having been formed, that it has induced their
324
friends to turn on them.
Yet, the government is permitted to manipulate and interfere in
our personal relationships with no justification or oversight for the
same reason as it may access our bank records: because we have
consented to the sharing of information with some small part of our
world (whether business or personal), we are deemed to have
consented towards everyone, including the government. If this
sounds familiar to the reader, it should. Recall the use, in a rape
trial, of the victim’s prior sexual history to make a strikingly similar
examines the Court’s use of this rationale with respect to garbage. Colb, supra note
84, at 153–55. An alternate justification of the holding of California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988), rested on the idea that by leaving her garbage on the curb for the
trash collector, a homeowner not only assumes the risk posed by snoops and
scavengers, but also bears the risk that the collector might peruse the contents of the
trash or, even worse, invite the police to do so, rather than disposing of it in the usual
way. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
323
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
324
Heffernan, supra note 84, at 10607. Professor Heffernan argues that while
the Fourth Amendment cannot regulate an insider’s choice, of her own volition, to
betray the subject of the government’s interest, the Fourth Amendment should be
implicated when the government “takes steps on its own to penetrate intimate
relationships.” Id. at 10910.
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argument: because she has consented to one instance of sexual
activity (or perhaps more) in the past, she is likely to consent to any
and all, and therefore, equally likely to have consented to the specific
instance of intercourse she claims to be a rape.
In many ways, then, current search law mirrors traditional rape
law. Each doctrine favors the perpetrator of the violation—ironically,
the government in the former context and the defendant in the
latter—and places a substantial burden on the victim claiming the
violation. In each context, force is construed narrowly and consent,
broadly. Great demands are placed on the victim to resist, else the
violation will not be deemed a search or a rape, as the case may be.
And, the victim is said to have assumed the risk of the violation if she
is perceived as somehow having caused or contributed to the
vulnerability that is exploited against her, by engaging in risky
behavior or through her associations with others. With such parallel
structural features reflecting and reinforcing an imbalance of power
between government and defendant, on the one hand, and male
perpetrator and female victim, on the other, it should not be
surprising that Fourth Amendment scholars have likewise identified
broader social concerns stemming from the Court’s jurisprudence, to
which the Article now turns.
B. Search Law Under Siege
Part III.B began by noting the disparity in physical strength,
generally speaking, between men and women, which of course makes
it more difficult for a female victim to prevent unwanted intercourse
in the face of a truly determined perpetrator. At the same time,
traditional rape law failed to realistically evaluate this imbalance of
strength and power, placing squarely on the victim the responsibility
of resorting to extraordinary physical measures to thwart the violation
of her person. So, too, the target of government surveillance faces a
similar disadvantage when all the power and resources of the State
are brought to bear upon her, and similarly, the law of searches also
requires extraordinary measures to maintain privacy in the face of the
government’s determination to breach that privacy and obtain the
information it seeks.
The Court’s unrealistic assessment of the imbalance of power
325
between law enforcement and the individual, and the Court’s
willingness to permit the government to exploit that imbalance, have
325

See supra note 234.
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resulted in a Fourth Amendment that has been noted by scholars to
326
be “a whites-only amendment,” to “create and sustain” a racially
327
and to include a “poverty exception” to its
biased world,
328
protections.
In short, the Court’s decidedly government-friendly
doctrine has disadvantaged citizens not only in their individual
capacities viz-a-viz law enforcement, but has also developed in ways
that particularly affect individuals as members of larger groups,
namely minorities and the poor.
A great deal has been written on the subject of race and the
Fourth Amendment, and the scholarship is replete with examples of
legal doctrines and police practices that negatively and
329
disproportionately impact minority citizens. For present purposes,
this Article focuses on poverty and its relationship to the definition of
a search, in particular the disadvantage to the poor inherent in a
definition of a search that places almost exclusive emphasis on
precautions taken to preserve privacy and punishes deviation from
the proscribed level of diligence. This is not to say that this analysis
overlooks the implications of search doctrine on minorities. As noted
by many scholars, the “huge economic disparities that persist between
the races” play a major role in the continued segregation of minority
330
groups to poor, urban, high-crime areas.
Professor Amy Ronner
326

Ronner, supra note 64, at 423.
Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 947, 968
(2002). Professor Carbado argues that a colorblind doctrine that takes note of race
only when a police officer is engaging in obvious racist behavior “obscures . . . the
racial allocation of the burdens and benefits of the Fourth Amendment. The
material result of this racial allocation is that people of color are burdened more by,
and benefit less from, the Fourth Amendment than whites.” Id. at 96869.
328
Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 391, 404 (2003).
329
See generally Carbado, supra note 327, at 969; Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping
the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999); Tracey
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998) [hereinafter
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment] (discussing the history and present state of
race-based policing and the disproportionate impact on African Americans of
discretionary, pretextual seizures); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain
a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983).
330
David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 678 (1994); see also, e.g., Ronner, supra note 64, at
386 (“African Americans and Hispanics tend to populate poor, inner city
neighborhoods, which are commonly known to be high crime areas.”); David A.
Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower
Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 100001 (1998) (“Those
who live in high crime areas will likely be poor and members of minority groups.”);
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 328 (1997) (noting the disproportionate focus of
327
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observes:
[t]he insidious effect of such segregation is that the police
are able to direct inordinate law enforcement efforts at
blacks in the urban core.
Also, police officers
disproportionally stop, detain, and arrest African
Americans. They do this without probable cause and
331
without articulable suspicion.
Just as minorities are more vulnerable to being stopped by
police, so, too, are people with few financial resources more
vulnerable to government surveillance that falls outside the scope of
the Fourth Amendment, requiring no justification at all on the part
332
of the police. The current definition of a search, as outlined above,
requiring of individuals that the measures taken to preserve privacy
be virtually insurmountable before police surveillance will be deemed
a search, put the poor at a great disadvantage relative to the
government and to those with greater resources.
In other words, one’s constitutional privacy is limited by
one’s actual privacy. . . . [which] leads to the conclusion
that Fourth Amendment protection varies depending on
the extent to which one can afford accoutrements of wealth
such as a freestanding home, fences, lawns, heavy curtains,
and vision- and sound-proof doors and walls. . . . As a result,
police on minority suspects because “minority neighborhoods tend to be poorer and
more crime-ridden”).
331
Ronner, supra note 64, at 38687. Professor Ronner illuminates the repressed
racism inherent in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), discussing how the Court, in
permitting stops based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, acknowledged,
then dismissed, the very real potential of “wholesale harassment” of members of
minority communities, something, the Court stated, the exclusionary rule was
impotent to prevent or address. Id. at 40607 (quoting Terry, 319 U.S. at 14). While
Terry “laid the foundation for a racist Fourth Amendment,” the Court “installed the
roof” thirty years later in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (upholding a seizure
based on unprovoked flight in a high-crime area). Ronner, supra note 64, at 405.
According to Professor Ronner, each of the criteria used by the Court to establish
reasonable suspicion in Wardlow targets minorities, in that simple presence in their
own community becomes grounds for suspicion (notwithstanding that presence in a
non-minority community may also be grounds for suspicion), as does the natural
response of flight from police, based on a “well-founded and historically ingrained
fear and distrust of law enforcement” (making flight not quite so “unprovoked” as
the Court would have us believe), resulting in a “Fourth Amendment [that] cannot
serve the very class of people that needs it the most.” Id. at 41323. Professor Tracey
Maclin finds it “startling that the Court would ignore racial concerns when
formulating constitutional rules that control police discretion to search and seize
persons on the street.” Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 329, at 340;
see also Carbado, supra note 327, at 96567 (arguing that the Court either ignores or
constructs race in order to reach desired doctrinal outcomes in particular cases).
332
Slobogin, supra note 328, at 400.
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people who live in public spaces (for instance, the homeless
who reside in boxes) and people who have difficulty hiding
or distancing their living space from casual observers (for
instance, those who live in tenements and other crowded
areas) are much more likely to experience unregulated
333
government intrusions.
If Mr. Ciraolo, with his doubly-fenced yard (complete with swimming
pool and sunning deck) did not do enough to earn the protection of
the Fourth Amendment, how likely is it that the urban poor will be
able to do so?
The incongruence between current Fourth Amendment
doctrine, with its focus on privacy and precautions, and the reality of
daily life for so many of our citizens becomes all the more evident
when one considers the following eloquent passage, which, written
and delivered by Professor Anthony Amsterdam over thirty years ago,
still resonates today:
[The framers] did not know the miles on miles of tiny
boxes in which millions of our people live, driven to the
streets with all the desperation of a prisoner escaping and
then dogged down endless, agitated corridors of windows
till the human soul cries out for someplace it can breathe
and not be stared at. They did not know the vast, stinking
slums of Harlem summers where the people boil like eggs if
every door and window is not opened, and where to be
young and black and take to the streets is to be hassled by
334
the cops.
It seems that, like the Framers, Supreme Court Justices also
cannot contemplate the conditions described above and experienced
335
by so many of our citizens.
When privacy is the ultimate interest
protected by the Fourth Amendment’s ban against unreasonable
333

Id. at 401.
Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 401.
335
For example, as noted by Professor Heffernan, supra note 84, at 8586, when
deciding that overnight guests in homes are entitled to claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches, the Justices were able to see
themselves as guests in an invaded home: “We stay in others’ homes when we travel to
a strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our parents, children, or more
distant relatives out of town . . . . We will all be hosts and we will all be guests many
times in our lives.” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1989) (emphasis added).
However, in concluding that a mobile home was more like an automobile than a
home, for purposes of qualifying for the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, “we,” the Justices were nowhere to be found.
Heffernan, supra note 84, at 8586 (discussing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386
(1985)).
334
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searches, and at the same time privacy is also the yardstick by which
the existence of Fourth Amendment protection is measured, the
middle-class homeowner will be better situated than his counterpart
living in the tenement: the former can shut his outer doors and
retreat into his home to enjoy his solitude and refuge from the
outside world.
But if you live in a cheap hotel or in a ghetto flat, your
neighbors can hear you breathing quietly even in temperate
weather when it is possible to keep the windows and the
doors closed. For the tenement dweller, the difference
between observation by neighbors and visitors who
ordinarily use the common hallways and observation by
policemen who come into the hallways to “check up” or
“look around” is the difference between all the privacy that
his condition allows and none. Is that small difference too
336
unimportant to claim Fourth Amendment protection?
Thus, requiring a high level of actual privacy before one is entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection further diminishes what little privacy
is afforded to those living in conditions of poverty.
Perhaps, as suggested by Professor Yale Kamisar, “few of us have
ever seen or thought much about the plight of an individual who is
337
If we care
being searched illegally in a poor neighborhood . . . .”
about equality, and if we, as a people, believe the guarantees of the
constitution should apply to one and all, regardless of the ability to
purchase those guarantees, we must care about the very different
Fourth Amendment experienced by minorities and the poor.
The reader has already seen this before, of course—a system
under which individuals are in effect held responsible for the
circumstances thrust upon them or for the consequences of
exercising some small bit of personal freedom or autonomy. Recall,
in the traditional rape context, how the prevailing attitude was one
that punished women for engaging in consensual sexual activity or
336

Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 404.
Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 43 (1995) (comparing the seeming indifference to unfair
search practices with the enthusiastic public reception of the Court’s decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is a fundamental right, and that as such, indigent defendants are entitled
to appointed counsel)). Professor Kamisar mentions another possible explanation
for such disparate public reactions: “Too many people . . . are roused by any violation
of ‘the symbol of a ceremonial trial,’ but ‘left unmoved by an ordinary
nonceremonial injustice.’” Kamisar, supra, at 44 (quoting THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 142 (Harbinger ed., Harcourt, Brace & World 1962)).
337
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even for placing themselves in risky situations where they might be
victimized. Recall how, according to feminists, the law and practice
of rape kept women at home and under control, existing “in a
condition of terror” and relying on protection from the very group
338
they needed protecting from.
Similarly, current search doctrine
punishes individuals for stepping outside their homes (or failing to
adequately secure them) or for interacting with others, making all of
us truly “secure” only behind bolted doors and drawn window shades
and in nearly complete solitude. And, especially in poor, urban
areas, the police take on the dual role of protector and predator as a
339
means of social control.
Further, if rape victims found themselves, rather than their
attackers, to be effectively on trial in a rape prosecution,
experiencing all the distrust and disapproval inuring to criminal
defendants generally, how much greater the disadvantage must be to
most victims of police surveillance who seek to claim a Fourth
Amendment violation before a court, who find themselves not only
effectively, but actually, on trial as criminal defendants. Search
doctrine is almost exclusively driven by the Court’s response to
defendants’ claims of violations, with those claims arising, generally,
only because something incriminating was found.
In other words, the champions of our Fourth Amendment rights
are often factually guilty, and the Court’s hesitation to reverse
convictions and deprive the State of valuable evidence may well be
the true motivation behind the government-friendly doctrine that has
developed. However, such a narrow focus on the immediate
consequences of a decision bearing on the constitutionality of a
police investigative practice misses the larger picture and makes us all
338

See supra notes 20820 and accompanying text.
Professor Ross notes that “there is a culture of masculinity within police
departments that places ‘an emphasis on demonstrating the aggressive demeanor
known as command presence. . . . A corollary of that attitude is that police officers
feel the need to punish disrespect.’” Ross, supra note 3, at 26 (quoting Frank Rude
Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training
(Suffolk Univ. L. Sch. Research Paper No. 08-23, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1257183). The Court, in Terry v. Ohio, also recognized
aggressive policing as a source of friction between law enforcement and minority
communities, noting that “[t]his is particularly true in situations where the ‘stop and
frisk’ of youths or minority group members is ‘motivated by the officers’ perceived
need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes
accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of
the streets.’” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1415 n.11 (1967) (quoting PRESIDENT’S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967)).
339
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340

more vulnerable and less secure.
Whether fueled by animus
towards the exclusionary rule and a reluctance to overturn
convictions or by a categorical preference for the interests of law
enforcement, an overwhelming number of the Court’s Fourth
341
Amendment decisions have favored the government.
Professor Tracey Maclin describes the Court’s post-Katz
jurisprudence as abandoning that case’s “individualistic, protectionoriented approach” in favor of an approach weighing individual
interests of freedom from government intrusions against the
government’s interest in law enforcement, with the Court’s balancing
approach eventually morphing into a “‘police perspective’
342
approach.” In determining whether individuals possess a legitimate
or reasonable expectation of privacy, then, the Court adopts the
perspective of the “government agent seeking to destroy that
privacy. . . . In effect, the Court has adopted the outlook of the fox in
343
defining the rules that will govern the henhouse.” This, of course,
turns the Fourth Amendment on its head and destroys the intent of
Katz, in so much as that case reflected an understanding of the
Fourth Amendment as a provision meant to protect the citizenry
against the excesses and arbitrary exercise of official power, and not a
provision meant to aid the government in the enforcement of its
344
laws.
A Court wishing to craft a government-friendly Fourth
Amendment doctrine has three tools at its disposal: it can recognize
police activity as implicating the Fourth Amendment, but determine
it to be reasonable; it can acknowledge a Fourth Amendment
violation but uphold convictions obtained with illegally obtained
evidence by limiting the reach of the exclusionary remedy; or it can
simply hold that the police conduct at issue simply does not trigger
the Fourth Amendment at all. This Article, of course, is concerned
with the third method of ensuring a favorable Fourth Amendment
landscape for law enforcement.
However, all three doctrinal
340

See Maclin, Government Perspective, supra note 95, at 66970 (“[T]he Court is
often unable (or unwilling) to appreciate the implications of its rulings for persons
not immediately involved in the cases before it . . . whenever the Court upholds a
challenged police practice against an obviously guilty individual, the Court is also
licensing similar intrusions against not-so-obviously innocent persons as well.”).
341
Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 257 (1984).
342
Maclin, Government Perspective, supra note 95, at 66970.
343
Id. at 67475.
344
See id. at 67778.
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approaches achieve the same practical result for the government:
broad access to individuals despite the Amendment’s purpose to limit
such access. The reader may recall that rape law scholars described
traditional rape law in similar terms: despite the offense of rape
purporting to limit men’s access to women, the law, as construed,
345
accomplished quite the opposite.
The reader should also here recall the Article’s discussion, in
Part III.B, of some of the broader concerns that fueled the reforms
achieved in the law of rape. Rape reformers sought to address the
imbalance of power that skewed doctrine in favor of men as the
advantaged group, and which resulted in a law that did little to
improve male behavior and much to burden women both in their
individual and collective capacities. While male sexual autonomy was
valued and promoted, the autonomy of women was not only
discouraged but, in effect, punished. The same broad criticisms are
mirrored in Fourth Amendment search doctrine. The Court’s
jurisprudence promotes, and thus enhances, the imbalance of power
between government and individual, resulting in search law that
provides law enforcement expansive investigatory freedom
(autonomy) with little or no restrictions on its behavior. Not only do
the victims of intrusive police surveillance find themselves at a severe
individual disadvantage, but entire groups of citizens are
disproportionately burdened, namely minorities and the poor.
Individual autonomy, as in the rape context, is discouraged and
punished, and victims are blamed for their failure to secure
themselves against intrusion if they have in any way placed themselves
at risk. Thus the broader goals of rape reformers—to promote
equality by addressing the imbalance of power, to improve behavior,
and to promote autonomy—are applicable to this context as well.
The next section completes the analogy between these two areas of
law by turning again to the specific reforms achieved in and proposed
to the law of rape as they inform the pursuit of the above-mentioned
goals in the law of searches.
C. Search Law Tomorrow: What We Can Learn from Rape Reform
1.

Abolishing the Utmost Resistance Requirement

One of the most significant reforms (and victories) achieved by
rape reformers was the abolition of the utmost resistance
requirement. A parallel change in the law of searches is warranted
345

See supra text accompanying notes 189190.
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and adequately supported by Katz.
The Fourth Amendment
described above, with what effectively amounts to an utmost
346
resistance requirement, excludes too many from its protective
reach. While Katz does not, in this author’s view, require an abolition
of any resistance requirement, it can be understood to support a
requirement of reasonable resistance. After all, Mr. Katz did resist the
aural intrusion perpetrated on him by “occup[ying] [the phone
347
booth], shut[ting] the door behind him, and pay[ing] the toll . . . .”
Further, the Katz majority’s mention of what one “seeks to preserve as
348
private” implies some action on the part of the individual to
exclude others.
The question of how much is required of individuals can and
should be understood in terms of reasonableness, as described in
various formulations of the reasonable resistance requirement in
rape law, with resistance serving two functions: to demonstrate that
the force used by police to overcome that resistance is sufficient force
to constitute a Fourth Amendment search and to demonstrate the
victim’s nonconsent. In the rape context, the Missouri Court of
Appeals, for example, engaged in a totality-of-circumstances analysis,
taking into account the ages of victim and perpetrator, any relative
advantage the perpetrator could exploit, and the setting of the
349
attack.
In other words, the force used by the perpetrator was
measured not by an ideal standard of utmost resistance, but by the
more realistic standard of the victim’s capabilities and ability to resist
under the circumstances. As for the second function of resistance,
serving as a demonstration of nonconsent, reasonable resistance has
been defined as what was reasonably needed to inform the
perpetrator of the victim’s lack of consent, without requiring the
victim to resist to the utmost before the perpetrator would be
350
obligated to take her “no” seriously.
Similarly, police surveillance
should be deemed a search when police overcome reasonable
measures taken by the victim to maintain privacy, basing a finding of
reasonableness on a realistic assessment of a given victim’s capability
to resist the police and not requiring of the victim more than
practicably or economically possible, taking into account the
imbalance of strength and power between government and victim.
346
347
348
349
350

See supra text accompanying notes 289299.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
Id. at 351.
See State v. Kilmartin, 904 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
See, e.g., DEL. CRIM. CODE § 761(j)(1) (2011).
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Finally, traditional rape law evolved to recognize as rape when
the perpetrator, through deception, intoxicants, threats, or other
means, prevented resistance by the victim. In the search context,
deception and secrecy are police tools of the trade. Obviously, true
consent searches aside, police would acquire considerably less
information if they announced their surveillance to suspects. This
surreptitious nature of surveillance is troubling, however, when the
definition of a search requires such vigorous resistance on the part of
the victim, as most often the victim has no idea that extraordinary
precautions are even needed.
Of particular concern is the use of undercover agents and
informants, described by Professor Albert Alschuler as a “dark corner
351
of law enforcement that is all but immune from judicial control,”
whereby police, whether by posing as drug buyers or meter readers,
or worse yet, by manipulating relationships (either artificially creating
new or maliciously destroying existing friendships) deceive
individuals into permitting access into their homes and lives. As far
as the use of “false friends,” the Court justifies this unregulated form
of surveillance on the theory that the target has assumed the risk that
her relationships might not be as she believes them to be.
Pointing out again the de facto resistance requirement
permeating the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, what if the
government does more than deceive the victim into letting her guard
down, and takes affirmative steps to thwart the victim’s ability to
resist? In 1994, to accommodate the FBI’s concern over new
telephone technologies that would hamper the government’s ability
to listen in on our conversations, Congress enacted the
352
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).
Professor Lee Tien offers the following description:
CALEA in effect mandates that telecommunications be
designed to facilitate government surveillance . . . . Under
CALEA, “carriers must take steps to ensure that the broad
technological trends in the industry do not eliminate law
enforcement access to communications of targeted
individuals” . . . . For instance, carriers subject to CALEA
cannot provide carrier-based encryption services without
assuring that law enforcement can decrypt the
351

Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 1, 38 (1983).
352
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. L. No.
103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as 47 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1010 (2000) and in
portions throughout Title 18).
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353

communications.
With such measures implemented to facilitate governmental
intrusion into our communications, the government is having its cake
and eating it, too. As long as the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy depends on the victim’s precautions to maintain that privacy
(precautions, as we have seen, that must be all but impervious to
penetration), the government effectively destroys any reasonable
expectation by rendering resistance impossible. Making matters even
worse, victims are lulled into a false sense of security in their
communications because they may believe that they have in fact taken
precautions (or that such precautions are already in place), and that
their conversations are protected from outside interference.
This very real method of eliminating reasonable expectations of
privacy is far more dangerous to personal security than the
hypothetical posed by Justice Blackmun in his opinion for the Court
in Smith v. Maryland, contemplating the Government’s sudden
announcement, on “nationwide television that all homes henceforth
would be subject to warrantless entry,” which would, naturally,
eviscerate any “actual expectation of privacy regarding [our] homes,
354
papers, and effects.”
In Justice Blackmun’s totalitarian world, at
least, citizens would be on notice of the government’s surveillance
355
activities, and could prepare accordingly. For purposes of defining
the search, then, resistance should not be required where the
government has taken affirmative steps to preclude the possibility of
such resistance, any more than resistance is expected from the victim
of date rape when she has unknowingly been given an intoxicant that
renders her incapable of resisting.

353

Lee Tien, Doors, Envelopes, and Encryption: The Uncertain Role of Precautions in
Fourth Amendment Law, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 873, 905 (2005) (quoting James X.
Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws
to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 90 (1997) (arguing that the government
should not be constitutionally permitted to secretly interfere with the ability to take
precautions against surveillance)).
354
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 n.5 (1979).
355
See also Tien, supra note 353, at 888 (“[W]e are unlikely to take precautions if
we are not aware that our privacy is threatened. If the government installs highly
conspicuous video surveillance cameras in some public places, people who do not
like to be photographed might avoid those places. They would have no reason to
avoid those places if the cameras were hidden.”).
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Recalibrating Force and Nonconsent

Many of the advances in rape law were driven by the twin goals
of improving male behavior and promoting women’s autonomy.
Recast in Fourth Amendment terms, these goals resonate with those
urging change in criminal procedure doctrine as well and are
consistent with the purpose of that Amendment (and others): to
cabin official power and promote individual liberty and freedom.
However, the Court’s deference to the needs of law enforcement over
individual interests has fostered the opposite result, and the
government’s ability to intrude upon its citizens, often with no
justification whatsoever, has been greatly augmented. Numerous
scholars have reached the conclusion that the Court’s privacycentered approach has failed to deliver the “security” promised to the
356
“people.”
What does it mean to be secure? Professor Thomas Clancy, for
example, answers that question by equating the right to be secure
357
with the right to exclude. Moreover, the right to exclude does not
require justification based on the pursuit of other aims, although the
assertion of that right may be motivated by a desire to enjoy property,
to maintain privacy, to preserve dignity, or even simply to express
358
anti-government sentiment.
The Fourth Amendment right to be
secure may also be understood as an interest in exercising some level
of control over one’s person, house, papers, and effects—in other
words, as the right to autonomy and self-determination.
What of property and privacy, respectively representing the preKatz and post-Katz regimes, as the primary measures of the Fourth
Amendment’s scope? Professor Halliburton proposes that the Fourth
Amendment be reunited with its property-based roots, but urges that
356

See generally Clancy, supra note 83, at 307–08 (“Only by understanding the
meaning of the term ‘secure’ is it possible to determine the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections . . . .”); Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz, supra note 76,
at 814 (arguing for a reinvigorated view of “property of personhood” to replace
privacy as the primary interest protected by the Fourth Amendment); William J.
Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016
(1995) (arguing that criminal procedure should focus less on privacy and more on
police coercion); Tomkovicz, supra note 79 (promoting an instrumental view of
Fourth Amendment privacy).
357
Clancy, supra note 83, at 308–09. Professor Clancy identifies property, privacy,
and security as the three “possible candidates” for delineating the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection, arguing that property and privacy have proved inadequate
measures of the Amendment’s protection, and that security, as the right to exclude,
is the interest best suited to the task. See id.
358
Id. at 309.
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property be broadly understood in terms of its connection to and
359
enrichment of personhood. Professor Halliburton draws upon the
work of Professor Margaret Radin in exploring the “relationship
between the law of property and what she calls the ‘personhood
perspective’ . . . . The core ‘premise underlying the personhood
perspective is that to achieve proper self development—to be a
person—an individual needs some control over resources in the
360
external environment.’”
Professor James Tomkovicz, on the other hand, urges an
instrumental understanding of privacy as the core value to be
protected by the Fourth Amendment, which includes, but is not
limited to, a view of privacy as promoting secrecy for the sake of
361
secrecy alone.
An instrumental conception of privacy promotes a
great deal more than secrecy, and perhaps was given its most
eloquent and concise expression by Warren and Brandeis, who
362
described Fourth Amendment privacy as “the right to be let alone.”
When we are afforded privacy, or let alone, we are given the space
and freedom to constitute ourselves as individuals, and privacy can
realize its function “as a medium within which other rights and
363
interests can survive, even flourish.”
While confidentiality and
solitude at times provide the necessary shelter from the world in
which we can freely be ourselves, at other times, “a degree of openness
is essential to and integrally connected with the exercise and
359

Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz, supra note 76, at 851.
Id. at 852 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 957 (1982)).
361
Tomkovicz, supra note 79, at 648. The Court’s conception of privacy as
protecting only, or primarily, secrecy, not only has affected the substantive Fourth
Amendment right, but has also affected the availability of its primary remedy—
exclusion. The Court’s narrow conception of Fourth Amendment privacy is
evidenced by its reasoning that once privacy has been breached it cannot be
restored, and therefore, exclusion is not a personal constitutional remedy, but a
method of deterring future Fourth Amendment violations. See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (establishing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to ‘cure the invasion of
the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.’”) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to grand jury
proceedings) (“Th[e] wrong . . . is fully accomplished by the original search without
probable cause. . . . Questions based on illegally obtained evidence are only a
derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search and seizure. They work no
new Fourth Amendment wrong.”). Id.
362
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890).
363
Tomkovicz, supra note 79, at 667.
360
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364

enjoyment of constitutional rights.” Thus, current search doctrine,
which penalizes, by removing from the definition of a search, virtually
anything we share with others (even inadvertently), forces an
impermissible choice between constitutional protections: we exercise
associational and expressional freedoms at the cost of our Fourth
Amendment rights.
Whether the core interest to be protected by the Fourth
Amendment is identified as security, property-as-personhood,
instrumental privacy, autonomy, or simply the “right to be let alone,”
we can once again turn to rape law scholarship for insight. Professor
Schulhofer, in urging that autonomy, as something more than simply
freedom from violence, should become the focal point for reform,
identifies two dimensions of autonomy: physical autonomy, meaning
a right to bodily integrity, and moral or intellectual autonomy,
365
involving the capacity to express one’s personal preferences.
Understood this way, autonomy is as much about the “right to be let
alone” as it is about the right to choose not to be let alone, and to
define the scope of our involvement and interactions with others.
Therefore, any use of force that interferes with an individual’s
unconstrained choice with respect to her physical or intellectual
preferences is destructive to autonomy.
As for the dual requirement of force and nonconsent, while
many rape reformers advocate for the abolition of one or the other,
the two elements may not be so easily severable. Maintaining that a
search requires, as its elements, both the victim’s nonconsent and the
government’s use of force to overcome that nonconsent, the Court’s
conceptions of what constitutes sufficient force and what amounts to
consent or nonconsent must be reevaluated in light of a more
realistic account of social attitudes and norms.
Those rape law scholars advocating for the law to criminalize the
use of force to obtain intercourse without regard to the victim’s state
of mind criticize traditional victim-centered law on two grounds: (1)
they are troubled by the law’s almost exclusive focus on the victim’s
conduct and seek to shift attention to the perpetrator and his
364

Id. at 682. In advocating for an instrumental conception of privacy, Professor
Tomkovicz argues that the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test should be
abandoned in favor of an approach that examines not one’s expectations with
respect to privacy, but whether the individual claiming a search has a “legitimate
need[] for privacy.” Id. at 700 n.216. “In other words, a qualifying privacy need must
have a basis in the laws, principles, traditions, or customs of the American social
order . . . .” Id. at 700.
365
See Schulhofer, supra note 243, at 71.
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conduct, and (2) they are skeptical about the law’s reliance on
nonconsent as the touchstone of rape, when much behavior that is
construed as consent is obtained under conditions of physical,
366
economic, and political inequality.
Thus, rape victims are
essentially blamed for the violations of their person, and their
passivity, ambiguity, weak resistance, or acquiescence, even under
illegitimate pressures, is construed as consent.
The current definition of a search suffers from the same flaws:
the Court fixes its attention almost exclusively on the individual
claiming a violation when determining whether the victim enjoyed a
reasonable expectation of privacy. But this unilateral approach fails
to ascertain from what or whom the individual should expect privacy
and constructs privacy in a normative vacuum. In other words, the
part of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test that should give
normative content to what citizens have a right to expect from their
government is simply missing. This focus on the adequacy (or
inadequacy, as is most often the case) of the victim’s precautions
against the possibility of intrusion has resulted in what Professor
Heffernan describes as a “vigilance model of privacy, one that
requires people to be constantly alert to the way in which others can
367
intrude on their lives.” This model of privacy requires that people
remain on high alert to expect the worst from their fellow citizens
and, consequently, from the police. Under this model, a failure to
guard against having those low expectations met results in a
368
divestiture of Fourth Amendment protection.
Professor Heffernan argues that, instead, Fourth Amendment
privacy should be based on an “expectation of forbearance on the
part of others—that is, in an expectation that others will restrain their
curiosity with respect to those aspects of life that are essential to
369
defining and maintaining individual identity.”
A forbearance
model of privacy is imbued with a strong equality ideal, in that the
prevailing expectation is that others will not exploit vulnerability or
take advantage of relative positions of superior strength and
resources, allowing individuals some measure of personal security
regardless of their economic means. In the words of William Pitt to

366

See supra text accompanying notes 233234.
Heffernan, supra note 84, at 6.
368
Of course, living in a constant state of vigilance precludes us from
experiencing the security and ease that allow us the time and peace of mind to
engage in other more personally and socially valuable pursuits.
369
Id. See also Tien, supra note 353, at 884 (discussing social precautions).
367
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the House of Commons, words that still resonate today:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain
may enter; but the king of England may not enter; all his
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
370
tenement.
Pitt’s powerful words are really as much about affording even the
“poorest man” security in his home as they are about physical
trespass, although he could not have known when those words were
uttered that, over two hundred years later, police could (and would)
hover in helicopters over that tenement, their prying eyes entering
through cracks in the frail roof alongside the wind and rain. I join
Professor Heffernan in advocating that the Court adopt a
forbearance model of privacy, and in doing so, give meaningful
review to the means used by police to breach that privacy, because
when the Fourth Amendment is said to permit the government’s
violation of ordinary social and legal norms, none of us can claim the
371
security promised to us by that Amendment.
Turning to nonconsent, those rape law scholars, on the other
hand, who advocate for a definition of rape that focuses on the
victim’s consent or nonconsent, seek to elevate autonomy to a
372
position of primary importance in the movement for reform.
For
370

NELSON B. LASSON, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 49–50 (1937) (quoted in Heffernan, supra
note 84, at 14–15).
371
Professor Scott Sundby proposes that “government-citizen trust” should be an
animating principle in the formation of Fourth Amendment doctrine and values.
Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”‘s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1754 (1994). Under this view, which
is consistent with the forbearance model described above, citizens should be entitled
to trust that the government will refrain from abusing its power, as the government
should trust that its citizens are obeying the laws. Id. at 1777–78 (emphasizing the
importance of the trust being reciprocal). For Professor Sundby, where government
action is inconsistent with the assumption that citizens are acting lawfully, such
action should be deemed a search. Id. at 1791. This position is counter to the
Court’s current approach, which seems to permit the government to assume
individual wrongdoing, and subsequently allows governmental measures to verify
that assumption, while requiring the public to trust that the government will not
intrude unreasonably. Id. at 1811. I submit that the Court’s current model defining
searches is based on a vigilance model, under which police assume citizen
wrongdoing; and citizens, in order to gain Fourth Amendment protection, must also
assume that anyone, including government agents, may (and often do) resort to
unlawful or socially unacceptable means to violate privacy, and must protect
themselves accordingly.
372
See supra text accompanying note 235.
THE
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these scholars, an exclusive focus on force fails to take into account
non-forcible methods of violating bodily integrity, such as deception,
fraud, extortion, or other coercive abuses of power that interfere with
the victim’s meaningful choice.
Further, an autonomy-based
approach recognizes that autonomy involves more than a negative
interest in preventing unwanted intercourse, but also includes the
positive interest in permitting and engaging in desired intercourse.
If we now consider the word “intercourse” outside of its sexual
context, the preceding statement applies equally to an autonomybased conception of the Fourth Amendment.
Of course, in constructing its search doctrine, the Court does give
almost exclusive attention to the element of consent, but certainly
not with the aim of promoting individual autonomy. The Court,
rather, construes consent broadly, equating limited consent with
knowing exposure, and simultaneously undervalues or completely
disregards expressions of nonconsent.
Whether described as
instrumental privacy or security, the interest of autonomy, in both its
negative and positive aspects, and in both its physical and intellectual
capacities, should be given more prominence in defining the search.
And if autonomy is to be taken seriously, then consent must be
defined more narrowly and any expression of the victim’s nonconsent
must be given credit.
One more reform achieved on behalf of rape victims merits
particular attention for its applicability to the law of searches: the
enactment of “rape-shield” laws. Prior to the enactment of these
evidentiary provisions, rape victims were essentially put on trial, with
their past sexual history, their attire, and their sexual behavior
regularly paraded in front of juries to prove both propensity to lie
373
and propensity to engage in sexual intercourse.
Noting again the
positive expression of autonomy, permitting women to choose when
to engage in sexual activity, as well as when not to, rape-shield statutes
sought to prevent juries from punishing women who voluntarily
engaged in intercourse (or appeared as if they wanted to) by finding,
as a matter of fact, that a woman who would consent to one would
likely consent to all.
This reasoning is, of course, precisely the logic underlying the
Court’s treatment of voluntary disclosure to third parties as knowing
exposure to the public. As long as privacy-as-secrecy is treated as the
primary interest protected by the Fourth Amendment, the individual,

373

See supra text accompanying notes 173176.
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in disclosing information to anyone, has relinquished his privacy in
an absolute sense, and therefore has forfeited any reasonable
expectation of privacy. Again, a shift in focus to a broad autonomybased model of Fourth Amendment protection would respect and
permit an individual’s choice to share certain information in a
limited way (which, in today’s world, is often not really any choice at
all), without equating that choice with a complete forfeiture of
Fourth Amendment protection.
3.

A Balanced Approach to the Katz ReasonableExpectation-of-Privacy Test

Drawing from rape law and analogizing to Fourth Amendment
search law, this Article has identified the similar broad goals of
improving the behavior of those in power, encouraging autonomy of
the subjugated group, and promoting equality. The realization of
these goals in the context of defining a search can be assisted
through the adoption of parallel reforms—namely, expanding the
notion of force, narrowing the understanding of consent while
recognizing nonconsent expansively, and lowering the resistance
requirement to a reasonable level. This Article next turns to situating
these reforms within the framework provided by Katz v. United
374
States. Part II of the Article has presented support for this balanced,
conduct-oriented approach in the text of Katz, examining Justice
Harlan’s concurring opinion, from which the Court has derived the
current reasonable expectation of privacy definition of a search, in
conjunction with Justice Stewart’s opinion for the majority. A careful
reading of these opinions will demonstrate that the reforms
suggested above provide a model of defining the Fourth Amendment
search that is truer to the letter and spirit of Katz than the Court’s
current approach.
Justice Harlan’s definition of a search requires “first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
375
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
Thus, once a person has exhibited,
376
through physical or social cues, that he subjectively wishes to keep
374

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
376
See Tien, supra note 353, at 883–84. While physical precautions, such as
fences, doors, window blinds, and luggage, block visual or aural access to
information, social precautions entail reliance on the observance of social norms.
For example, when one enters a bathroom stall or changing room and closes the
door, one expects that others will not peep through cracks, or from above or below
375
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something private, the first prong of Justice Harlan’s test has been
met, whether or not those wishes are ultimately respected by the
police. Perhaps it was Justice Harlan’s use of the word “expectation”
that led the Court down an empirical (and quite cynical), rather than
normative, path in defining searches, leading to the conclusion,
based on rather low expectations of human behavior, that we cannot
reasonably expect much from anyone, let alone the police.
Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court, however, contemplates
377
“what [one] seeks to preserve as private,” without reference to any
expectation regarding his subjective intent. If our expectations,
however, are viewed from the perspective of the forbearance model
378
proposed by Professor Heffernan, then we can legitimately expect
that others will respect our wishes to keep certain aspects of our lives
private. On the other hand, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
379
the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”
Thus, the first prong of Justice Harlan’s formulation, based on Justice
Stewart’s language, is all about consent. By seeking to preserve
something as private and by exhibiting that subjective intent, an
individual demonstrates her nonconsent to physical or visual
penetration.
Knowing exposure, however, may be seen as
constituting affirmative consent, described in the rape context as
380
“affirmative and freely-given permission,” which can be expressed
through words or actions.
Although Justice Stewart used the word “knowingly” rather than
“intentionally” with respect to exposure to the public, knowing
exposure can be understood, in conjunction with its opposite state of
actively seeking to conceal, as the intentional failure to take any
381
precautions to conceal that which is known to be open to view.
the door, to observe what is commonly understood to be a private activity, even
though it is entirely possible (and easy) to do so. See id. The efficacy of social
precautions as creating legitimate expectations of privacy, of course, assumes a
forbearance model of privacy. See supra text accompanying note 369.
377
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
378
See supra text accompanying notes 369370.
379
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). Note that Justice Stewart talks about
knowingly exposing something to the public, and not the type of limited exposure to
third parties that the Court subsequently has equated with knowing exposure.
380
State in re M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 444 (1992).
381
At common law, the definition of “intent” included the mental state of
knowledge that the proscribed result was practically certain to occur. See DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, § 10.04. Therefore, there is support
for equating knowledge that exposure is a virtual certainty with intentional exposure.
While I may err on the side of a more protective definition of a search by equating
knowledge with intent with respect to exposure, the Court has erred in the opposite
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Borrowing once again from an affirmative consent model of rape, in
State of New Jersey in re M.T.S., the New Jersey Supreme Court defined
physical force as “any amount of force against another person in the
absence of what a reasonable person would believe to be affirmative
382
and freely-given permission . . . .” Similarly, this Article argues that
any measures taken by police in the face of the victim’s exhibited
nonconsent constitute force, thus avoiding the paradox identified by
Professor Estrich in her criticism of State v. Alston: that unwanted
penetration can be simultaneously against the will of the victim, and
383
yet not accomplished by force. On the other hand, what has been
knowingly or intentionally exposed to the public requires no force to
be seen, and the police are situated similarly to any member of the
public.
The second prong of Justice Harlan’s test is implicated when the
individual seeking privacy has indicated his intent through certain
cues and precautions, and the police have used force to overcome
those precautions. This Article proposes that this prong, under
which the reasonableness of privacy expectations is determined, be
infused with the normative values and judgments described above.
Once the victim of the surveillance has met the threshold of the first
prong, by exhibiting some desire to maintain privacy, courts should
realistically evaluate the adequacy of the precautions taken. To that
end, this Article advocates for a reasonable resistance approach, with
the reasonableness of one’s resistance or precautions, as well as the
reasonableness of the force used to defeat those precautions,
analyzed under the totality of the circumstances.
The circumstances examined would include an honest
assessment of the feasibility and availability, to that particular
individual, of additional or more effective precautions, not requiring
more resistance than realistically possible in her situation. Such a
fact-sensitive, case-by-case analysis may be more difficult to
administer, and may hamper the creation of bright-line categories of
searches and non-searches, but is nevertheless preferable to the onedirection, essentially equating knowledge with recklessness or negligence. See Colb,
supra note 84, at 122 (“[The Court] treats the risk of exposure to third-party
wrongdoing as tantamount to an invitation for that exposure . . . .”).
382
M.T.S., 129 N.J. at 444. Note that the New Jersey Supreme Court provided for
a reasonable mistake-of-fact defense, an approach that may be appropriate in the
search context as well, for it is difficult to maintain that police are acting improperly
if they in fact reasonably believe, from the circumstances, that the subject of the
search has consented. See id.
383
See Estrich, supra note 28, at 1111.
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size-fits-all approach the Court has adopted, especially when the “all”
are generally wealthy, white individuals who have greater access to
effective precautions and are less often the victims of police targeting
in the first place.
Any force, then, used to overcome what have been determined
to be reasonable precautions, would be a sufficient amount of force
to trigger Fourth Amendment protection, and the circumstances
taken into account when evaluating the use of force would certainly
include inquiry into police violations of social and legal norms, as
those norms are intimately tied to the precautions people generally
feel the need to take. An assessment of the reasonableness of force,
in its relationship to resistance, should also include a conception of
force as measures taken to prevent or nullify the efficacy of
resistance, including deception, coercion, or the use of certain
technology.
4.

Minnesota v. Carter: The Road Not Taken
384

Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Minnesota v. Carter
provides an example of the type of nuanced, fact-sensitive inquiry
that a balanced, conduct-oriented approach to defining a search
would entail, and demonstrates that courts are eminently capable of
385
conducting such an inquiry in this context.
Carter held that
defendants, who were observed by police through a gap in closed
window blinds, had no legitimate expectation of privacy or “standing”
to contest the search of the apartment in which they were bagging
cocaine because their only connection to the apartment was of a
“purely commercial nature” and they had spent only a short amount
386
of time therein. Justice Breyer concurred in the result, but not on
“standing” grounds. Rather, Justice Breyer determined that no
search had occurred, even had the defendant been the homeowner,
384

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (holding that defendants had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in an apartment they occupied for only a short
time, to engage in a purely commercial activity).
385
Indeed, courts regularly engage in totality of the circumstances analysis in a
variety of settings, including, for example, in determining whether an individual has
been seized, see, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“We
conclude that a person has been ‘seized’ . . . only if, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.”), and, of course, in deciding questions of voluntariness, see, e.g.,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (“In determining whether a
defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality
of all the surrounding circumstances . . . .”).
386
Carter, 525 U.S. at 91.
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based on an analysis of resistance and force such as this Article has
387
outlined.
Acting on a tip from an individual who, while walking past a
basement-level window, had observed a group of people bagging
cocaine in a garden apartment, Officer Thielen walked within twelve
to eighteen inches of the window in question and observed the
388
described criminal behavior through venetian blinds.
To Justice
Breyer, whether the blinds had holes or had been simply adjusted in
the wrong direction was irrelevant, because “[o]ne who lives in a
basement apartment that fronts a publicly traveled street, or similar
space, ordinarily understands the need for care lest a member of the
389
public simply direct his gaze downward.”
In other words, the
defendant did not exercise reasonable resistance under the
circumstances, and nothing more would have been required of him
390
than to take care that the blinds were correctly drawn.
It is also
relevant that the area from which the activities inside the apartment
were observed was not just a public thoroughfare, over which people
passed by quickly, but a grassy area where families congregated to
391
walk and play, and where people commonly stored bicycles, thus
increasing the risk of observation by the public. Thus, for Justice
Breyer, Officer Thielen observed no more than any member of the
public could have, and indeed, had already, observed.
If the defendant’s resistance was not sufficient, what of the force
used by Officer Thielen? Interestingly, the Minnesota Supreme
Court had reached the opposite conclusion, determining that
“Officer Thielen had engaged in unusual activity, that he ‘climbed
over some bushes, crouched down and placed his face 12 to 18 inches
from the window,’ and . . . saw into the apartment through ‘a small
392
gap’ in blinds that were drawn.”
Justice Breyer found that the
record did not support these factual assertions, and thus, did not take
393
note of these particular facts in making his determination. What is
most interesting, however, is that Justice Breyer implied that, had the
387

Id. at 103–06 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 103.
389
Id. at 105.
390
The first prong of Justice Harlan’s test would have been met, as by drawing the
blinds, even though not perfectly, the defendant did indicate a desire to maintain
privacy in the apartment, and cannot be said to have knowingly exposed his activities.
391
Carter, 525 U.S. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
392
Id. at 104–05 (Breyer, J., concurring).
393
Id. at 105 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I would not determine the constitutional
significance of factual assertions that the record denies.”).
388

SOREE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

224

1/9/2013 3:10 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:127

record permitted him to consider these facts, it may have made a
difference. Thus, Justice Breyer allowed for the possibility that, had
Officer Thielen climbed over hedges and crouched down, behavior
that is clearly contrary to social norms, rather than merely standing in
a common area and directing his gaze downward, this distinction may
394
In any case, Justice Breyer’s
have had constitutional significance.
opinion demonstrates that courts are capable of careful application
of specific facts, and indeed, he underscored “the importance of
395
factual nuance in this area of constitutional law . . . .”
V. CONCLUSION
This Article concludes by reiterating the value of exploring the
parallel between rape law and search law, and of applying the insights
of rape law reform to the law of searches. Space constraints do not
permit a thorough exploration of how the proposed changes to the
current definition of the Fourth Amendment search would affect
existing examples of search doctrine, other than to mention the
obviously likely result of the inclusion of more governmental
surveillance into the protective reach of the Amendment. The most
significant benefit of comparing these two seemingly unrelated areas
of law, however, may simply be to promote a shift in perception by
engaging the analogy provided by rape law reform. When police
surveillance is understood as an exertion of official power over a
victim to obtain information for use in “fortify[ing] the coercive
396
power of the state against the individual,” and the subjects of
surveillance are seen as potential victims of such exercise of power,
then the concerns, goals, and achievements of rape law reformers
illuminate the pursuit of balance, equality, dignity, and autonomy in
Fourth Amendment doctrine as well.
The time is ripe to advocate for significant change, as the Court,
397
even prior to its decision in United States v. Jones, has indicated its
394

The more unreasonable the measures undertaken by the police, the more
reasonable, by inverse proportion, the precautions exercised by the victim seem to
be. For example, if Officer Thielen indeed had to climb over bushes to reach an
area in which he could crouch in front of the window, then perhaps the drawn
blinds, even assuming a small gap, should be considered reasonable as a precaution,
as we do not regularly expect people to go through such lengths to look into our
homes.
In other words, there is a proportional relationship between the
reasonableness of precautions and the reasonableness of force used to overcome
those precautions.
395
Carter, 525 U.S. at 105 (Breyer, J., concurring).
396
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
397
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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willingness to reconsider some of the reasoning that has driven much
398
of its post-Katz jurisprudence. For example, in Bond v. United States,
the Court held that the exploratory squeeze of luggage placed in the
overhead compartment of a bus was a search, and that the defendant
passenger rightfully claimed a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his luggage so placed because “he does not expect that other
passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag
399
in an exploratory manner.”
The Court adopted a forbearance
model of defining a search, and recognized the legitimacy of the
defendant’s expectation despite the fact that he did not resist to the
utmost (he could have kept the luggage under his seat or on his lap),
and despite the fact that the police, while clearly violating social
norms, did not do anything more than another other passenger could
have done. Taking social norms into account both bolstered the
adequacy of precautions taken by the defendant, and supported a
400
finding of unreasonable force used to overcome those precautions.
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that the use of a thermal
imager to detect relative levels of heat escaping from a home
constituted a search, as the “Government use[d] a device that is not
in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would
401
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion . . . .”
As in Bond, the defendant in Kyllo did not take the most rigorous
precautions possible, as he could have insulated his home more
thoroughly to conceal the production of excessive heat in his home
402
to the outside world.
The Court’s reliance on the fact that the
technology used by the police in Kyllo was not in general public use is
significant because the Court signaled its understanding that when
police resort to extraordinary technological measures to invade
privacy, with such means being generally available only to police,
individuals fail to successfully resist the intrusion, both because
398

See Colb, supra note 84, at 160–84, for a thorough discussion of numerous
cases in which the Court has demonstrated ambivalence concerning the flaws
identified by Professor Colb, namely equating vulnerability to exposure with knowing
exposure, and equating limited exposure as exposure to the general public.
399
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000).
400
The Court also found significant that the squeeze of the luggage involved a
physical, rather than merely visual, inspection. Id. at 337. Of course, this rationale
for finding that the government conducted a Fourth Amendment search is entirely
consistent with the physical trespass reasoning of Jones with respect to the GPS placed
on the defendant’s vehicle. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
401
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001).
402
This fact is noted by Justice Stevens, in dissent. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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successful resistance is not feasible in light of the superior
technological capability of the police, and because people would not
be on notice of the need to resist. In Kyllo, then, the Court adopted a
reasonable-resistance approach and demonstrated a broader
understanding of force used by government.
Finally, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court held that the
drug testing of the urine of pregnant women, and dissemination of
the results to law enforcement for the purpose of forcing those
women testing positive into drug treatment, did not qualify as a
403
special needs search.
Because of the procedural posture of the
case, the Court did not resolve the question of whether the women
404
had consented to the searches.
By remanding on the issue of
consent, the majority seemed at least open to differentiating between
knowing exposure, which can be viewed as consent to all, and the
405
informed consent provided to few and limited to a specific purpose.
Thus, by implicitly holding that providing police with the results of
the urine testing without specific consent for that purpose
constituted a search, the Court indicated its willingness to consider
406
narrowing the scope of consent in the context of defining searches,
which is consistent with the goals of respecting and promoting
autonomy identified by rape law and search law scholars alike.
This Article urges criminal procedure scholars to look to the
development of current rape law for the insights that may promote
similar development in the law of Fourth Amendment searches. At
the very least, the specific reforms this Article has identified from
rape law and proposes should be considered in defining searches—
namely, adopting a reasonable (rather than utmost) resistance
requirement, emphasizing the conduct of police to delineate
reasonable expectations of privacy (rather than focusing solely on the
victim’s conduct), and narrowing the definition of consent—will
contribute to the important goals of improving government behavior,
promoting individual autonomy and liberty, and realizing the
aspiration of equality, both between government and citizen and
between wealthy and poor. Most importantly, however, a broader
definition of the Fourth Amendment search will ensure that a great

403

See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 67.
405
See id.
406
See id. This is precisely what Justice Sotomayor urges the Court to consider in
her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
404
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deal more of governmental surveillance will be subject to judicial
scrutiny, resulting in a Fourth Amendment that truly protects people,
407
and not police.

407

This is, of course, a reference to Justice Stewart’s famous declaration in Katz:
“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In closing, I wish to emphasize that a more inclusive definition
of a search will not necessarily result in complete inaccessibility of information to law
enforcement. By including more surveillance within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment, however, police will be required to comply with its substantive and
procedural requirements. What those requirements are, or, in other words, what
renders searches reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, is a separate, although
related, issue. For one approach to the question of balancing a more inclusive
definition of a search with law enforcement needs, see Christopher Slobogin, Peeping
Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1427–33 (2002) (arguing for a
proportionality principle in Fourth Amendment search doctrine, pursuant to which
the definition of a search would be expanded to include a great deal more of the
government surveillance activity that the current narrow definition excludes, but
adjusting the level of justification required for the search according to its level of
intrusiveness).

